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ARTICLE
MODELS FOR USE OF MEDIATION IN
E-DISCOVERY
By: Steven C. Bennett*
Many commentators and courts suggest that
cooperative approaches to e-discovery planning hold the
key to lower-cost, higher-quality e-discovery processes.1
Yet, admonitions to cooperate hardly suffice to motivate
self-interested parties.2 Some system to foster cooperation
*The author is a partner at Park Jensen Bennett LLP in New York. The
views expressed are solely those of the author, and should not be
attributed to the author’s firm or its clients.
1
See JAY E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
CIVIL DISCLOSURE: E-DISCOVERY AND RECORDS § 4.19 (3d. ed. 2013)
(noting that cooperative approaches represent a “significant attempt to
do something about the rapidly escalating costs of civil litigation”);
CAROLE BASRI & MARY MACK, EDISCOVERY FOR CORPORATE
COUNSEL, Foreword (2013) (noting “paradigm shift” in e-discovery
process, toward cooperation); Daniel B. Garrie & Edwin A. Machuca,
E-Discovery Mediation And The Art Of Keyword Search, 13 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 467, 472 (2012) (effective e-discovery requires
that “attorneys share their understanding of the case and the technology
with opposing counsel”); See also The Sedona Conference Cooperation
Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009); The Sedona
Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 361
(2009) (prisoner’s dilemma may break down where “actors involved
must repeatedly face the same or similar decisions” and each side
“must evaluate the risk of the other side responding with similar
conduct during a subsequent ‘round’”).
2
See Hon. David J. Waxse, Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?,
18 RICH J.L. & TECH. 8, 15 (2012) (despite Sedona Cooperation
Proclamation and “numerous [judicial] opinions,” it appears that
“cooperation is not being used enough”); Hon. Nora Barry Fischer &
Richard N. Lettieri, Creating the Criteria and the Process for Selection
of E-Discovery Special Masters in Federal Court, 58:2 THE FED.
LAWYER 36, 37 (2011) (where not addressed early, ESI issues “often

9
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beyond the parties themselves
system proposed as a means
cooperation involves the use of
outlines an array of mediation
used for that purpose.

appears essential.3 One
to promote e-discovery
mediation.4 This Article
techniques that could be

Mediation Alternatives
The term “mediation” encompasses a broad array of
processes5 and techniques.6 In general, mediation is meant
come up later in the proceedings, causing unnecessary delays and
expensive e-discovery motions”); Kathleen P. Browe, A Critique of the
Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REV.
751, 756 (1994) (lack of cooperation “backs up already overloaded trial
dockets,” affecting the “efficiency of the entire judicial process,” and
leading to “a decline in public respect for the legal profession”).
3
See generally Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69
B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989) (judges can do little about discovery
abuse when parties control the discovery process themselves); John
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics Of Cooperation,
Nuclear Deterrence And Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989).
4
See generally Steven C. Bennett, Mediation As A Means To
Improve E-Discovery Cooperation, 23:2 ALB. L. J. OF SCI. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2014).
5
See Kyle Beardsley, Using The Right Tool For the Job: Mediator
Leverage And Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN STATE J. L. & INT’L AFF.
57, 57-58 (2013) (noting that mediation may include functions such as
“mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in the negotiations,
shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement;” mediators must
“tailor the level of leverage” applied to “needs of the situation”). See
also Thomas Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living With ADR:
Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict
Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, Pepperdine Law Paper
No. 2013/16, www.ssrn.com (2013) (noting “diverse array” of dispute
resolution options, including mediation, mini-trial, fact-finding, courtannexed non-binding arbitration, and early neutral evaluation); Peter
Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The
Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV.
371 (2009) (noting “dozens” of dispute resolution processes, including
psycho-educational programs, collaborative law, mediation, judicially
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to facilitate communication, promote party-created
solutions, and help clarify issues—all with the assistance of
a neutral third party.7 Mediation as a set of tools may serve
a variety of goals and adapt to a variety of circumstances.8
What follows is a sampling of mediation-related
techniques, generally arrayed from least intrusive (and least
expensive), to more formal (and thus more resource and

moderated settlement conferences, and high conflict interventions);
Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 128 (2009) (suggesting
use of multiple processes for dispute resolution, with ability of parties
to “loop” back or forward, as necessary, to different systems).
6
See Susan Nauss Exon, The Effects That Mediator Styles Impose On
Neutrality And Impartiality Requirements Of Mediation, 42 U.S.F. L.
REV. 577, 578 (2008) (most agree that mediation involves “a neutral
and impartial third party who assists others in resolving a dispute,” but
mediation involves “varying styles, techniques, and orientations”);
Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan
Wilkenfeld, Mediation Style And Crisis Outcomes, 50 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 58, 69 (2006) (noting facilitation, formulation and manipulation
as among alternative “styles” of mediator activity).
7
See ABA, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Preamble,
AMERICANBAR.ORG
(2005),
available
at
www.americanbar,org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_r
esolution/model_standards_conduct_april2007.authcheckdam.pdf.
(mediation is “a process in which an impartial third party facilitates
communication and negotiation and promotes voluntary decisionmaking by the parties;” mediation “serves various purposes, including
providing the opportunity for parties to define and clarify issues,
understand different perspectives, identify interests, explore and assess
possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory agreements”).
8
See Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework For
Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 129-30 (2009)
(design of system depends on “goals,” which may include efficiency,
fairness, satisfaction and other factors); CATHY A. CONSTANTINO &
CHRISTINA SICKLES-MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS, 41 (1996) (system design requires consideration of whether
ADR is appropriate, choice of process appropriate to particular
problem, and making sure participants have necessary knowledge and
skill to use ADR system).

11
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time intensive).9 These techniques may also be arrayed on
a continuum from “facilitative” to “evaluative” in nature.10
(1)
Education: Despite the long period in which
the Internet, e-mail and other technologies have become
integrated into daily life, ignorance of best practices in ediscovery remains a problem for the legal profession.11
Technology savvy mediators can provide an education
function for counsel and parties, even without becoming

9

This is not to suggest that the spectrum of processes necessarily must
flow from “easiest” to “hardest” cases. Simple dispute resolution
techniques often work well in some of the most complicated disputes;
and the reverse is also true. See William Ury, Getting Disputes
Resolved: Designing Systems To Cut The Costs Of Conflict (1988)
(ease of dispute resolution depends on focus on interests, or rights, or
power—in ascending order—to determine degree of difficulty in
resolving dispute).
10
See Dwight Golann, Variations In Mediation: How—And Why—
Legal Mediators Change Styles In The Course Of A Case, 2000 J. OF
DISP. RESOL. 41, 44 (2000) (presenting “grid” of mediation practices,
from facilitative to evaluative). See also Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking In Mediation: The New Old Grid And The New New
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (noting various types
of mediation, including evaluative, facilitative and transformative
systems); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 7 (1996).
11
See Mikki Tomlinson, Attacking eDiscovery Ignorance In 2013,
(Nov.
29,
2012),
available
at
www.somansatech.com/2013/company/eng_news_view.php?idx.
(suggesting that poor cooperation efforts in e-discovery “oftentimes
boils down to eDiscovery ignorance”); John M. Barkett, The 7th
Circuit E-Discovery Pilot Project: What We Might Learn and Why It
Matters to Every Litigant in America, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION
NEWS
(Dec.
2011),
available
at
www.apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/mobile/docs/barket
t.december11.pdf (“Without better education, e-discovery may not be
managed fairly or frugally, and certainly not quickly.”).
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deeply involved in a matter.12 For example, a court might
establish a “hot-line” system with trained court staff or
volunteer mediators who are available to answer basic
questions about the court’s rules and expectations regarding
e-discovery and technology. The system might also
provide information about essential forms, such as
“clawback” agreements and confidentiality orders,13 and
12

See PATRICIA KUTZA, NEW SAN FRANCISCO FORUM PROMOTES EDISCOVERY MEDIATION
(Oct.
23,
2013),
available
at
www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202624724121?slreturn=20140224
132046 (mediators can serve as “an antidote for the lack of e-discovery
training in law schools”); DANIEL B. GARRIE & SALVATORE SCIBETTA,
WE NEED MEDIATION IN E-DISCOVERY (June 5, 2013), available at
www.law360.com/articles/445869/we-need-mediation-in-e-discovery
(mediator serves as “listener and translator;” to “translate the technical
underpinnings of each party’s systems into actionable discovery efforts
that both parties can comprehend”); Daniel B. Garrie & Edwin A.
Machuca, E-Discovery Mediation And The Art Of Keyword Search, 13
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 467, 469-70 (2012) (“technically
proficient” neutral may be required where parties and courts are
unfamiliar with “latest methods” of searching for and processing
electronic information); David Cohen & Claire Covington, EDiscovery: Liaisons Are Key to Discovery Success, INSIDE COUNSEL
(Aug. 7, 2012), www.insidecounsel.com/2012.com/2012/08/07/ediscovery-liasons-are-key-to-discovery-success (subject matter experts
necessary “given that most lawyers and judges have little training in the
technical issues surrounding ESI”); Hon. Nora Barry Fischer & Richard
N. Lettieri, Creating the Criteria and the Process for Selection of EDiscovery Special Masters in Federal Court, 58:2 THE FED. LAW. 36
(2011) (Rule 26(f) conferences have “generally remained ineffective
where counsel “lack the technical skill and experience necessary to
facilitate effective resolution” of ESI issues). See also Richard N.
Lettieri, WHAT IS E-MEDIATION, AND WHY MIGHT I WANT TO
RECOMMEND IT TO MY CLIENT?, (2010), available at
www.lettierilaw.com/documents/emediationseptember-2010Newsletter.pdf. (counsel “unfamiliar with ESI” may benefit from use of
mediator).
13
See Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, 28:3 FAM.
L.Q. 407, 415 (Fall 1994) (telephone hotline system can be used on
“on-demand” basis to provide information not available from
workshops and other public education). Similar systems are often set

13

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 341
information
regarding
court-connected
mediation
services.14 A courthouse “ombudsman” might provide
similar services.15
up as ethics hotlines. See Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics
Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 737 (2002)
(noting bar ethics committees that “field questions over the telephone,
including, in some cases, via an ‘ethics hotline’”). See also Kimberlee
K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer
Ethics for Effective Representation In A Non-Adversarial Approach To
Problem-Solving, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 950 (2001) (noting that
“nearly every bar association has a committee or program focused on
the civility of lawyers”).
14
See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients And Mediation, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1373 (1998) (“Many lawyers simply lack a
basic understanding of the mediation process, the premises and values
which drive it, and the creative outcomes which are possible.”).
15
Traditionally in European systems, ombudsman programs have
focused on government agencies, rather than courts. See Diana Douse,
MEDIATION
AND
OTHER
ALTERNATIVES
TO
COURT,
www.parliament.uk (June 6, 2013) (noting use of ombudsman as
“independent and impartial means of resolving certain disputes outside
the courts;” the ombudsman may deal with “complaints” regarding
“public bodies and private sector services”); Stephanie Smith & Janet
Martinez, An Analytic Framework For Dispute Systems Design, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1401, 1447 (2009) (ombudsman system
involves “[a] third party within an organization who deals with
conflicts on a confidential basis and gives disputants information on
how to resolve the problem at issue”). Courts in the U.S., however,
have begun to experiment with such programs. See Michele Bertran,
Judiciary Ombudsman: Solving Problems In The Courts, 29 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 2099, 2108 (2002) (New Jersey program offers public
information, including “educational literature, videos and a website,”
and citizen assistance, including “investigation and resolution of
complaints”); Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers,
JUDGES JNL. 8, 10 (Spr. 1994) (noting use of courthouse ombudsmen,
who “distribute self-help form packets,” and conduct workshops to give
instruction to groups of litigants). The mediation functions described
here generally fit the concept of an ombudsman. See Martin A. Frey,
Alternative Methods Of Dispute Resolution 5, 12 (2003) (“third party”
assistance in dispute resolution may include “ombuds” system; such a
system can help parties take “corrective action” before problems
become “much more difficult to address”); KARL SLAIKEU & RALPH

14
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(2)
Needs Assessment: Cases vary, and so do ediscovery problems; the capacity of parties and counsel to
resolve such problems varies as well. A system of
assessment—not of the merits of the dispute, or even of the
relative positions of the parties regarding e-discovery
matters—aimed at determining whether the parties are well
prepared to cooperate in the case,16 and identifying the
kinds of resources that would best serve the needs of the
parties, might be offered as a form of “triage.”17 A
HASSON, CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: HOW TO DESIGN A
SYSTEM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 94 (1998) (ombudsman provides a
“neutral, confidential, readily available resource (usually available in
person, by telephone, email, or some other direct means) to assist
parties in self-help, troubleshooting (via coaching), informal shuttle
diplomacy, and sometimes convening of the parties to help them select
from options such as informal mediation or other higher resources”);
Shirley A. Wiegand, A Just And Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation
With The Ombuds Model, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95 (1996)
(ombudsman system embodies mediation, with additional capabilities).
As a neutral third party, moreover, an ombudsman could help reinforce
a culture of civility within the e-discovery process. Cf. Michele
Bertran, Judiciary Ombudsman: Solving Problems In The Courts, 29
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 2099, 2103 (2002) (ombudsman investigations
may include questions of “discourteous behavior or incivility”).
16
See John M. Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Handling In
Courts And Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
81, 82 (2008) (“parties may not feel ready to settle, or even work
together, right away”); Phillip M. Armstrong, Why We Still Litigate, 8
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 379, 380-81 (2008) (noting that culture, ego,
emotion and other barriers may prevent parties from settling disputes
outside court proceedings); Craig A. McEwen, Employing The Law To
Increase The Use Of Mediation And To Encourage Direct And Early
Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 838 (1998)
(reviewing factors that may inhibit parties from using mediation early
in litigation process); Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a
Mediator for? Mediation’s “Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 7-12 (1996) (noting barriers to negotiation
that mediation can help manage).
17
See Salem, supra note 5, at 372 (suggesting the use of “triage,”
where the “most appropriate” form of ADR service can be identified

15
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mediator, for example, could help identify gaps in
knowledge that, if corrected, could lead to enhanced
cooperation18 and creative solutions.19 Such a system
might require interviews or could be conducted through a
written questionnaire, perhaps even an on-line service.20
The system might also focus on helping parties identify
reasonable timetables for discovery21 and help identify
cases with specific forms of e-discovery related case
management problems.22 The neutral might determine that
“on the front end” of a case, to reduce burden, provide more effective
services, and more efficiently use scarce court resources).
18
See Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding
Unprofessional Conduct in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983, 1002
(2008) (that stating discovery abuses often happen because “attorneys
do not understand the complex technologies involved,” and “acting out
of ignorance and fear, they do not cooperate”).
19
Garrie & Machuca, supra note 1, at 474 (neutral may assist where
parties have failed to “secur[e] legal counsel with the requisite
technological acumen”); See Mike Hamilton, E-Discovery Court Pilot
Programs: E-Discovery Templates That Legal Teams Should Utilize, E.
DISCOVERY BEAT (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.exterro.com/ediscovery-beat/2012/02/23/e-discovery-court-pilot-programs-ediscovery-templates-tht-legal-teams-should-utilize/ (stating that neutral
can “provide the necessary skill and expertise to help expedite the ediscovery process by quickly identifying practical and fair solutions”).
20
Bruce L. Mann, Smoothing Some Wrinkles In Online Dispute
Resolution, 17 Int’l J. of Law & Info. Tech., no. 1 at 83 (2009)
(introducing concept of “expert-peer online assessment” of disputes as
means to resolve conflicts). See Salem, supra note 5, at 380 (stating that
triage system would involve initial screening or interviews by neutral
who could help identify the service that will “best meet the needs” of
the parties).
21
See Stephen F. Gates, Ten Essential Elements Of An Effective
Dispute Resolution Program, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 397, 398 (2008)
(“Much of the cost of litigation is a function of cycle time from case
inception to final resolution, and all steps in the management process
should be focused on reducing this cycle time.”).
22
See Lande, supra note 16, at 91 (noting use of systems for “early
screening of cases” to provide “early warning of potential case
management problems, even before developing a scheduling order”)
(quotation omitted). Such a system might also operate through a

16
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no form of mediation would assist the parties in the case
and direct the parties to the normal court processes.23 As in
all mediation, the needs assessment recommendation would
be non-binding.24
(3)
Facilitating Discussion: A mediator who
concentrates on facilitating discussion between parties,25 as
opposed to evaluating a matter or helping parties structure a

“differential” case management system, helping to designate cases as
“expedited, standard, [or] complex,” for example, id. at 94. See also
Frank E. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases And Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading To A MediationCentered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2006) (proposing
framework for matching cases to ADR processes); Frank E.A. Sander
& Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting The Forum To The Fuss: A UserFriendly Guide To Selecting An ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49
(1994).
23
See William J. McLean, Beware Masters In E-Discovery, LAW.COM
(Aug.
21,
2008)
http://www.alm.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423953864
(noting
potential circumstances where “no amount of cajoling could stop the
tactical flood of discovery motions”). See also FAQ: How Do I Know
When To Use E-Mediation Versus A Special Master?, ACESIN.COM
(2011) http://www.acezin.com/index.php?q=node/115 (“if there is such
[a] breakdown in communication that the parties cannot even agree that
the sky is blue, then more likely the parties need a special master to act
as referee and ‘make the calls’”).
24
See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision Of Self-Determination In
Court-Connected
Mediation:
The
Inevitable
Price
Of
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (noting
importance of “self-determination” as central element of mediation).
25
See Exon, supra note 6, at 591 (explaining that facilitator
“encourages party attendance, facilitates communication, poses
questions to uncover the parties’ underlying needs and interests, helps
educate the parties by assisting them to understand the other’s needs
and interests, and otherwise attempts to provide a comfortable forum in
which the parties can develop their own creative solutions to a
problem”).

17
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resolution, can serve an important purpose.26 In the
discovery context, merely ensuring that parties
communicate about essential issues in a courteous manner
can aid the process.27 For example, a mediator whose role
in a conference consists of helping with scheduling the
conference and ensuring a professional tone in the
discussion might require very little preparation regarding
the substance of the dispute. 28 A mediator might also
encourage parties to bring together their technical

26

See Fischer, supra note 2, at 37 (suggesting use of “facilitator” to
lead discussions on ESI issues, where attorneys are unable or unwilling
to proceed with e-discovery conference).
27
See Daniel B. Garrie, Redefining The Discovery Terrain: The Need
For Mediation In E-Discovery, Part III, L & FORENSICS (Nov. 28,
2013) http://www.lawandforensics.com/redefining-discovery-terrainneed-mediation-e-discovery-3/ (function of mediator to “facilitate
cooperation” and “open” dialogue); Kutza, supra note 12 (stating that
mediators can “primarily work on getting the dialogue going,” versus
“shuttle diplomacy” of conventional settlement negotiations) (quoting
Michael Carbone).
28
See Ron Kilgard, Discovery Masters: When They Help—And When
They Don’t, ARIZ. ATT., Apr. 2004, at 30, 34 (Apr. 2004) (“the mere
fact of having to discuss these issues in person with the master present,
and not in angry faxes and e-mails written late at night, has a taming
effect on the lawyers”); Allison O. Skinner, The Role Of Mediation For
ESI Disputes, THE ALA. LAW, Nov. 20, at 425, 426, (Nov. 2009)
(“Often, discovery battles can result in an exchange of potentially
inflammatory correspondence that may be used as an exhibit to [a]
motion to compel or motion for protective order. . . . Mediating the ediscovery dispute allows the litigants to make proposals
confidentially.”). See also Angela Garcia, Dispute Resolution Without
Disputing: How The Interactional Organization Of Mediation
Hearings Minimizes Argument, 56 SOC. REV. 818 (1991) (noting that
mediation “constrains the presentation of accusations and denials” in
negotiation); Lande, supra note 16, at 92 (facilitator may help with
“reduction of partisan psychology; prevention of conflict escalation;
and creation of a mandatory event that overcomes logistical barriers to
negotiation”).
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personnel to address creative solutions to e-discovery
problems in a case.29
(4)
Structuring Negotiations: A mediator may
aid parties by bringing an agenda for discussion to the
process.30 In the e-discovery context, at the outset of a
29

See Kenneth J. Withers, E-Discovery In Commercial Litigation:
Finding A Way Out Of Purgatory, 2 J. CT. INNOV. 13, 22 (2009)
(suggesting that, “if you can get the IT people from both parties
together in a room, they will often solve problems that the lawyers
thought were insurmountable”); Mary Mack, Litigation Prenups, EDiscovery ADR And The Campaign For Proportionality,
METROPOLITAN
CORP.
COUNS.
(May
3,
2010)
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/weticles/12510/mary-macklitigation-prenups-e-discovery-adr-and-campaign-proport+ionality
(“There is a great advantage in having the ‘meet and confer’ take place
under the cloak of mediation. It keeps the discussion and the written
offers to compromise confidential. Mediation also provides a cloak of
confidentiality for the IT people. This makes it possible for the IT
people to talk more openly because they are not on the record.”); Peter
S. Vogel, E-Neutrals, E-Mediation And Special Masters: An
Introductory
Guide,
LEXOLOGY.COM
(July
2,
2012),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e5fcfc29-8666-40df92c0-9ef088102ecc (suggesting that mediator require parties to indicate
who will attend mediation sessions to provide “technical support”
concerning ESI issues). The mediator may also remind parties that all
mediation discussions are confidential; Allison Skinner & Peter Vogel,
E-Mediation Can Simplify E-Discovery Disputes, AM. LAW. (Sept. 23,
2013)
http://www.americanlawter,com/id=1202620012101/EMediation-Can-Simplify-E-DiscoveryDisputes?slreturn=201401214201708 (stating that mediators may work
with IT personnel to educate them about their role in the e-discovery
process, and use “confidential caucus” to communicate ideas, without
an inquiry being “misinterpreted as a weakness”).
30
See Allison O. Skinner, How To Prepare An E-Mediation Statement
For
Resolving
E-Discovery
Disputes,
(2009)
http://smuecommerce.gardere.com/allison%soskinner%20preparing%20for%20emediation%20discovery.prf
(using pre-mediation submissions,
mediator can identify “areas of mutuality” that can be “readily disposed
of,” so that parties may thereafter focus on solutions to “more
challenging issues”). One very simple task for a mediator would consist
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case, many basic issues (preservation of evidence, search
techniques, and privilege protection, to name a few)
constitute essential elements for negotiation.31 Yet, one
common phenomenon is the “drive by” Rule 26(f)
conference, where counsel “meet and confer” in name
only.32 A mediator might insist on discussion of all
essential topics33 with the aim of creating a comprehensive
of identifying immediate areas of agreement between the parties.
Indeed, online systems have been developed to facilitate these kinds of
basic agreements. See Noam Ebner, Bryan Hanson & Arthur
Pearlstein, ODR In North America, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 431, 447 (Mohamed S. Adbel Wahab, Ethan Katsh &
Daniel Rainey eds. 2012) (describing online system where parties
“inform the platform of their real preferences and priorities, beyond
what they are willing to share with the opposite party,” where software
can “conduct an analysis of the agreement to see if it maximizes each
party’s gains” and one can imagine adaptation of such processes to the
e-discovery field.)
31
See Robert A. Cole, E-Discovery Increases Possibility Of Mediated
Resolutions, DAILY BUS. REV. (Oct. 3, 2012) http://www.uwwadr.com/zgraph-content/uploads/2012/10/Bob-Cole.pdf (explaining that
outlining an agenda for conducting e-discovery mediation may include
crafting agreements on preservation and collection protocols, including
sampling and search techniques).
32
See Craig Ball, Musings On Meet And Confer, CRAIG D. BALL, P.C.
(2007) http://www.craigball.com/Musings_on_Meet_and_Confer.pdf
(noting phenomenon of “drive-by event with no substantive exchange
of information”); Michael Collyard, E-Discovery: Avoiding Drive By
“Meet & Confers,” INSIDE COUNSEL (Sept. 13, 2011)
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/09/13/e-discovery-avoiding-driveby-meet-confers? See also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY:
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULEs 15 (2009) (FJC study indicates that only
half of attorney respondents included discussion of ESI in Rule 26(f)
conferences, and only one in five court-ordered discovery plans
included provisions relating to ESI).
33
See Peter S. Vogel, The Role Of e-Mediation In Resolving ESI
Disputes, (Oct. 29, 2012) http://www.disputingblog.com/guest-postthe-role-of-e-mediation-in-resolving-esi-disputes-in-federal-court-
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e-discovery plan for the case.34 Where the parties have
otherwise agreed on the e-discovery schedule and plan, the
mediator might focus on more difficult issues, such as
creating a search term protocol.35 Parties might also agree
on a process for resolving future e-discovery disputes.36
(5)
Screening Motions: Litigants are generally
must certify that they have “met and conferred” in good
interview-with-allison-skinner/ (noting that “most meet and confers are
ineffective;” mediator may act with “court sanctioned checklist” of
issues to discuss); Ronald J. Hedges, The Sedona Conference Points
The Way Toward Control Of The Costs And Burden Of E-Discovery, 59
FED. LAW. 46, 47 (2012) (suggesting use of mediators and courtappointed experts to assist in “good faith” process of “meet and
confer”); Zachary Parkins, Electronic Discovery: Why The
Appointment Of Special Masters In All Large Electronic Discovery
Disputes Is Vital To The Process Of American Civil Justice, AM. J.
MEIDATION 97, 104 (2011) (suggesting role for mediator where parties
do not prepare for Rule 26(f) conference “in an effective way”).
34
See Allison O. Skinner, Alternative Dispute Resolution Expands Into
Pre-Trial Practice: An Introduction To The Role Of E-Neutrals, 13
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 113, 125 (2011) (arguing goal of
mediation to created a mediated e-discovery plan). See also, Skinner &
Peter Vogel, supra note 29 (typically, litigants would agree to emediation at the outset of a case, to develop a discovery plan; with the
mediator thereafter available to help “break any impasse that may
arise”); Robert Hilson, Neutrals May Ease Anxiety Over Florida’s New
E-Discovery Rules, ACEDS.ORG (Apr. 26, 2012) (neutrals can help
“shape discovery plans”) (quoting Lawrence Kolin, mediator); Peter S.
Vogel, Use E-Mediation And Special Masters In E-Discovery Matters,
LAW.COM (July 5, 2010) (“E-mediation is most effective when initiated
at the beginning of litigation, at the outset of discovery. . . . [I]f the
parties can agree to the initial [mediated e-discovery plan], this will
reduce the number of disputes presented to the trial court.”).
35
See Daniel B. Garrie & Siddartha Rao, Using Technology Experts
For Electronic Discovery, 38 LITIG. 13 (2012) (mediator can
“expedite” agreement on search terms, and avoid potential that parties
might later “complain” about terms used)
36
See Cole, supra note 31 at 10 (parties may “[c]reate a method for
resolving any disputes that may arise over the mediated plan”).
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faith before bringing discovery related motions.37 The
“meet and confer” obligation, however, may be as subject
to abuse as any other element of the e-discovery process.38
Thus, a mediator might help confirm that parties truly have
met their obligations to confer in good faith before seeking
court assistance.39 On more complicated, longer-lasting
matters, a more permanent system of referral to mediation
(akin to dispute resolution boards in construction matters)40
37

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (requiring party moving for protective
order to certify “good faith” effort to confer “in an effort to resolve the
dispute without court action”); FED. R. CIV P. 37(a) (requiring party
moving to compel to certify “good faith” effort to confer “in an effort
to obtain [disclosure] without court action.”).
38
See Nicola Faith Sharpe, Corporate Cooperation Through CostSharing, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 109, 134-35 (2009)
(suggesting that “meet-and-confer requirements will simply play out as
the rest of the game does,” unless “rules that support cooperation as a
favorable strategy” include “penalties” that counter a “strategy of
abuse”).
39
See Skinner, supra note 34, at 128. (“[A]n e-mediation conducted in
good faith demonstrates [that] the parties have met their Rule 26
obligations.”); Vogel, supra note 34 (mediator could “certify to the
court that the parties met and conferred in good faith on the enumerated
ESI issues”). See also Mack, supra note 29 (suggesting that court could
“direct all e-discovery disputes to e-mediation before involving the
judge,” which would permit a party to “explain in a setting without the
judge why the issue arose in the first place and what was being done to
rectify it”).
40
A dispute review board (which could be a single individual) would
aim to identify e-discovery problems as they arise and resolve them
before they escalate. See Peter Vogel, Use eMediation To Save Time
And Money, TEX. LAW. (Sept. 2, 2013) (suggesting that use of
mediation “as early in the case as possible” permits mediator to
“address eDiscovery matters when they first arise”). Constructionrelated dispute review boards serve similar purposes. See Ming-Lee
Chong & Heap-Yih Chong, Dispute Review Board: Concept And
Introduction To Developing Countries, 2 INTERSCI. MGMT. REV. 6, 6-7
(2010) (dispute resolution boards, first conceived in the 1950s, have
been implemented in virtually all construction areas); id. at 7 (board
typically created at outset of project, with periodic status meetings and
site visits; if conflicts arise, the board can provide “informal” opinions
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might be appropriate.41 Discussions with a mediator may
help sharpen the focus of the parties for presentation to the
court of any unresolved issues.42
(6)
Neutral Evaluation:
Traditionally, the
concept of mediation has not involved evaluation of
disputes, but rather facilitation of discussion to resolve
disputes.43 Increasingly, however, the notion of nonto help resolve disputes); Smith, supra note 5, at 167 (dispute
resolution board generally formed at start of construction project, and
“meets regularly to follow work progress and to provide guidance to
the parties on differences before they become disputes”). The purpose
of a dispute review board is to “[create] an atmosphere of trust and
cooperation,” James Denning, More Than An Underground Success, 63
CIV. ENG. 42 (1993), with the aim of preventing disputes from
escalating. See Colleen A. Libbey, Working Together While “Waltzing
In A Mine”: Successful Government Construction Contract Dispute
Resolution With Partnering And Dispute Review Boards, 15 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 825 (2000). See also Kathleen M.J. Harmon,
Effectiveness Of Dispute Review Boards, 129 J. OF CONSTRUCTION
ENG. & MGMT. 674, 676 (2003) (statistics suggesting high levels of
success with dispute review boards, resolving disputes before project
completion).
41
See Skinner, supra note 34, at 127 (parties may use mediator on
“issue-by-issue” basis, “as needed,” where mediator is “familiar with
pre-trial activities” in the case and able to address specific issues as
they arise).
42
See Losey, supra note 18, at 997 (cooperation means “refinement of
disputes and avoidance when possible;” some discovery disputes “may
still arise,” but “the issues presented for adjudication will be much
more focused and refined”); Hon. W. Royal Furgeson, Jr., Karl Bayer
& Elizabeth L. Graham, E-Discovery And The Use Of Special Masters,
DISPUTING BLOG (2011) (even if not all disputes are resolved,
mediation process “provides parties with a better understanding of the
key disputes which must be presented to the court”); Skinner, supra
note 28, at 425 (even if not all conflicts are resolved, mediation permits
parties to “illuminate the key disputes to be presented to the court,”
without “inflammatory” communications).
43
See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation
Is An Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996);
Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
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binding evaluations as a part of mediation44 has taken
hold.45 The neutral evaluation process generally involves
each side in litigation presenting a summary of its position,
with the neutral evaluator offering an evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case.46 Such an
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997) (analyzing why
evaluations do not comport with mediator’s essential role).
44
Some commentators suggest that some degree of evaluation is
inherent in the mediation process. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying
Real Dichotomies Underlying The False Dichotomy: Twenty-First
Century Mediation In An Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 371,
377 (2000) (noting “continuum,” from facilitative to evaluative, for
forms of mediation, based on “key determinants” of the needs of the
parties, based on their past and current relations, and other factors.);
Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate In Mediation:
Applying The Lens Of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV.
155, 157 (1998) (“much of what goes by the name of mediation today
involves some evaluative activity by the mediator; to construct a
definition that excludes most of what the practitioner and lay
communities understand to be mediation would spawn needless
confusion”).
45
See Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical For
Mediators To Evaluate Or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 675 (1997)
(suggesting that “mediator evaluation can assist the parties in their selfdetermination efforts”); Benjamin F. Tennille, Lee Applebaum & Anne
Tucker Nees, Getting To Yes In Specialized Courts: The Unique Role
Of ADR In Business Court Cases, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 35, 48
(2010) (mediation may combine “evaluative and facilitative practices to
get the best results”); Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 5, at 44
(noting that, in “lawyered” cases, a mode of mediation where “sooner
or later, there is some kind of evaluation by a mediator with [a]
background as a legal advocate or judge—predominates”).
46
See Daniel B. Garrie, supra note 27, part II (mediator may help
“educate each party about the reality of their demands”); Smith &
Martinez, supra note 5, at 166 (neutral case evaluation generally
involves a lawyer who “provides an advisory opinion to the parties as
to their respective case strengths, weaknesses, and value”); Brian
Jarren, The Future Of Mediation: A Sociological Perspective, 2009 J.
OF DISPUTE RESOL. 49, 50 (2009) (mediator can serve as “agent of
reality” when parties reach impasse); Frey, supra note 15, at 12 (neutral
evaluation “provides the parties and their attorneys with the opportunity
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evaluation may lead to resolution of the conflict or may
simply assist with case planning47 (helping the parties
understand the nature of the issues, for example).48
(7)
Mediator Facilitated Search: In some
49
instances, parties and counsel might agree to permit a
mediator with substantial technology skills to conduct or
supervise a search for responsive records.50 The mediator’s
recommendations regarding production of materials to
opposing parties, however, would not bind the producing

to visualize the case from a third party’s perspective;” by having
“preview of what might happen,” parties achieve a “clearer
understanding” of settlement issues).
47
See Gates, supra note 21, at 400 (evaluator may be “very helpful in
eliminating the ‘emotional attachment’ that a party may develop in its
case and lead to serious negotiations”); Julie Macfarlane, Culture
Change? A Tale Of Two Cities And Mandatory Court-Connected
Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 266 (2002) (mediator may
provide parties with “reality check,” useful in negotiation). See also
Lande, supra note 16, at 99 The Wayne D. Brazil, Early Neutral
Evaluation Or Mediation? When Might ENE Deliver More Value?, 14
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10 (2007).
48
See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 15, at 892 n. 44 (noting that, in some
forms of mediation, it is “common” to have a separate stage [where] the
mediator conducts a ‘conflict analysis,’ and “reports to the parties
‘what the conflict is’”) (quoting Interview with mediator Howard
Bellman, in Dedham, Mass. (June 18, 2006)).
49
See Garrie & Rao, supra note 35 (suggesting that, in some cases,
“[c]ooperative efforts and the expeditious selection of keywords are
hampered” by “adversarial zeal” of attorneys).
50
See Garrie & Rao, supra note 35 (mediator may conduct search, or
may simply “ensure that appropriate documents are produced at a
reasonable price respective to the underlying issue”); Marian Riedy,
Suman Beros & Kim Sperduto, Mediated Investigative E-Discovery,
2010 FED. CTS. L. REV. 79, 79-81 (2010) (outlining process for neutral
with skills of “trained digital investigator” to “search and retrieve
relevant information,” in a manner similar to an “in-house expert,” but
with both parties sharing the expense).
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party.51 In essence, the mediator would simply come to
learn more about the circumstances of the parties’ data
systems and records, which could improve the mediator’s
ability to make competent recommendations.52 Whether
this relatively intrusive process constitutes “mediation” is
debatable.53 Certainly, a specific agreed-upon protocol for
the endeavor would be essential.54
Conclusion
Mediation constitutes a generally accepted
mechanism for dispute resolution.55 Mediation processes
are regularly incorporated into court-annexed ADR
systems56 and are often chosen by parties as a means for
51

See Marian Riedy, Suman Beros & Sperduto, supra note 50, at 98-99
(system proposed would prevent mediator from producing information
if party does not agree to produce).
52
See Marian Riedy, Suman Beros Sperduto, supra note 50, at 97
(suggesting that the “standard” mediation process does not suffice,
“because the mediator is only aware of the information the parties
voluntarily disclose”).
53
See Skinner, supra note 34, at 128 n. 69 (rejecting notion that
“mediated investigative e-discovery” is actual mediation, given that
mediator may lack neutrality after conducting investigation).
54
See Nolan-Haley, supra note 14, at 1371 (“[Mediation] is an informal
process based on principles of individual sovereignty and selfdetermination.”).
55
See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 5 (noting that in survey, 87%
of respondents report some use of mediation); Jennifer Reynolds, The
Lawyer With The ADR Tattoo, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395,
397 (2013) (“even the most traditional lawyers use ADR techniques
and processes all the time, from client counseling to negotiation to
mediation to arbitration”); Richard S. Weil, Mediation In A Litigation
Culture: The Surprising Growth Of Mediation In New York, 17 DISP.
RESOL. MAG. 8, 8 (2011) (in survey of litigators, 90% expressed a
positive view of mediation).
56
See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures:
Mediation And Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISPUTE RESOL. 271, 272 (2011) (noting that judicial settlement
conferences and court-connected mediation have become
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resolving their disputes.57 The mediation process is
flexible, meant to adapt to the needs of the parties and the
circumstances of the case.58
Courts continue to experiment with mediation
forms,59 however, and evidence on the relative
effectiveness of various systems remains difficult to
assess.60 Cutting-edge systems of dispute resolution, such
as online mediation,61 offer interesting possibilities, but
“commonplace” parts of court systems); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics In ADR: The Many “Cs” Of Professional Responsibility And
Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 979, 990 (2001)
(“Virtually every state and federal court requires some form of ADR at
least to be considered by the lawyers in a litigation matter, and,
increasingly, transactions and contracts contain ADR clauses.”).
57
See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 5, at 30 (noting extensive use
of mediation in commercial, employment and personal injury disputes);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR And The “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth
And Impact Of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL
LEG. STUDIES 843, 848-49 (2004) (“By far the predominant process
choice [in ADR] is mediation, with its much-touted potential benefits
of flexibility, party control, confidentiality, relatively low cost, and
minor risk.”).
58
See Simeon H. Baum, Mediation And Discovery, in DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND E-DISCOVERY § 3.1 at 51 (Daniel B. Garrie & Yoav
M. Griver eds. 2012) (unique features of mediation include “freedom
and creativity that infuses” the process).
59
See Brian Jarren, supra note 46, at 64 (courts still “experimenting”
with mediation as an aspect of case management).
60
See Michael Heise, Why ADR Programs Aren’t More Appealing:
An Empirical Perspective, SCHOLARSHIP@CORNELLLAW: A DIGITAL
DEPOSITORY (2008) www.scholawship.law.cornell.edu (noting
“mixed” evidence on effectiveness of ADR programs). See also Baum,
supra note 58, at 72 (“Mediation is no panacea.”).
61
See Mann, supra note 20, at 89 (suggesting that online dispute
resolution processes “can play various roles in consensus building”);
Ethan supra note 30, (describing online system that allows software to
“clarify and highlight both the parties’ disagreements and their desired
solutions;” suggesting that system can help by “assisting the parties to
identify common interests”); Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros And Cons
Of Online Dispute Resolution: An Assessment Of Cyber-Mediation
Websites, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2003) (noting potential for
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have not yet received attention from court administrators.62
The systems outlined in this Article, although grounded in
well-recognized mediation techniques, certainly cannot be
considered “tried and tested” in the e-discovery sphere.63
The mediation process, moreover, can be abused in some
instances.64
Nonetheless, judicial administrators and dispute
resolution system designers must start somewhere.65 The
notion of multiple “doors” to dispute resolution is firmly
embedded in our legal culture.66 Courts can and should
consider ways to open doors to expand the use of
mediation-related techniques into the e-discovery process.
Court-connected pilot projects and study programs, already
use of “traditional” dispute resolution mechanisms, supplemented by
online technologies, which may include “fully automated” systems or
systems that include a human neutral).
62
See Ebner, Hanson & Pearlstein, supra note 30 (no court-annexed
online dispute resolution systems currently). See also Julio Cesar
Betancourt & Elina Zlatanska, Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): What
Is It, And Is It The Way Forward?, 79 ARBITRATION 256, 263 (2013)
(“still too early to predict” future of online dispute resolution).
63
One of the earliest references to mediation of e-discovery disputes is
less than five years old. See Skinner, supra note 28, at 425.
64
See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods To Promote
Good-Faith Participation In Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50
UCLA L. REV. 69, 71 (2002) (noting that “some lawyers use mediation
to make misleading statements, ‘smoke the other side out,’ gain
leverage for later negotiations, drag out litigation, increase opponents’
costs, and generally wear down the opposition”). See also Kimberlee K.
Kovach, The Vanishing Trial: Land Mine On The Mediation Landscape
Or Opportunity For Evolution: Ruminations On The Future Of
Mediation Practice, 7 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT. RESOL. 27, 29 (2005)
(noting that mediation can become a “curse” of “hoops to jump
through” in litigation, rather than a “process expansion” leading to
dispute resolution).
65
See generally Slaikeu & Hasson, supra note 15.
66
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract And Other
Possibilities, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303 (1998); Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution And
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995).
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underway in many jurisdictions,67 should be encouraged in
this area.68

67

See Hamilton, supra note 19. See also Daniel Garrie Instructs 7th
Circuit’s Pilot e-Mediation Program, E-DISCOVERY BEAT (May 14,
2013)
www.lawandforensics.com/e-discovery-beat/2012/02/23/ediscovery/court/pilot/programs-e-discovery-templates-that-legal-teamsshould-utlize (“first of its kind” program to train mediators, who
“agreed to volunteer their time for cases with heavy discovery loads,
but comparatively small monetary returns”); Principles Relating To
The
Discovery
Of
Electronically
Stored
Information,
www.ediscoverypilot.com (Aug. 1, 2010).
68
See Wissler, supra note 56 at 274 (lawyers tend to view mediation
with court staff mediators “more favorably than mediation with
volunteer mediators”).
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ARTICLE
A CHRISTIAN VISION OF FREEDOM AND
DEMOCRACY: NEUTRALITY AS AN OBSTACLE
TO FREEDOM
By: Karen Jordan
Abstract
This article presents the underlying vision for the
argument that principles of liberal neutrality pose a genuine
obstacle to freedom in democratic society. There is a
growing concern that liberty and justice are unattainable in
modern democratic societies that are grounded in
neutrality, including the United States. Experience has
demonstrated significant shortcomings of the modern
freedom movements grounded in political theories,
which—along with the theory of neutrality—reject the need
for core substantive values to guide law and policy. The
underlying basis of such theories is a particular modern
conception of freedom. But a well-grounded and reasoned
alternative vision of human freedom exists: a distinctively
Christian vision of human freedom as understood in light of
the philosophical and theological study of God’s revelation
to man. A comprehensive treatment of the Christian vision
of human freedom can be gleaned from the scholarly work
of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus
Benedict XVI. From this alternative perspective, freedom
is promoted and safeguarded only when core substantive
values and moral insights are respected as the point of
reference for law and justice in society, a condition which
posits a role for the State in prudently fostering respect for
those values and insights. Because this alternative vision is
often misunderstood, the purpose of this article is to present
a concise but in-depth synthesis of the writings of
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Ratzinger bearing on human freedom and democracy and to
thereby encourage dialogue leading to a more moderate use
of neutrality principles.
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A Christian Vision of Freedom and Democracy:
Neutrality as an Obstacle to Freedom
“A confused ideology of liberty leads to a dogmatism
that is proving ever more hostile to real liberty.”1
Freedom has been a defining mark of modern and
postmodern thought.
In the areas of science and
technology, as well as the arenas of politics and sociology,
freedom has been the objective. But what is freedom?
What is the best way to think about freedom? In the
modern era, the goals of science and technology have been
to dominate nature, and the political goals have been to
eliminate oppressive governing regimes and to end
injustice and unjust discrimination based on differences in
race, class, and other categorizations. Undoubtedly, many
good things have resulted from these goals. But overall,
the modern freedom movements have proved
unsatisfactory.
In European societies, Marxist-based
political and social theories led to tyranny and human
devastation.
In the United States, the “unitedness”
promised and envisioned has dissipated. And to many,
liberty and justice are no longer perceived as possible
because lawmaking and policy-making have been reduced
to rule by the strongest. The general direction of the
modern quest for freedom surely must be right. An
1

JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 36
(2006). In this book, Ratzinger emphasizes that the main divide in
contemporary society rests on the question of the existence of God. Id.
at 40-45. On the one side lies the great historical and religious cultures
of humanity; on the other side lies a perspective reflecting humanity’s
emancipation from God. In its conclusion, this article affirms that this
divide lies at the heart of the controversy regarding use of the neutrality
principle. The underlying premise of neutrality is a vision of freedom
that, in essence, views family, morality, and God as antitheses to
freedom. These ideas will be discussed in Part I & Part IV(A) of this
paper.
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important question is why the modern approaches to
freedom have gone awry.
To many, the crux of the problem is society’s
reliance on the idea of neutrality, a doctrine central to legal
and political philosophy in the United States today. 2
Modern ideas of liberal neutrality rest on the premise that
the state should not express preferences regarding
substantive values or competing conceptions of good or,
more specifically, the end toward which citizens should
strive. 3 This is because, in the liberal tradition, judgments
2

See, e.g., JAMES KALB, THE TYRANNY OF LIBERALISM:
UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING ADMINISTERED FREEDOM,
INQUISITORIAL TOLERANCE, AND EQUALITY BY COMMAND (2d ed.
2008); ROBERT H. DIERKER JR, THE TYRANNY OF TOLERANCE: A
SITTING JUDGE BREAKS THE CODE OF SILENCE TO EXPOSE THE LIBERAL
JUDICIAL ASSAULT (2006). See also CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND
COMMUNITARIANISM (Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley & Robert
P. Hunt eds. 1995).
3
See, e.g., John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and
Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 513-97
(2009) (providing a comparative analysis of neutrality and Catholic
social teaching). Breen explains that neutrality is widely considered a
defining feature and virtue of that strand of American political
philosophy referred to as liberalism; and that liberalism has provided
the intellectual foundation for much of the American legal system. Id.
at 514-15 & 517 (citing and quoting a number of influential works). See
also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991). In America, the neutrality
approach is perhaps most properly attributable to John Rawls. Rawls
rejected the idea that a “general moral conception” can provide the
basis for a “public conception of justice” in a democratic society. He
advocated instead for an approach that rests on the “overlapping
consensus” of a particular culture. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (1985),
available
at
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/RawlsJustic
e.pdf In his mind, this was because “we – we modern inheritors of the
traditions of religious tolerance and constitutional government – put
liberty ahead of perfection.” See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
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concerning what is good, the ends in life worthy of pursuit,
are subjective; no conception of what is good exists that
would warrant attempts to coerce dissenters.4 Being
neutral means that all values and viewpoints are regarded
as equal.5
Scholars have pointed out deficiencies
associated with the principle of neutrality. For example,
they say that it is unworkable and illusory to the point of
being deceptive.6 But this creates a new question: if
society needs substantive values to guide policy-making,
what values should be selected? This is the stumbling
block for many people.
In the United States, significant support exists for
the idea that core Christian values should provide the
foundation for law and justice. Indeed, for much of the
history of the United States, Christian values were the
foundation for society. It is only because of the neutrality
principle—especially as imposed by the United States
Supreme Court in the arena of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence7—that the idea has been increasingly
quashed. In a recent Establishment Clause case, Justice
4

Breen, supra note 3, at 525-26 (drawing on ANDREW ALTMAN,
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)). Breen notes
that “because the nature of the good is unsettled, contested, and always
open to dispute, liberalism holds that it is never appropriate to use the
coercive power of the state to mandate a particular theory of the good.”
Id. at 526.
5
See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
305, 311-12 (1990) (explaining neutrality as advocated in Bruce
Ackerman’s theory of liberal justice and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of
rights).
6
See, e.g., id. As explained by Dean Steven Smith, neutrality is
illusory and impotent. It cannot guide public policy; cannot garner
respect of citizens; and, in fact, operates in a way that is deceptive to
the public. Id. at 313-29. Cf. Galston, supra note 3, at 3-21. The
citations in footnote 2 above also address this idea.
7
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(landmark case in which the Supreme Court adopted the neutrality
principle in the context of the Establishment Clause).
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O’Connor, an advocate of the view that it is impermissible
for state action to give rise to even a subtle feeling of
exclusion (i.e., to make a person aware that his or her
religious views might be out of sync with more mainstream
religious views), suggested that reconsidering use of the
neutrality principle was unthinkable. After noting the
existence of strong religious sentiments in the United
States, which she attributes to judicial enforcement of the
form of neutrality that cabins religious views to the private
realm, Justice O’Connor essentially stated: “Why would we
want any other approach?”8
Importantly, however, if the principle of neutrality
itself is misguided—if “unitedness” has been lost and
democratic government has been reduced to rule by the
strongest—the idea that core Christian values should
provide a foundation for law and justice should be rejected
only for sound substantive reasons. A key purpose of this
article is to explain why acceptance of core Christian
values as guideposts can better safeguard liberty and
justice. A sound argument exists that liberty and justice in
society depend on state recognition of, and prudent use of,
core Christian values in policy-making.9 In response to
8

See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 882
(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor had pointed to
violence in other areas of the world resulting from “assumption of
religious authority by government.” She then states: “Those who
would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must
therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system
that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?” Id.
Her line of reasoning suggests a failure to appreciate that moving away
from neutrality does not mean “assumption of religious authority by
government.” Rather, it would entail government respect for a source
of moral authority beyond the state, which means that it would be
beyond the majority vote.
9
This would not necessarily mean a return to state practices struck
down by the Court due to Establishment Clause concerns. Past reliance
on Christian values in fashioning laws may not always have been
“prudent” and may have involved values beyond the realm
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Justice O’Connor’s question, society should want another
approach because, in the quest for freedom, how humans
live does matter.
Notably, the case for a more tempered use of
neutrality has been persuasively presented in the work of
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus
Benedict XVI.10 In addressing freedom and democracy,
Ratzinger’s focus has mainly been on the situation in
Europe.11 But his message is relevant to any society
hoping to maintain a pluralistic democracy where liberty
and justice are possible. The crux of Ratzinger’s message
is that freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when
core Christian moral insights are respected as the
foundation and point of reference for law and justice.
Regarding the interaction between Christianity and political
authority in a pluralistic democracy, Ratzinger’s
philosophy perhaps is best captured by the statement that
democracy must be lived “on the basis of Christianity and
Christianity on the basis of the free democratic state.”12
appropriately considered “core values.” Cf. JOSEPH RATZINGER,
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 21-22 (2006) (noting that Christians
have at times in the past expected too much from the “earthly city”).
10
Because the bulk of the writings considered in this article were
written by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger before he was elected Pope, this
paper uses the name Ratzinger in both the text of the paper and in
citations.
11
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, EUROPE TODAY AND TOMORROW:
ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES (Michael J. Miller trans.,
Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2007) (2004). See also JOSEPH RATZINGER AND
MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS: THE WEST, RELATIVISM,
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM (2007); JOSEPH RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT
FOR EUROPE? THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: ASSESSMENT AND
FORECAST (Brian McNeil trans., Ignatius Press, 2d ed. 1994) (1991)
[hereinafter Ratzinger, A Turning Point].
12
JOSEPH RATZINGER, A Christian Orientation in a Pluralistic
Democracy?: The Indispensability of Christianity in the Modern Age,
in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY
204, 215 (Robert Nowell trans., Crossroad Pub. Co. 1st Am. Ed.1988)
(1987) [hereinafter Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation].
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The first half of this statement of course meets strong
resistance in today’s culture. Nonetheless, Ratzinger has
been adamant that, although the distinct spheres of Church
and State must be respected,13 a society electing a
democratic government must recognize as inviolable a
certain basic set of values and those values having a
Christian foundation.14 To Ratzinger, the existence of these
values was a precondition for democracy, and adherence to
these values is necessary for the survival of democracy.15
13

See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Theology and the Church’s Political
Stance, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 152, 161-62 [hereinafter Ratzinger,
Political Stance] (noting that where the Church itself becomes the state,
freedom becomes lost; but, also, that freedom is lost when the Church
is precluded from being a public and publically relevant authority).
Ratzinger has also acknowledged that, in the past, the Church has at
times overstepped its bounds. The Church at times has expected too
much from civil society in terms of the Christian norms it expected to
be recognized by the state and, at times, has over-asserted its claim to
public legal status. See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra
note 12, at 212-13.
14
Ratzinger explains that Christianity provides the rational foundation
for ethics; ethics remains rational only when reason is purified by faith;
and a Christian foundation “is imperative precisely if [the state] is to
remain the state and pluralist.” Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation,
supra note 12, at 216-18. The necessary purification of reason by faith
(and vice versa) occurs within the context of Christianity and the
Church. See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158-60. As
explained below, truth exists in the world because it is a product of the
Eternal Reason that is Love, also known as God. Humans have access
to the truth, but only with the assistance of revelation from God. The
Church, understood in its fullness, is the “place where [Truth] is
perceived.” Id. at 160.
15
“The state must recognize that a basic framework of values with a
Christian foundation is the precondition for its existence. It must in
this sense as it were simply recognize its historical place, the ground
from which it cannot completely free itself without collapsing. It must
learn that there is a continued existence of truth which is not subject to
consensus but which precedes it and makes it possible.” Ratzinger, A
Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 219. Ratzinger also stresses
that democracy was formulated precisely to preserve inviolable values
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Because it is largely a matter of historical fact that
Christian values were a precondition for democracy,16 the
more controversial assertion is the claim that moral insights
from the Christian tradition are necessary for the survival
of democracy.
Indeed, this perspective may be
incomprehensible to persons influenced by the pervasively
secular culture present in contemporary society. But the
perspective is challenging to understand even for Christians
and others who would be open to the idea.
For that reason, in this article I strive to help make
this perspective of freedom and democracy comprehensible
and, in particular, to do so largely using the work of
Cardinal Ratzinger.17 It is useful and appropriate to focus
on Ratzinger’s scholarly writings for a number of reasons.
Ratzinger is recognized for his strong intellectual
capabilities and his ability to communicate his ideas clearly
and succinctly.18 His writings also reveal a genuine attempt
and rights. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, What is Truth, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 55 (2006).
16
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 215 n. 11
(While democracy is a product of the fusion of Greek and Christian
heritage, it was, more specifically, “formed under the particular
conditions of the American Congregationalist pattern;” it is not a
product of the so-called Enlightenment era, nor of the European
Reformation movement).
17
Ratzinger’s ideas and teaching on human freedom and democratic
society are fully consistent with Catholic teaching generally, especially
as presented in important papal encyclicals and instructions addressing
Catholic social doctrine. See, e.g., J. BRIAN BENESTAD, CHURCH,
STATE, AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL
DOCTRINE (2011) (presenting Catholic social doctrine, but also usefully
integrating the particular contributions of various popes, including Pope
Benedict XVI). See generally MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING:
COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS, (Kenneth R. Himes et al. eds.,
2005).
18
See, e.g., D. VINCENT TWOMEY, THE ESSENTIAL POPE BENEDICT
XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES xvii-xix (John F.
Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds.,HarperOne reprint ed. 2008)
(commenting on the “breathtaking scope” of Ratzinger’s corpus of

39

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 367
to understand and address opposing positions.19
Additionally, Ratzinger addressed issues bearing on the
foundations of political and social order in a somewhat
systematic way throughout his career. Because his work
represents an impressive integration and synthesis of
theology, philosophy and politics, he has gained respect as
a profound political thinker whose ideas are rich and
coherent.20
Accordingly, this article first frames the issue as
one of properly understanding human freedom and then
presents the basic Christian vision. Next, the article
presents a synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings bearing on
human freedom to help flesh out the deeper philosophical
and theological foundation for the Christian vision; namely,
its grounding in the existence of a personal God and the
perceptions and conceptions arising from deep reflection on
the Trinity and the Incarnation. Such study reveals
intelligibility in creation that must be respected.
Specifically, it reveals that within each human being there
exists an existential capacity designed to reach beyond the
self and toward God and others, a capacity fulfilled by reunion with God and others. Freedom, then, is living one’s
life in a manner that helps one to achieve that union, and
Christian values—which are consistent with the
intelligibility in creation—thereby promote human
freedom. Ratzinger’s work presents a strong argument that
intellectual work, on its originality, creativity, and consistency, and on
Ratzinger’s attention to the ideas of “the great thinkers of humanity,
theologians and otherwise”).
19
Id. at xix (noting that all of Ratzinger’s writings reveal his “courage
to face any question or objection because of the confidence he has in
the Truth revealed in Jesus Christ and handed on by the church’s
apostolic tradition”).
20
See, e.g., THOMAS R. ROURKE, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF BENEDICT XVI 3-4 (2011), 3-4 (explaining that
Benedict’s social thought merits considerably more attention than it has
received).
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foundational judgments concerning the ends in life worthy
of pursuit are not solely subjective. Rather, freedom is an
integral aspect of the human person, and thus, how freedom
is used matters—and matters beyond the personal or
private, subjective sphere.
Furthermore, because survival of democracy hinges
on sufficient unity among the citizens regarding the values
deemed inviolable,21 Ratzinger advocates that the state has
a role in prudently fostering respect for those values,
including expecting reverence and respect for God and holy
things, and encouraging serious study of questions such as
the existence of and nature of God.22 Again, this
21

See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Constraint in the Church, in
CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY,
supra note 12, at 183, 188 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Freedom and
Constraint] (“Ultimately, the democratic system can function only if
certain fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone.”
“[T]here must be an ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained
even if its rational basis cannot be established absolutely and
conclusively.”). See also Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note
12, at 205 (“Pluralist democracy, in itself, does not “unite[] its citizens
in a fundamental assent to the state. . . .For its foundations, it depends
on other powers and forces outside of itself.”); JOSEPH RATZINGER,
Luther and the Unity of the Churches, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM &
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 99, 131
[hereinafter Ratzinger, Luther] (noting that “[a] formal unity without
clear content is fundamentally no unity at all.” Unity based on
common skepticism and not knowledge is, in essence, based on
capitulation).
22
See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 21820. Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary responsibility
for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the Church and
Christians. Id. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the
Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006) (emphasizing the
public task of Christian churches: they must be free to “address the
freedom of all human beings so that the moral forces of history may
remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, Biblical Aspects of
the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM &
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 147, 151
(explaining that the core responsible political activity is to nurture
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perspective is at odds with the neutrality principle imposed
by the American judiciary, at least since the 1950s.23 Thus,
this article also clarifies how Ratzinger’s vision of human
freedom renders his approach to Church-State issues fully
consistent with vigorous respect for religious freedom or
freedom of conscience. The bottom-line is that personal
choices about how to live matter, and it is permissible for
the state to foster a culture in which persons can more
readily live in a genuinely human way—not through heavyhanded or unnecessary measures, but through prudent
adherence to a limited number of core values.
V. The Overarching Issue: Properly Understanding
Human Freedom
In discussing democracy’s need for grounding itself
in Christian moral insights and values, Ratzinger generally
supports his message with a two-pronged approach. Under
the first prong, he points to and explains why prevalent
political theories of the modern era have failed. Under the
second prong, he presents, in a variety of ways, his vision
for safeguarding genuine human freedom. This article
focuses primarily on the second prong of his argument, but
this section also briefly introduces Ratzinger’s perspective
on the failures of modern political philosophies.
In his writings, Ratzinger has demonstrated that
political theories following the trajectory initiated by
Rousseau-type thinkers are grounded in a radical
philosophy of freedom and what he has labeled as the
“secular trinity of ideas;” the three ideas are progress,
absolutism of scientific technology, and political
public acceptance of the validity of morality and God’s
commandments).
23
In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the
Supreme Court adopted the neutrality principle in the context of the
Establishment Clause.
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messianism.24
Ratzinger characterizes the radical
philosophy of freedom as encompassing the individualistic
ideology that was a component of all Enlightenment
thought, the anarchic tendencies flowing from Rousseau’s
vision of human nature and the social contract where no
right order exists and human will is the sole norm of human
action,25 and the Marxist tendency to rely on structures and
24

Ratzinger discusses two good examples of failures of modern
philosophies. See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 25-133;
JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropological
Vision of the 1986 Instruction Libertatis Conscientia, in CHURCH,
ECUMENISM & POLITICS, supra note 12, at 255, 256-265 [hereinafter
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation].
25
Rousseau’s essay on the social contract was written in 1762. See
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR: PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL
RIGHT,
(1762),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm [hereinafter Rousseau, Social
Contract]. To Rousseau, the “sacred right” of the social order is built
upon conventions, see id., Bk. I, ch. I., conventions that flow from
Rousseau’s view of human nature. See id. at Bk. I, ch. II. To
Rousseau, human beings differ from animals in only two respects: they
can rise above instincts by an act of freedom or free will, and they have
a faculty of self-preservation that develops all other faculties. See
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY
25 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1992) (1755)).
Rousseau’s notion of the social compact reflects these dual
and limited aspects of human nature. In his theory of the social
contract, because humans cannot know what justice is, nothing exists to
delimit the majority vote. See Rousseau, Social Contract, supra, at Bk
II, ch. VI. His concept of the “general will” is, in the end, the only
limit on government, and persons are entitled to reclaim their natural
rights and liberties when law and government fail to reflect the general
will. But Rousseau does not see the general will as being subject to any
absolute measure.
Rousseau’s philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of John
Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available
at http://jim.com/2ndtreat.htm (also known as Locke’s Second Treatise
on Government). The second essay on civil government was drafted
between 1685–1688.
See JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT AND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, (Sterling P.
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systems to bring about justice.26 From this perspective,
freedom generally is understood as:
the possibility of doing
everything one wants to do
and of doing only what one
would like to do oneself.
Freedom understood in this
way is a matter of doing what
Lamprecht ed. 1937) [hereinafter Locke, Second Treatise]. Locke’s
theory of the social contract rests solidly on an absolute measure that
operates as a genuine limit on the “one will” that gives rise to political
laws and acts of government. To Locke, the nature of the social
compact is inescapably tied to limits on human action existing in the
state of nature before societies have consented to be governed: the law
of God and the law of nature. To Locke, this law stands as “an eternal
rule to all men, legislators as well as others.” See Locke, Second
Treatise, id. at #135.
Both Locke and Rousseau recognized consent of the people as
the source of authority in civil society, namely, the consent arising
upon agreement to be part of the society. Both also propose that
legitimate laws made within society will be grounded in the consent of
the body politic, as determined by majority vote, and delimited by the
notion of the common good of the community. The key difference
between Locke and Rousseau lies in the operation of and limits upon
that “one will.” Whereas in Rousseau’s theory the legislative power
becomes, in essence, the source of the laws governing society, in
Locke’s theory the legislative power serves a higher law, by making the
law of God and the law of nature better known and fostering a more
effective operation of the law for the general good of all. Further, the
majority vote in Locke’s theory serves only as a means to ensure that
laws reflect the consent of society. The majority vote remains
subordinate to the law of God and the law of nature. A majority vote
inconsistent with the Eternal law would constitute a sign that the
agreement has been breached, thereby legitimizing resort to the natural
liberty to form a new society.
26
JOSEPH RATZINGER, Truth and Freedom, in THE ESSENTIAL POPE
BENEDICT XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS & SPEECHES 336, 343 (New
York: HarperOne, 2007) (John F. Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds.,
HarperOne reprint ed. 2008) [hereinafter Ratzinger, Truth and
Freedom].
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one likes, of arbitrary whim. .
. . From this point of view
liberation consists in throwing
off
constraints
and
obligations. Every obligation
appears as a shackle that
restricts
freedom;
every
obligation that is thrown off
becomes a step forward on the
road to freedom. It is clear
that from this kind of point of
view the family, the Church,
morality, and God must
appear antitheses to freedom.
God obliges men and women;
morality is a basic form in
which this obligation to him is
expressed. . . . Even the state,
declared to be the ruler of man
over man, becomes an
opponent of freedom.27
Ratzinger has noted that this perspective is grounded in a
definite understanding of human nature, an understanding
expressed most completely in the philosophy of Sarte:
For Sarte man is pure
existence without essence.
There is no certainty about
what he or she is or how he or
she should be. One must
discover anew what it is to be
human from the nothingness
of an empty freedom. The idea
27

Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 259-60.
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of freedom is here pushed to
its ultimate radical position,
no
longer
merely
emancipation from tradition
and
authority
but
emancipation from his or her
own nature and essence, a
state
of
complete
indeterminacy which is open
to anything.28
To Ratzinger, history has shown that in reality these
perspectives lead to the opposite of freedom and to human
dissatisfaction. The dissolution of traditional links and
obligations, the dependence on large anonymous systems,
and the alienation resulting when societal practices break
down traditional structures such as family and Church
have, in fact, “turned out more and more to be the precondition for total dictatorship and totalitarian enforcement
of conformity.”29
Similar negative results flow from the interplay of
the secular trinity of ideas of progress, absolutism of
scientific technology, and political messianism. Ratzinger
has explained that the union of these ideas was most
consistently developed in Marxism, emerging as a
“political myth of almost irresistible power.” But the union
of these ideas also exists today, albeit in weaker forms, in
Western society.30 These ideas also represent the exclusion
28

Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 191. The
perspective is also thoroughly theological: “Behind all this there stands
a programme which must ultimately be labeled theological: God is no
longer recognized as a reality standing over against man, but instead
man may himself or herself become what he or she imagines a divinity
would be if it existed. . . .” Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra
note 24, at 260.
29
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 262.
30
See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 129-30.
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of God from the shaping of history and human life.31 Ideas
of progress and absolutism of scientific technology are
grounded in a self-limitation of reason: a narrowing down
of reason to the perception of what is quantitative and, thus,
omits the insights common to almost the whole of mankind
before the modern period. In particular, this omits the
conviction that morality is not created by man on the basis
of calculation of expediency. But, rather, man “finds it
already present in the essence of things.”32 Without
substantive values for guidance, “progress” becomes any
new approach and any new technology necessarily is a
good.33 Messianic approaches to governance place reliance
on systems and structures and political and economic
activity, rather than on ethical efforts of citizens. These
ideas reflect materialism and its program.34 As explained
by Ratzinger, this brand of liberation depends on abdication
of ethical principles and behavior and, therefore, abdication
of responsibility and ultimately of conscience.35 And
destruction or loss of conscience is “the precondition for
totalitarian obedience and totalitarian domination.”36 The
ultimate result of adhering to these political theories thus is
not freedom but, rather, a type of slavery.37
31

Id. at 130 (noting that, in essence, this trinity of ideas replaces and
thus excludes the concept of God).
32
See id., 34. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE
CRISIS OF CULTURES, 39-45 (2006).
33
See JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES
41-42 (2006) (“[T]he guiding principle is that man’s capability
determines what he does. If you know how to do something, then you
are also permitted to do it. . . . But man knows how to do many things,
and this knowledge increases all the time. If this knowledge does not
find its criterion in a moral norm, it becomes a power for destruction. . .
.”).
34
See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-08.
35
Id.
36
Id. See also Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 165.
37
See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-11
(emphasizing also the break down of the rule of law and a loss of the
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Ratzinger’s attention to and analysis of these
shortcomings and failures is crucial.
If political
philosophies divorced from substantive values or divorced
from core Christian values were producing good results, his
message would be moot. But modern societies keep
stumbling. Even in the United States the situation seems
precarious. A prevalent sentiment exists that government,
particularly at the federal level, is not working. In each
branch of government, law and policy is being made on the
basis of power. Even citizens unfamiliar with political
philosophies generally, or the doctrine of neutrality in
particular, likely would agree that a key problem is the
much divided nature of the electorate—a dividedness
arising in large part because of the absence of societal
consensus on core values.38
After highlighting modern governments’ failures to
achieve freedom, the second prong in Ratzinger’s approach
explains that genuine human freedom is safeguarded only
when democratic government and the majority vote are
limited by inviolable moral standards and, more
specifically, standards grounded in core Christian values.
sense of transcendence that causes people to search for ways to escape
society). See also CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH,
INSTRUCTION ON CHRISTIAN FREEDOM (March 22, 1986),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html, at #10-19
(noting, inter alia, the new forms of oppression arising from
unrestrained use of technology, modern acts of terrorism, and
collectivist approaches that quash human aspirations for the
transcendent).
38
From Ratzinger’s perspective, the increasing dividedness in society
is due in large measure to the overarching clash between those
believing in dependence on God and those seeking emancipation from
God: “The real antagonism typical of today’s world is not that between
diverse religious cultures; rather, it is the antagonism between the
radical emancipation of man from God, from the roots of life, on the
one hand, and the great religious cultures, on the other.” JOSEPH
RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44 (2006).
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The importance of democratic government and the majority
vote being delimited by inviolable moral standards should
be fairly obvious. As Ratzinger has emphasized, the
history of the twentieth century has readily demonstrated
that the majority can err—and err seriously.39 Those
adhering to the neutrality principle tend to believe that the
gross abuses that have occurred elsewhere will not happen
in the United States.40 Frankly, that belief has no logical
basis. Nonetheless, another valid reason exists for holding
the view that inviolable moral standards must exist to
delimit the majority. The idea of inviolable rights and
standards was a key premise of the founding generation.
The premise was part and parcel of the prevailing
philosophies of the founding era and is spelled out in the
39

The multiple instances of state sanctioned genocide is a prime
example. See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good,
in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 45-52 (2006) (pointing to the
twentieth century totalitarian states).
Ratzinger also has often
explained that failure to identify values to limit and guide the majority
vote leads to radical relativism. See, e.g., id. at 47, 56 (discussing
Richard Rorty’s “utopia of banality” wherein a freedom without
substance dissolves into meaninglessness). See also Ratzinger, Luther,
supra note 21, at 131 (noting that authority based on skepticism
becomes arbitrary). The basic idea is simply that, without inviolable
standards to delimit majority vote, law becomes nothing other than a
mirror of whatever happens to be the predominant views or opinions of
the moment—however egregious those may be.
40
See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS (1998); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND
TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1991). Rorty adheres to the view that
a certain “intuition” provides sufficient safeguards against egregious
government acts. Ratzinger compares Rorty’s views to certain
seventeenth century ideas; namely the idea that there was a single,
universal morality which was a true and clear light that could be
perceived by all humans if they would but open their eyes. Ratzinger
explains that reliance on mere intuition is unworkable in contemporary
society because the “evidential character” of moral principles no longer
exists. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 50-51 (2006).
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founding documents of the United States.41 Therefore, the
more challenging position for many is why the inviolable
values should be—or must be—informed by traditional
Christian insights.42
To that question, Ratzinger spells out a rationale
that is more sophisticated than the one typically provided
by advocates for Christian values. The answer gleaned
from the corpus of Ratzinger’s writings is that Christian
values have their origin from the transcendent and, more
specifically, from the Creator of humanity and the world.
Therefore, these values necessarily are consistent with the
meaning or intelligibility in creation and will thereby
promote genuine human freedom. This answer is grounded
in a certain understanding of human freedom: an
understanding of freedom that is readily distinguishable
from the radical philosophy of freedom described at the
outset of this section. Whether to reconsider use of the
41

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Ratzinger notes that de Tocqueville recognized that democracy in
America was made possible by the precondition of a basic moral
conviction. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 51 (2006). Indeed, basic social
contract doctrine is premised on the idea that the society consenting to
government agrees on basic ideas about rights and liberties: otherwise,
joining together and consenting to be governed and to be bound by
laws of the society makes little sense.
42
For example, although Professor Steven Smith presents persuasive
reasons why the modern concept of liberal neutrality is illusory and
ineffective (indeed, deceptive), and, in-turn, argues for the need for a
set of substantive beliefs and values upon which public decisions can
be based (and also for a return to a proper understanding of toleration).
He suggests that the content of the substantive values does not matter:
“Legislatures and courts must make decisions, and decisions require
choices among beliefs and values. . . . Thus, every regime must have its
orthodoxy. The orthodoxy might not constitute a cohesive ideology or
theology, it might not be read into the official constitution, and it might
vary from year to year or even, to some degree, from locale to locale.
But a set of substantive beliefs and values . . . must exist.” Smith,
supra note 5, at 332 (emphasis added).
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neutrality principle, then, ultimately rests on the extent to
which this alternative view of freedom is deemed credible.
As explained, a primary goal of this article is to
provide a comprehensive yet comprehensible explanation
of this alternate vision of human freedom through a
synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings.43 Ratzinger’s work
makes clear that this is a well-reasoned alternative view. It
grounds freedom in a vision of humanity; its history and
destiny as understood in light of philosophical and
theological scrutiny; and the development of God’s
revelation to man. It is a vision intimately bound up with
belief in God. But it is no more theologically based than
neutrality itself and the radical philosophies of freedom,
which are bound up with denial of the existence of God.
II. A Christian View of Human Freedom
Ratzinger’s comprehensive vision of human
freedom can be understood only by studying a number of
sources. These sources include two documents issued by
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: Instruction
on Certain Aspects of the “Theology of Liberation,” issued
August 6, 1984 (“ICATL”), and Instruction on Christian
Freedom and Liberation, issued March 22, 1986
(“ICFL”).44 It is useful to begin with an analysis of these
43

Although this vision of freedom is absolutely central to
understanding how to live out Christian faith, this author was unable to
identify a good source providing a comprehensive and comprehensible
explanation.
44
Ratzinger served as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of
Faith from 1981 until he was elected pope in 2005.
The
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON
CHRISTIAN FREEDOM AND LIBERATION (Mar. 22, 1986),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html [hereinafter
ICFL] is the more comprehensive of the two documents. But the
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON

51

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 379
documents because they present the basic outline of the
alternative vision of freedom—namely, the Christian
understanding of freedom as liberation from sin and
freedom to follow the commandments of God.
In presenting this vision of human freedom, the two
Instructions rely predominantly on the biblical witness to
God’s historical encounters with humanity.45 The ICFL
makes clear its reliance on revelation—and its approach to
interpreting revelation—by noting at the outset that it is
through the “mystery of the Incarnate Word and Redeemer
of the world” that the Church “possesses the truth regarding
the Father and his love for us, and also the truth concerning
man and his freedom.”46 That is, it is only by revelation
interpreted in light of Jesus Christ as the fullness of
revelation that a proper conception of human freedom can
be grasped.
The ICFL points out that the yearning for freedom
central to the modern era has its source in the Christian
heritage, as captured by the witness of Holy Scripture in
both the Old and New Testaments.47 The key liberating
event testified to in the Old Testament is the Exodus: God’s
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE “THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION” (Aug. 6, 1984),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.html [hereinafter
ICATL] makes certain key points more directly and clearly.
45
Again, this is likely due to the Congregation for the Doctrine of
Faith’s (“CDF”) primary concern with addressing liberation theologies,
which tended to reverse the relationship between the Old and New
Testaments. See Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at
265 (noting that, in liberation theology, “baptism is [] understood on
the basis of the exodus,” and “it is the symbol of a political process of
liberation to which” the oppressed are called; and “Jesus is interpreted
by reference back to Moses, while Moses is interpreted in anticipation
by reference to Marx.”). As explained by Ratzinger, the Instructions
take the traditional path of seeking the internal logic of the basic pattern
of biblical testimony to understand God, the world and man. Id. at 266.
46
ICFL, supra note 44, at #3.
47
Id. at #5.
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action in rescuing his People from their bondage in Egypt,
an event preceded by—and later re-enacted through—the
paschal sacrifice and meal.48 The ICFL recognizes the
Exodus as providing a model for freedom and liberation.
The event, however, must be properly understood. The
ICFL thus explains that, in this event, freedom from
economic, political and cultural slavery is attained, but it is
attained part and parcel with God’s action in entering into a
covenant with Israel. Liberty is thus linked to communion
or a relationship with God.49
Further, as part of the covenant, God provides to
Israel its Law, which included both the moral precepts of
the Decalogue and religious and civil norms to govern the
life of the people chosen by God to be his witness among
the nations.50 Because the core of this collection of laws is
love of God above all things and of neighbor as oneself, the
pattern reflected by the Exodus event is freedom to live in a
society “centered upon worship of the Lord and based upon
justice and law inspired by love.”51 The ICFL also explains
48

As clarified by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the fact of the
exodus was possible “through a religious event, the sacrifice of the
pasch, which is an anticipated core-element of the Torah.” See
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 268.
49
ICFL, supra note 44, at #44.
50
Id. at #45.
51
Id. As explained by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the goal of
exodus includes discovery of a law that “provides justice and thus
builds up the right relationships of men and women between each other
and with the whole of creation.” See Ratzinger, Freedom and
Liberation, supra note 24, at 267. “These relationships . . . depend
however on the covenant, indeed they are the covenant; they cannot be
devised and shaped by men and women alone, they depend on the
fundamental relationship with regulates all other relationships, the
relationship with God.” Id. at 267. Indeed, “the really liberating
element in the exodus is represented by the inauguration of the
covenant between God and man, the covenant which is made actual in
the Torah, that is in regulations of justice that are the shape of
freedom.” Id. at 268.
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that the Psalms and the testimony of the Prophets suggest
that injustice within this society occurs from transgressions
of the law caused by “hardened hearts,” and that those
suffering from injustice (the poor and the needy) learn to
place their trust in the Lord: “the ‘poor of Yahweh’ know
that communion with him is the most precious treasure and
the one in which man finds his true freedom.”52
Thus, as stated perhaps more directly in the
previously issued ICATL, the Old Testament portrays
salvation and healing from injustice as essentially a
religious experience.
For example, whatever form
suffering may take on the part of those who are faithful to
the God of the Covenant (poverty, political oppression,
hostility of enemies, injustice, failure, or death), it is from
God alone that one can expect salvation and healing.53
Further, freedom is linked to covenant with God and bound
up with law and norms addressing relationships with God
and others.
The witness provided by the New Testament
clarifies this pattern of freedom. As expressed in the ICFL:
“The Exodus, the Covenant, the Law, the voices of the
Prophets and the spirituality of the ‘poor of Yahweh’ only
achieve their full significance in Christ.”54 It is by the
power of the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ that humanity
has been set free: “Through his perfect obedience on the
Cross and through the glory of his Resurrection, the Lamb
of God has taken away the sin of the world and opened for
us the way to definitive liberation.”55
More specifically, the ICFL explains that the
Paschal Mystery enabled an outpouring of grace. The heart
of Christian freedom therefore lies in the action of grace,
received through faith and the Church’s sacraments. Grace
52

ICFL, supra note 44, at #46-47.
ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #5.
54
ICFL, supra note 44, at #49.
55
Id. at #51.
53
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frees humanity from sin and places humanity in
communion with God.56 That is, through Christ’s Death
and Resurrection, humanity is offered the opportunity to be
reconciled with God, and the human experience of
reconciliation is possible through the action of the Holy
Spirit.57 The essence of the freedom attributable to grace
and the work of the Holy Spirit is a capacity which sin had
impaired—a capacity inherent within human beings to love
God above all things and to remain in communion with
him—a capacity that is constantly challenged or affected by
the mystery of iniquity still at work in the world.58 As a
consequence, Christian life is one of perseverance: human
existence is a “spiritual struggle to live according to the
Gospel and is waged with the weapons of God.”59
Grace, thus, is the source of true freedom.60 And
freedom itself is an enhancement or magnification of the
capacity to love. It is moving away from sin and being
brought into a closer union with God. It is the breaking
down of barriers separating humanity from God.61 Again,
the ICATL perhaps is more clear and direct: “Freedom is a
new life in love.”62
The Instructions therefore make clear that the Old
and New Testaments are consistent in revealing that true
56

Id. at #52.
Id.
58
Id. at #53.
59
Id. at #53 (citing Eph 6, 11-17).
60
Id. at #54.
61
Cf. id. at #52 (“In Christ, we can conquer sin, and death no longer
separates us from God”); Id. at #53 (“For freedom Christ has set us
free” (Gal 5:1).); Id. at #58 (“[P]ossessing the pledge of the Spirit, the
People of God is led towards the fullness of freedom. The new
Jerusalem which we fervently await is rightly called the city of freedom
in the highest sense.”); Id. at #63 (“Through the word of God and the
Sacraments, man is freed in the first place from the power of sin and
the power of the Evil One which oppress him; and he is brought into a
communion of love with God”).
62
ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #2.
57
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liberation depends on God’s action in helping humanity to
avoid hardness of heart, to avoid transgression and sin, and
thus to more fully conform with God’s law or command of
love.63 God calls man to freedom,64 and genuine freedom
is freedom from sin and being with God. Communion with
God is made possible through grace, and communion with
God is linked in some way with how one lives. Living in
accordance with the Gospel brings man and society closer
to God. Rejecting God’s gift of grace results in pursing the
inherent human need for the transcendent—the infinite—in
finite things. Worship of created things—rather than
God—disrupts relationships and causes disorders that affect
the sphere of family and society.65 Thus, liberation from
sin is what will alleviate the evils, oppressions, and
suffering in the world.
V. The Deeper Philosophical &
Foundation for Human Freedom

Theological

As noted, the ICFL explains that the Church
possesses the truth concerning man and his freedom
through the Mystery of Jesus Christ. “From him, who is
‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (Jn 14:6), the Church
receives all that she has to offer mankind.”66 The ICATL
similarly emphasizes that authentic human progress and
liberation rests on three “indispensable pillars” of truth: the
63

Notably, in light of revelation in Jesus Christ, the law of the Old
Testament has been transformed: love is now a “response to the gift of
love with which God draws near to us.” Letter from Benedict XVI,
Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and
Women Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love, (Dec.
25,
2005)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1.
64
ICFL, supra note 44, at #37.
65
Id. at #39.
66
Id. at #3.
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truth about Jesus, the Savior from human sin; the truth
about the Church; and the truth about man and his
dignity.67 The documents explore most deeply the truth
that genuine human liberation is salvific: it is freedom from
sin.
Yet, the overarching theme of the Instructions is
that truth and freedom are inseparably linked, and that
understanding human freedom also hinges on coming to
understand the truth about man. The ICFL states that, by
revealing to man “his condition as a free person called to
enter into communion with God,” the Gospel of Jesus
Christ prompted an awareness of “hitherto unsuspected
depths of human freedom.”68 Similarly, the ICATL notes
that the radical philosophies of freedom which aim to
create a new man through social control and social
structures “leads to the denial of the meaning of the person
and his transcendence” and, at the same time, destroys the
foundation of ethics, namely, the absolute character of the
distinction between good and evil.69 In both instances, the
CDF is emphasizing the importance of properly
understanding the meaning of the human person.
Understanding the truth about man and the human person
clarifies what sin is, which in turn clarifies what constitutes
liberation.
The Instructions, however, do not explore in any
depth the concept of the human person or the truth about
man. The ICFL rejects the modern concept of the subject
of freedom as “an individual who is fully self-sufficient and
whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the
enjoyment of earthly goods.”70 It states that “every
individual is oriented toward other people” and that
genuine freedom exists only where “reciprocal bonds,
67

ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #5.
ICFL, supra note 44, at #5.
69
ICATL, supra note 44, ch. IV, #15.
70
ICFL, supra note 44, at #13.
68
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governed by truth and justice, link people to one another.”71
It also states that “God did not create man as a ‘solitary
being’ but wished him to be a ‘social being,’” and, thus,
man “can only grow and realize his vocation in relation
with others.”72 Sin, breaking away from God in acts of
total autonomy and self-sufficiency, constitutes a denial of
self.73 The freedom possible with the assistance of grace is
a restored capacity to love God and remain in communion
with him.74 Love of God, Christian love, takes the form of
fraternal love.75 And, as stated in the ICATL, “[t]he
recognition of the true relationship of human beings to God
constitutes the foundation of justice to the extent that it
rules the relationships between people.”76
But what is the basis for these propositions? In
what way does the truth about man and his destiny or about
the true relationship of human beings to God undermine
ideas of autonomy and self-sufficiency or, on the contrary,
support the idea that human aspirations for freedom hinge
on relationships between people? Again, it is by careful
reflection on Jesus Christ as the fullness of revelation that
truth emerges. In other writings, Cardinal Ratzinger has
tried to flesh out the truth about man emerging from
philosophical and theological reflection on Jesus Christ.
71

Id. at #26.
Id. at #32.
73
Id. at ##37-38. See also ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #12 (stating
that sin “strikes man in the heart of his personality”). Sin, breaking
away from God, disturbs man’s internal order and balance and the
order and balance in society. Sin also disrupts man’s aspiration to the
infinite, and distorted attachment to finite created things leaves him
“always searching for an impossible peace.” ICFL, supra note 44, at
#40.
74
ICFL, supra note 44, at #53.
75
Id. at ##56-57. Fraternal love encompasses the “direct and
imperative requirement of respect for all human beings in their rights to
life and to dignity.” Id.
76
ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #6. See also ICFL, supra note 44, at
#60.
72
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The short answer is that the Christian perspective of human
freedom is fully supported when it is understood that man
is made in God’s image precisely insofar as being “from,”
“with,” and “for” constitutes the fundamental
anthropological pattern. It is this pattern that constitutes
the essence of the human person. Moreover, human
freedom is a collective endeavor and attaining freedom
depends on following the way opened up by Jesus Christ.
The cornerstone supporting these basic principles is the
idea of a personal God.
A. Freedom Grounded in a Logos that is Love
A comprehensive vision of Christian freedom is
more understandable and compelling when viewed within
the bigger picture of the existence of “being” in the world.
Explaining how Christianity in general fits into the larger
philosophical realm was part of Ratzinger’s objective in his
book Introduction to Christianity. In this book, Ratzinger
was not addressing freedom specifically, but, nonetheless,
made many points in the book that are relevant to
understanding the Christian vision of human freedom.
Ratzinger explains that, when considering the existence of
being in the world, the overarching question is: “In all the
variety of individual things, what is, so to speak, the
common stuff of being – what is the one being behind the
many ‘things’, which nevertheless all ‘exist.’”77 He notes
that the endless variety of philosophies attempting to think
out “being” can, broadly speaking, be reduced to two basic
possibilities: the materialist solution or the idealistic
solution. He then explains Christianity’s tie to the idealistic
solution.

77

JOSEPH RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 156 (J.R.
Foster trans., Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2004) (1968) [hereinafter Ratzinger,
Introduction].
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The materialistic solution sees everything
encountered in the world as mere matter. Matter is the only
thing that “always remains as demonstrable reality and,
consequently, represents the real being of all that exists.”78
Matter is the raw tangible stuff that constitutes or
comprises things and beings in the world. From a
philosophical perspective, matter is a being that does not
comprehend being in that it “‘is’ but does not understand
itself.”79 Thus, if matter is the being of all that exists, the
logical implication is that any capacity to “understand
being” that may exist in the cosmos arises only as a
secondary, chance product during the course of
development.80 Therefore, the fact that human beings can
understand things, or find meaning in things, is a mere
accident. Materialism, then, accords primacy to the
irrational.81
Christianity rejects the materialist solution in favor
of a modified idealistic solution.82 The idealistic solution
78

Id. at 156.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Ratzinger had highlighted this important point in a number of
writings. See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS
OF CULTURES 49 (2006) (noting that whether the world comes from an
irrational source is a fundamental issue: “A reason that has its origin in
the irrational and is itself ultimately irrational does not offer a solution
to our problems. Only that creative reason which has manifested itself
as love in the crucified God can truly show us what life is.”).
82
Ratzinger has explained that all great cultures have recognized the
idealistic solution, namely, the doctrine of objective values expressed in
the Being of the world, and the conviction that man’s Being contains an
imperative; he does not invent morality on the basis of expediency but
rather finds it already present in the essence of things. He notes that
this common insight presents itself as the primal evidential character of
human life, and that modern thinkers drew the “simple conclusion” that
moralities of mankind constitute but human constructions. To
Ratzinger, “this diagnosis is extremely superficial. . . .” See JOSEPH
RATZINGER, Faith’s Answer to the Crisis of Values, IN A TURNING
POINT FOR EUROPE: THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD:
79
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posits that the scrutiny of things in the cosmos shows that
things and beings are “being-thought.” That is, all being is
a product of thought. Thinking is prior to matter, and,
specifically, thinking by a subjective mind.83 In nonChristian versions of idealism, all being is the beingthought of one single consciousness, and all being is
unified in the identity of the one consciousness. Any
appearance of independence proves to be mere
appearance.84 The Christian understanding is different
because the thinking being whose thought produces is not
just thought or Eternal Reason but, rather, the being is also
Love.
The person of Jesus brought this point to light in a
powerful way. But there was an understanding that existed
before Christ as a result of God’s encounters with Israel
that revealed him as a personal God. As Ratzinger
explains, the shema of Israel—“Hear, O Israel. He is our
God. He is One.”—is the real core of the believer’s

ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST, supra note 11, at 35-36. Ratzinger has
also explained that belief in Creation is reasonable, and, further, that
“even from the perspective of the data of the natural sciences it is the
‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and better explanation than any of
the other theories.” See Joseph Ratzinger, God the Creator, in IN THE
BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF THE
CREATION AND THE FALL 17 (Boniface Ramsey trans., Wm. B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co. 1995) (1986) [hereinafter Ratzinger, God the
Creator]. In the second homily Ratzinger explains that the scientificbased theories hinge on the entire ensemble of nature arising out of
errors and dissonances and that some scientists acknowledge the
absurdness of the theories, but, nonetheless, cannot break out of the
scientific mindset because “the scientific method demands that a
question not be permitted to which the answer would have to be God.”
JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Meaning of the Biblical Creation Accounts, in
IN THE BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
THE CREATION AND THE FALL, supra, at 22-25 [hereinafter Ratzinger,
The Meaning].
83
Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 156-57.
84
Id. at 157.
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identity and is grounded in the fact that God loves and
wants a relationship with his creation.
The believing Jew dies
reciting this profession; the
Jewish martyrs breathed their
last declaring it and gave their
lives for it. . . . The fact that
this God now shows us his
face in Jesus Christ (Jn 14:9) –
a face that Moses was not
allowed to see (Ex 33:20) –
does not alter this profession
in the least and changes
nothing essential in this
identity. Of course, the fact
that God is personal is not
mentioned in the Bible using
that term, but it is apparent
nevertheless, inasmuch as
there is a name of God. A
name implies the ability to be
called on, to speak, to hear, to
answer. This is essential for
the biblical God, and if this is
taken away, the faith of the
Bible has been abandoned. . . .
But what is actually meant,
then, by God’s name, by his
being personal?
Precisely
this: Not only can we
experience him, beyond all
[earthly] experience, but also
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he
can
express
communicate himself.85

and

God has revealed to humanity that he wants to
communicate with humans. He has communicated himself
to humanity in history because he desires a relationship
with humanity. And he has welcomed prayer from
humans.86 God’s desire and the nature of the relationship is
revealed most fully through Jesus Christ, but Scripture
reveals that God has been in relationship with humanity
since the dawn of creation. The first step in understanding
human freedom as communal with God—involving a
reality internal to the human being, or a capacity to be in
union with God, involves considering the issue from the
the
perspective
of
Christian
idealism—namely,
understanding of God as Reason and Love.
Ratzinger has stressed in many forums the
importance of the decision by the early Christians to
explicitly recognize that the God of the philosophers—the
Logos, the divine presence that can be perceived by the
rational analysis of reality—is one and the same as the
85

Id. at 22-23 (preface to the 2000 edition).
In Spe Salvi, Pope Benedict XVI explains that outside Christianity, a
God to whom one could pray did not exist, and that the idea of a
personal God radically changed the prevailing world-view that, in a
different way, is prominent today. “It is not the elemental spirits of the
universe, the laws of matter, which ultimately govern the world and
mankind, but a personal God governs the stars, that is, the universe; it
is not the laws of matter and of evolution that have the final say, but
reason, will, love – a Person. And if we know this Person and he
knows us, then truly the inexorable power of material elements no
longer has the last word; we are not slaves of the universe and its laws,
we are free.” Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to Bishops,
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay
Faithful on Christian Love (Nov., 30 2007) (on file with author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20071130_spe-salvi_en.html, at #5.
86
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personal God who has entered history.87 To Christians, the
Logos is not just Eternal Reason. It is not an anonymous,
neutral consciousness. The Christian God is not simply a
“first cause.” Rather, in Christianity the Logos loves. The
Logos is Love.88
A Logos that is Love fundamentally alters idealism.
The consciousness that is the ultimate being is not a mere
craftsman, but rather, is creative mind.89 Indeed, Eternal
Reason is creative because it is Love. Freedom is also a
consequence of Love. In creating or thinking, the Logos
that is Love gives freedom to its creation. As explained by
Ratzinger, the creative consciousness that is Love releases
what has been thought into the freedom of its own,
independent existence. Being-thought of the Logos that is
Love has more than a mere appearance of being: beingthought is true being itself.90
In Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger
highlighted several key implications flowing from this
understanding of Logos as creating and loving that are
relevant to understanding freedom. First, each human
being is not merely an individual “reproduction” or
secondary thing—the result of idea being diffused into
matter. Rather, each human being is a definite being, a true
being, unique and unrepeatable. “The highest is not the
87

Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 138.
Ratzinger gives an extensive treatment to the concept that God is
Love. See Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops,
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay
Faithful on Christian Love, (Dec. 25, 2005) (on file with author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1..
89
Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157. Ratzinger has noted
that the revelation that existence is Creation was itself a decisive
moment of Enlightenment. See Ratzinger, God the Creator, supra note
82, at 14.
90
Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157.
88
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most universal but, precisely, the particular, and the
Christian faith is thus above all also the option for man as
the irreducible, infinity-oriented being.”91 Each human
being exists because of being thought by God and, thus, is
known by and loved by God.
Second, the existence of any being created by the
Logos that is Love is, essentially, freedom. Therefore,
freedom is the structural form of all being.92 Stated another
way, it can be said that life itself is freedom. This has
positive and negative aspects. Because freedom is the
structure of creation, incomprehensibility is part and parcel
of the cosmos.
The world cannot be reduced to
mathematics, and the mystery of the demonic exists: “As
the arena of love [the world] is also the playground of
freedom and also incurs the risk of evil.” But the mystery
of darkness can be seen as an acceptable tradeoff for the
greater positives of freedom and love.93 Each human being
is a distinct being set free by God because of God’s love.
Third, all being is intelligible and meaningful
because pure intellect made it and He made it by thinking
it. The intelligibility in things, in being-thought that is true
being, is the expression of creative pre-mediation. Human
thinking, then, is “re-thinking,” and it is right or true when
it is in conformity with the thought of the Creator.94 As
explained by Ratzinger: “Man can rethink the logos, the
meaning of being, because his own logos, his own reason,
is logos of the one logos, thought of the original thought, of
the creative spirit that permeates and governs his being.”95
This means that the conception of man and the way man
91

Id. at 158. The Supreme Being can care for humans precisely
because His consciousness does not have limits – He can embrace the
whole. Id. at 146. From this perspective, love is higher than thought.
Id. at 147.
92
Id. at 157.
93
Id. at 159-60.
94
Id. at 59.
95
Id.
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should live is correct and true when in conformity with
God’s idea of man. Knowing what it means to be human
means coming to know the “Idea” of the Creative being.
If Eternal Reason and Creative Love are one and the
same, the measure of human action is Truth. This was the
message of Jesus: "The truth will make you free" (Jn 8:32).
But humanity can only know the Truth with God’s help and
Truth that comes from God has its center in Jesus Christ.96
This is the real essence of Christian faith. Faith is the
encounter with Jesus. Faith is the Word coming from the
transcendent. Faith is reception of what cannot be thought
out.97 In God’s encounters with mankind throughout
history, God is seeking a relationship that hinges on
mankind understanding God’s Idea for humanity. Creation
and Covenant go hand in hand.98 Jesus Christ is the key to
understanding God’s Idea for humanity. Jesus Christ is
essential to human freedom because he brought knowledge
and understanding—the fullness of revelation—to assist
human reasoning. But this is not all. It is his presence and

96

ICFL, supra note 44, at #3.
See JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican
Council, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 3, 10 (“Faith is the encounter with
what I cannot think up myself or bring about by my own efforts but
what must come to encounter me”); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21,
at 126-27 (Christian faith is sharing in knowledge with Jesus Christ).
98
To Ratzinger, this point is crucial. Materialism, as it shows up in its
many philosophical forms, rejects creation because it implies a
dependence that deprives the world its power and that ultimately is
perceived as the real barrier to freedom; it will not entrust itself to a
world already created, but only to world still to be created. The
Christian option is the opposite. Human beings are dependent. But it
is a dependence that takes the form of love and, thus, does not involve
diminishment of self, but, rather, leads to freedom. See JOSEPH
RATZINGER, The Consequences of Faith in Creation, in “In the
Beginning. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 98-100.
97
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the presence of the Holy Spirit that enable human union
with God.
B. Trinitarian Insights into Freedom
The Christian vision of freedom as explained by
Ratzinger partially rests on the principle that “man is God’s
image precisely insofar as being ‘from,’ ‘with,’ and ‘for’
constitute the fundamental anthropological pattern.”99 It is
this pattern that constitutes the essence of the human
person. Ratzinger’s understanding of this pattern rests on
the concept of the human person as revealed by Jesus
Christ and, more specifically, by knowledge of God as “one
being in three persons” and knowledge of Jesus Christ as
having “two natures and one person.” Therefore, it is a
concept with meaning because of the Christian doctrine of
the Trinity.
1) The Concept of Person
The concept of person that emerged from the
development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the process
of developing the concept, were explored by Ratzinger in
Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion of Person
in Theology, published in 1990.100 In this article, Ratzinger
points out that early Christian philosophers latched onto a
philosophically insignificant concept—the literary use of
dialogue or roles, persona, to depict the action occurring in
dramatic events—and transformed the concept in a radical
way. “The ‘role’ truly exists; it is . . . the face, the person

99

Ratzinger highlighted this point. See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom,
supra note 26, at 346-47.
100
Joseph Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion
of Person in Theology, 17 COMMUNIO 439 (1990) [hereinafter
Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition].
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of the Logos.”101 Jesus’s words and actions support the
concept of the Trinity, but what helps make the concept of
the Trinity comprehensible?
The early Christian
philosophers used the transformed concept of persona to
help explain the reality of the intra-divine dialogue found
throughout Scripture and the ontological reality of being
emphasized by St. John in writing his Gospel.
Foremost, the concept of “person” was understood
as a dialogical reality whose essence is action. But what is
the nature of this reality?102 To the early Christian
philosophers, the nature of reality fell into one of two
categories: substance (the sustaining form or real essence of
a thing) or matter with its accidents (the chance
circumstances of being). God is wholly spirit with no
accidents. The crux of the question, then, was whether the
persons of God were substance. The philosophers knew
this could not be the case since the essence of God’s being
101

Id. at 439, 442. In interpreting poems or narratives, ancient literary
scholars would uncover the prosopon or persona used by the author. In
studying Scripture, Christian philosophers noticed a similar use of
dialogue in that God speaks to himself and God speaks through the
Prophets. The philosophers spoke in terms of the “sacred writers”
introducing “different prosopa, different roles,” but the Christian
philosophers recognized a radical difference: “The roles introduced by
the sacred writer are realities, they are dialogical realities.” Id. at 441.
102
The question whether the three persons were in fact realities was,
itself, a challenging philosophical and theological question. Therefore,
does the “triplicity” genuinely inform humanity about what God is like
in himself or only about how man can relate to God or the mode in
which God relates to man? The Church settled on the understanding
that “God is as he shows himself; God does not show himself in a way
in which he is not.” Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 165
(emphasis in original). Or, as explained by Ratzinger, “[a]lthough it is
true that we only know God as he is reflected in human thought, the
Christian faith held firmly to the view that in this reflection it is him
that we know. Even if we are not capable of breaking out of the narrow
bounds of our consciousness, God can nevertheless break into this
consciousness and show himself in it.” Id. at 167 (emphasis in
original).
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is oneness. Scripture also made clear the idea of “relation”
between the persons of God: the Father and the Son.
Philosophy traditionally considered “relation” an aspect of
accidents, or a characteristic of matter (a thing is between,
beside, above, etc.), as opposed to form. The logical
solution was thus to conceive of relation differently: as a
reality within being and distinct from substance and
accident. Person is relation. Relation is the person, and the
person exists only as relation. Father, Son, and the Holy
Spirit are real existing relations, and nothing besides.103
Further, they are pure act. The idea that the Father begets
the Son means that the Father is self-donation: pure reality
of act, pure act-being.104 In Ratzinger’s words, “[i]n God,
person is the pure relativity of being turned toward the
other; . . . [it lies] on the level of dialogical reality, of
relativity toward other.”105
Ratzinger recognizes the interplay between
philosophy and theology that led to this original concept of
person as pure relativity toward others. But he also
emphasizes that Scripture confirms and deepens this
understanding. He explains that statements such as “The
Son cannot do anything of himself” (John 5:19) or “I and
the Father are one” (John 10:30) mean that Jesus “has
nothing of himself alone,” that he “does not place himself
as a delimited substance next to the Father;” and that Jesus
“constitutes nothing but relativity toward [the Father] that
103

Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100 at 444.
Id. at 444.
105
Id. Ratzinger emphasizes the novelty and value of this Christian
contribution to human thought: “Again we encounter the Christian
newness of the personalistic idea in all its sharpness and clarity. The
contribution offered by faith to human thought becomes especially
clear and palpable here. It was faith that gave birth to this idea of pure
act, of pure relativity, which does not lie on the level of substance and
does not touch or divide substance; and it was faith that thereby
brought the personal phenomenon into view.” Id. at 445 (emphasis in
original).
104
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does not delimit a precinct of what is merely and properly
its own.”106 Ratzinger also sees other Scriptural themes as
reinforcing the idea of person or relation as encompassing
“openness,” specifically, the theology of mission and the
doctrine of the Logos. In both the Old and New
Testaments, the emissary is one with the sender. Christ is
the genuine emissary who is in his entire nature “the one
sent.” As “the one sent” Jesus stands in complete relativity
of existence towards the one who sent him. Thus, the
“content of Jesus’ existence is ‘being from someone and
toward someone,’ the absolute openness of existence
without any reservation of what is merely and properly
one’s own.”107 The doctrine of the Logos is consistent.
The term Logos has rich significance in terms of eternal
rationality. But, in addition, Ratzinger points out that the
Logos, as Word, “is essentially from someone else and
toward someone else; word is existence that is completely
path and openness.”108
Moreover, Ratzinger points out that Scripture itself
suggests that this idea of person should be transferred to
humans. Jesus tells his disciples that “Without me you can
do nothing” (John 15:5), and prays that “they may be one
as we are one” (John 17:11).109 The idea of emissary,
similarly, is transferred to the disciples when Jesus states,
“As the Father has sent me, so I am sending you” (John
20:21). Ratzinger thus notes:

106

Id. at 445.
Id. at 446.
108
Id.
109
Ratzinger thus notes: “It is thus part of the existence even of the
disciples that man does not posit the reservation of what is merely and
properly his own, does not strive to form the substance of the closed
self, but enters into pure relativity toward the other and toward God. It
is in this way that he truly come to himself and into the fullness of his
own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom he is related.”
Id. at 445.
107
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I
believe
a
profound
illumination of God as well as
man occurs here, the decisive
illumination of what person
must mean in terms of
Scripture: not a substance that
closes itself in itself, but the
phenomenon of complete
relativity, which is, of course,
realized in its entirety only in
the one who is God, but which
indicates the direction of all
personal being.”110
Theological and philosophical reflection on the knowledge
of God as the Trinity, as three persons in one being, thus
provides a solid foundation for the idea that “relativity,
being turned toward other” is a distinct aspect of the human
person and thus of human existence.
In Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger also discusses
how reflection on knowledge of Christ reinforces this
vision of the human person. In trying to grasp the meaning
of Christ, theologians again focused on the word persona.
The formula is as follows: Christ has two natures—a
divine and human nature—but only one divine person.
Ratzinger notes that, as to the meaning of “person”
reflected in this formula, the early theologians worked out
what the person is not, but did not clarify with the same
precision what the concept means positively. In the many
battles over the question of “who and what is this Christ,” it
was clarified that the formula and its use of the phrase
“divine person” does not in any way indicate that anything
was lacking in the humanity of Christ.111 Therefore, the
phrase “divine person” cannot be thought of as indicating
110
111

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 448.
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that the reality of person, the reality of relativity, does not
reach Jesus’s humanity. Rather, the concept of person is an
essential aspect of the entire existence of Jesus, his divinity
and humanity. Beyond this, however, Ratzinger only
identifies “hints that point out the direction” for
Christological and, in turn, anthropological reflection. Yet
these hints are powerful and well grounded.
Ratzinger points out that Boethius’s concept of
person, which prevailed in Western philosophy as “the
individual substance of a rational nature,” is erroneous and
unhelpful in the context of the Trinity and Christology
because it puts the idea of “person” on the level of
substance.112 Reflection on God as three persons has
placed “person” in an arena of being distinct from both
substance and accident or matter. Further, person is an
aspect of the spirit, and in Jesus, would be an aspect of his
divinity and humanity.
In humanity, this spirit is
embodied.
Ratzinger then engages in philosophical reflection
on the nature of spirit to make a key point about the human
person. First, in contrast to matter that “is what is,” the
spirit is that “which is not only there, but is itself in
transcending itself, in looking toward the other and in
Because openness—
looking back upon itself.”113
relatedness to the whole—is thus the essence of spirit, it is
in reaching beyond itself, by being with other, that spirit
comes to itself. Second, spirit is that being which is able to
think about itself, about being in general, and about the
wholly other, namely, the transcendent God. Indeed,
Ratzinger points out that the ability to reflect on the
concept of God is the mark that truly distinguishes the
112

Id. at 448. (In other contexts, Boethius’s concept can provide a
springboard for reflection about the concept of person. See, e.g., John
Paul II’s work on the acting-person.)
113
Id. at 451 (quoting HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, DAS SEIN 133 (
1957)).
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human spirit from other forms of consciousness found in
animals.114 Third, the other through which the spirit
ultimately comes to itself must be God. He concludes that
if the person is itself the more it is with the other, “then the
person is all the more itself the more it is with the wholly
other, with God.”115 Or, stated another way: the “human
person is the event or being of relativity” and the “more the
person’s relativity aims totally and directly at its final goal,
at transcendence, the more the person is itself.”116
Integrating this point with knowledge of Christ,
Ratzinger sees two main ideas emerge. In Christ, “being
with other” is radically realized. Relativity toward other is
always the foundation of his consciousness and existence.
But this does not cancel out the “being with” that is
inherent to his human nature. “In Christ, in the man who is
completely with God, human existence is not canceled, but
comes to its highest possibility, which consists in
transcending itself into the absolute and in the integration
of its own relativity into the absoluteness of divine love.”117
Ratzinger’s first point is that this implies that the human
person in history is “being on the way” towards integration
into divine love.118
His second point flows from the fact that knowledge
of Christ “adds the idea of ‘we’ to the idea of ‘I’ and
‘you.’” Ratzinger notes that Scripture depicts Christ as the
“all-encompassing space in which the ‘we’ of human
beings gathers on the way to the Father.”119 Therefore,
Christ, the one divine person, is the “we” into which Love,
the Holy Spirit, gathers humanity. Similarly, Scripture
114

Id. at 451.
Id. at 451-52.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. Ratzinger does not emphasize the point in this article, but this
fact is also the reason why, or the mechanism through which, the
persons of collective humanity are able to integrate with God.
119
Id. at 452-53.
115
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shows God as the “we” of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Thus, the dialogical principle in Christianity is not simply
an “I-Thou” relationship. Rather, on both sides of the
dialogue, the “I” is integrated into the greater “we.”120
Thus, the true character of dialogue with the Father—
integration of the human relativity with Divine Love—is
properly reflected in the liturgical formula “through Christ
in the Holy Spirit to the Father.”121 To Ratzinger, this
proper understanding of the human person’s relationship
with God totally undermines a Christian view that
emphasizes only an individualized relationship with
God.122 Individuals should strive for a deep and personally
heartfelt relationship with God, but each person’s
relationship with God is necessarily intertwined with and
part of God’s relationship with humanity as a whole.
2) Freedom as Transcendence towards
Other
Understanding the concept of the human person,
and integrating it with the cornerstone idea of a personal
God, clarifies the following: The human being is a unity, a
spirit-in-body. An essential aspect of this unity is an
existential component: a reality encompassed by the term
person, a component that is pure relativity that knows of
God and is striving for integration with or union with God.
120

Id. at 453.
Id.
122
He also notes that the typical individualized “I”–“You” perspective
contributed to the eventual loss of the “You.” Id. at 453 (noting that in
Kant’s transcendental philosophy the “you” is no longer found). At the
same time, Ratzinger acknowledges that this collective vision of
integration or union with God was obscured by the manner in which
both Augustine and Thomas Aquinas presented certain aspects of the
Trinity. Id. at 454. See also id. at 449. But, the existential approach had
been introduced by the beginning of the Middle Ages by Richard of St.
Victor. See id. at 449.
121
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This existential component is integral to each human being
by virtue of being a creature of a personal God, a Logos
that is Love, and a God whose essence of oneness includes
a dialogical reality that is pure relativity of being turned
toward other. Indeed, for a Logos that is Love—a personal
God—this reality that is pure relativity necessarily exists.
It is the essence of Love. And it is this Love that is an
integral part of each human being and an inherent aspect of
human nature.123 It is this Love that is the person and the
relativity of each human. The love or relativity within each
human being is completed only by re-union with God.
Union or integration occurs on the level or plane of
relation, or Love, and union with God depends on thinking
and acting with God. Union or integration of this love in
each human being with Divine Love is possible in and
through Jesus Christ and, thus, occurs collectively with
other human beings.
These insights into the essence of the concept of
person clarify the nature of sin and thus why genuine
liberation is freedom from sin. Man does not come to
himself through autonomy and self-sufficiency. Rather, the
human person strives towards transcendence. “It is in this
way that he truly comes to himself and into the fullness of
his own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom
he is related.”124 This involves turning toward others. The
fundamental figure of human existence thus is a being
“from,” “with,” and “for,” and sin thus consists in human
123

The magisterium uses the phrase “nature of a being” to refer to what
constitutes the being as such, with the dynamism of its tendencies
toward its proper ends; “It is from God that natures possess what they
are, as well as their proper ends.” Beings are created and “impregnated
with a significance in which man, as the image of God, is capable of
discerning the creating hand of God.” INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL
COMMISSION, FAITH AND INCULTURATION ch. I, #1 (1988), available
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents
/rc_cti_1988_fede-inculturazione_en.html (internal quotations omitted)
124
Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100, at 445.
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actions that interfere with this pattern and with union with
God. Further, because the person is more himself or herself
the more the person’s relativity aims totally and directly at
its final goal and at transcendence, freedom necessarily
consists in liberation from sin.
C. The Incarnation: Freedom as Fulfillment of
the Divine Idea
The revelation brought by Jesus Christ opened a
whole new dimension to humanity’s knowledge of God
and, in turn, humanity’s knowledge of man. While this
article has discussed much of that insight bearing on human
freedom, Ratzinger’s writing fleshes out an even deeper
dimension of human freedom. A dimension grounded in
the unity of humanity and relating to how Jesus Christ
enables human union with God. This perspective of human
freedom only comes to light with the fullness of the
message of Christ. A fullness that is still unfolding but that
was rendered substantially comprehensible in the first
several centuries of Christianity by Christian philosophers
working with the Church and from within the faith.
In working out the implications of the doctrine of
the Trinity, along with the implications of understanding
the Logos as Love, the meaning of liberation from sin
began to come to light. Jesus brought liberation from sin.
It is in Christ that humanity has been set free. Freedom is
thinking and acting with God, such that union with God
occurs on the level or plane of relation, or Love. But, the
question arises: How, more specifically, does Jesus enable
humanity to achieve God’s objective? Ratzinger has
addressed this more particular aspect of the Mystery of the
Incarnation and the Trinity.
As explained, the doctrine of the Trinity posits God
as three Persons in One Being. Each Person is a reality or
an act of relativity. God is Father only in relation to his
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Son, only in “being for” the other. He is the act of giving
himself. Similarly, Christ is Son only in relation to Father.
He has nothing of his own and can do nothing on his own.
He stands in the Father and constantly is one with him.
Son is “being from” another. But since he also is one with
the Father, he is a “being for.” The Son is being “for
others.” This is the essence of the revelation of Jesus’s life
and work: the whole being of Jesus is a function of the “for
us.”125 Jesus is thus absolute openness of existence, from
and for. This existence is a complete path and openness.
The Holy Spirit is God facing outward, the means through
which Jesus Christ—in all his openness and breadth and
freedom—remains present in the history of the world.126
The Holy Spirit is the gift of Love and the constituting
principle of the new man in Christ.127
Ratzinger notes in Introduction to Christianity that,
in addition to other radical insights, the triple relativity of
these Persons in the one Being of God brought about a
profound break-through relating to unity and plurality in
125

Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 204. Indeed, Christians
understand that it is only “to him who died on the Cross, to him who
renounced all earthly power . . . to him who laid aside the sword and . .
. went to his death for others, to him who saw the meaning of human
existence, not in power and self-assertion, but in existing utterly for
others – who indeed was, as the Cross shows, existence for others – to
him and him alone God has said “You are my son, today I have
begotten you.” Id. at 219. Love of God and neighbor, which devolves
to service to others is, of course, the crux of the Jesus’s teaching. But,
what is important is not that Jesus left behind a body of teaching. What
is important is that Jesus is his teaching. Id. at 205, 226. As explained
by Ratzinger, “his being itself is service” and for this reason “it is
sonship.” Id. at 226.
126
Id. at 332-34.
127
Id. at 337. The Holy Spirit is “God’s gift to history in the
community of those who believe in Christ,” id. at 331, a gift accessible
largely through baptism, penance, and the Eucharist. Id. at 336. The
center of the Spirit’s activity in the world is thus the Church. Id. at
335.
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the philosophy of being. To ancient thought, only unity or
oneness could be divine, and plurality was conceived as a
disintegration of divine.128 However, if the highest Being
no longer is understood as a detached Being, existing
closed in on himself in his oneness, divinity is not mere
unity. Plurality too has its inner ground in God. “Plurality
is not just disintegration that sets in outside the divinity. . . .
it is not the result of the dualism of two opposing powers; it
corresponds to the creative fullness of God, who himself
stands above plurality and unity, encompassing both.”129
Ratzinger explains that the “multi-unity that grows in love
is a more radical, truer unity than the unity of the
‘atom.’”130 Thus, the “three persons” who exist in God do
not impair the unity or oneness of God but, rather, fills-out
that oneness.131
The idea that plurality can enhance unity makes
comprehensible the idea of collective freedom in and
through Jesus. Notably, Ratzinger explains in Introduction
to Christianity that this fuller message of Christian
liberation from sin has been obscured in recent centuries
due to an emphasis on “theologies of the cross” and St.
Anselm’s “satisfaction theory.”132 While these theories
have elements of truth, Ratzinger argues that a truer picture
exists. This picture rests more heavily on a theology of the
Incarnation and the Logos as Love. As explained, the
Logos that is Love creates being that can understand itself
and desires. That being does understand itself and that it
thereby comes to itself. The Incarnation is essential to this
objective. For humanity, the Incarnation was a crucial step
in the process of coming to know itself. Further, for the
128

Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
130
Id.
131
“[P]ure oneness can only occur in the spirit and embraces the
relatedness of love.” Id. at 188.
132
Id. at 231-32.
129

78

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 406
Logos that is Love, the Incarnation simply is part and
parcel of the divine Idea “man.”
The doctrine of the Incarnation focuses on the fact
of God’s assuming human nature: the fact that the Word
became flesh. Although this paper has not yet focused on
it, one other important aspect of the philosophical and
theological debates concerning the doctrine of the Trinity is
the key question whether Jesus was both fully divine and
fully human. In fact, the issue is the most fundamental one
because if Jesus was not fully divine and fully human, there
would be no need to delve into the issue of what it means
that there exist “three Persons in one Being.” Despite the
many theories proffered with other answers, however,
Christian philosophers working with the Church and from
within the faith adhered to the central conviction that
Jesus’s two natures, human and divine, were both
complete. Only in this way would his mediation be true
mediation. If he were some type of intermediate being his
presence would guide humanity not toward God, but away
from God, resulting in separation rather than mediation.133
As explained by Ratzinger, “[o]nly if he was really a man
like us can he be our mediator, and only if he is really God,
like God, does the mediation reach its goal.”134
In Incarnation theologies, being mediator (or
pathway) is an essential aspect of Christ’s liberation of
humanity. Ratzinger explains the theory as follows: Jesus
is the exemplary man, the Second Adam.135 The first
Adam, the moment when God’s Idea of man first took
shape, was but a first step in man’s process of becoming
man.136 The first step involved the transition from mere
life to mind. The second step, accomplished in Jesus, the
133

Id. at 163.
Id. at 166.
135
Holy Scripture refers to Jesus as the Second Adam. See id. at 236.
136
Ratzinger explains that, in the Bible, the word “Adam” expresses the
unity of the whole creature “man.” Id. at 236.
134
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Second Adam, involved a more intense contact between
humanity and God.
Man came into existence out
of the “clay” at the moment
when a creature was no longer
merely “there” but, over and
above just being there and
filling his needs, was aware of
the whole. But this step,
through
which
logos,
understanding, mind, first
came into this world, is only
completed when the Logos
itself, the whole creative
meaning, and man merge into
each other.
Man’s full
“hominization” presupposes
God’s becoming man; only by
this event is the Rubicon
dividing the “animal” from the
“logical” finally crossed for
ever and the highest possible
development accorded to the
process
[of
humanity’s
137
creation].”
It is in Jesus Christ, then, that humanity has reached its
goal.138 It is openness to the infinite that is the true mark of
man, and man is most complete when he is one with the
infinite. Jesus is “true man” because the person that is part
and parcel of his human nature is one with God.
137

Id. at 235.
As Ratzinger has stated elsewhere: “We can say that God created the
universe in order to enter into a history of love with humankind.”
Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 30.

138

80

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 408
It is important to appreciate two distinct aspects of
this Incarnation theory. First, it is grounded in the
understanding that there is one Divine Idea “man” that is
fulfilled in Jesus Christ.139 This key point was uniformly
held and taught by important and influential early Christian
thinkers.140 Ratzinger explicitly made this point in a 1981
Lenten homily entitled The Creation of the Human Being.
141
In that homily, Ratzinger explains that, in the biblical
account of Creation, God reveals much insight about this
Divine Idea:





Humanity is one Creation
from God’s one Good Earth.
The human being comes into
existence after God has
breathed his breath into the
body, when divine reality
enters humanity—when God
enters into his Creation.
Because divine reality is in
humanity, each human being
is known and loved by God,
is willed, and is made in his
image.

139

Ratzinger makes this point only in passing in Ratzinger, Truth and
Freedom, supra note 26, at 351.
140
See HENRI DE LUBAC, CATHOLICISM: CHRIST AND THE COMMON
DESTINY OF MAN (Lacelot C. Sheppard & Sister Elizabeth Englund
trans., Ignatius Press 1988) (1947) (citing and extensively quoting from
the work of the Church Fathers and early Christian philosophers).
Notably, Lubac’s work greatly influenced Ratzinger’s approach to faith
and theology.
141
JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Creation of the Human Being, in IN THE
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 41-58 [hereinafter
Ratzinger, The Creation].

81

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 409






Each human being realizes
the One project of God, and
has his or her origin in the
same Creative Idea of God.
To be the image of God
implies an inherent capacity
for relationship and capacity
for God.
The distinctive mark of the
human being is the capability
to think and to pray; humans
are beings of word and
love—beings moving toward
Another.142

Jesus is the exemplary man or Last Adam because, in Jesus,
the person inherent to his human nature is integrated with
his divinity and is completely open to God. God’s one Idea
“man” has thus achieved the goal of being completely open
to God.
This tells us about God’s goal for each human
being. The “true man”—the man conforming with the
Divine Idea “man”—is a person in union with God in a
manner akin to Jesus, but in a manner that is only possible
in and through Jesus. And this leads to the second
important aspect of the Incarnation theory. It helps clarify
how it is that Jesus Christ enables humanity to achieve
God’s goal.
In the article Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger
points out that in integrating knowledge about the human
person with knowledge of Christ, two main ideas emerge.
One is the idea that the human person in history is “being
on the way” towards fuller integration into Divine Love.
The second idea has bearing on how Jesus enables
142

Id. at 44-48.
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humanity, as a unity, to achieve God’s goal. Jesus Christ is
the all-encompassing space in which the “we” of human
beings gather on the way to the Father, into which the Holy
Spirit, Love, gathers humanity.143
The vision, then, is one in which the Holy Spirit
(the means through which Jesus Christ remains present in
history) is within human beings, enabling and enhancing
the inherent human capacity to love God and the inherent
relativity (Love) within human beings. In turn, that Love
within human beings is held together in unity and in the
space, openness, or path that is Jesus Christ, thereby linking
united human love with God’s love.
As pointed out by Ratzinger, this vision necessarily
implies the collective nature of man’s union with God.
Love of God and love of neighbor are thus inherently and
inextricably intertwined. Within the human being there is a
reality consisting of relativity, Love. This relativity is
ultimately reaching for God. But it is affected by
interactions with others. Actions of “being-with” or
“being-for” others enhances the movement towards God
and vice versa. The collective nature of humanity’s union
with God means that the action of any one person affects
the union of others with God. Actions of “being-with” or
“being-for” by any individual enhance the overall
movement towards God; negative actions by any individual
have a negative effect on the whole of humanity’s
movement towards God.
In humanity, then, from the beginning, heaven and
earth touch. In Jesus Christ the creation of humanity is
brought to completion. The pathway between heaven and
earth is fully opened, and all integration or union between
God and humanity—the one Divine Idea—will be by way
of the divine person Jesus. Thus, Jesus is “the way, and the
truth, and the life" (Jn 14:6). Jesus is the pathway that each
143

See supra notes 113 to 122 and accompanying text.

83

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 411
human being must endeavor to follow during his or her
lifetime in history. By following Jesus Christ in one’s
lifetime, one becomes, in reality, encompassed within
Jesus’s one saving action.144 Each individual is saved only
within the context of the whole. Moreover, by virtue of
being integrated with God, the plurality within the human
unity—a multi-unity in Love—contributes to the fullness of
the oneness of God.
D. Reprise of the Vision
As demonstrated by the foregoing subsection, the
Christian vision of freedom has layers of complexity. The
deeper the reflection is pushed—the more one uses human
reasoning to assist in understanding God’s revelation—the
more it becomes apparent that how freedom is used is
important.
The Christian vision is based on an
understanding of humanity and its history and destiny as
revealed by God. Human freedom depends on God and is
freedom from sin. This is so because the Creator of
humanity is Reason and Love. Each human being is a
distinct being set free by the Creative Logos that is Love.
Human life—the living out the freedom given by God—
should be a response to God. That response is guided by
and made possible by God, both by virtue of inherent
capacities within the human person and by virtue of God’s
144

In discussing Christian worship, which encompasses the entirety of
one’s life, Ratzinger explains: “The fundamental principle of Christian
worship is consequently this movement of exodus with its two-in-one
direction toward God and fellowman. By carrying humanity to God,
Christ incorporates it in his salvation. . . . [H]e who was crucified has
smelted the body of humanity into the Yes of worship. [Christian
sacrifice] is completely ‘anthropocentric’, entirely related to man,
because it was radical theocentricity, delivery of the ’I‘ and therefore of
the creature man to God. . . . The fundamental principle of sacrifice is
not destruction but love.” Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at
289.
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revelation, especially the fullness of revelation in Jesus
Christ.
In particular, love is a capacity, an existential
capacity that is itself a reality. Love is a transcendent
character within humans designed to reach beyond self,
especially towards God but also towards other human
beings. The purpose and goal of this capacity in the human
person is re-union with God, which depends on acting in
accord with God, which means acting in accord with the
truth at both the individual and collective levels. It is this
union with the transcendent that the human spirit is striving
for and that gives rise to the human yearning for freedom.
It is this inherent capacity to seek God that is the truly
distinguishing characteristic of humanity.
Union with the Creator depends on thinking and
acting in conformity with Eternal Reason and Love. In
practice, this means being receptive to God and other and
acting in conformity with the fundamental anthropological
pattern: being-from, being-with, and being-for. This is the
meaning or intelligibility within man, and it is acting
consistently with the meaning internal to man that
constitutes genuine human freedom.145 The inviolable
standards necessary for democratic society must be
standards that safeguard genuine human freedom.
Christian values provide just this type of standard. They
are values that have their origin from the Creator of
humanity and the world and are fully consistent with the

145

Because human freedom depends on grace, the Church and its
sacraments, especially baptism and penance and the Eucharist,
generally are crucial to attaining freedom. The capacity to love God
and remain in communion with him is dramatically enhanced by
reception of grace through the sacraments. For example, Ratzinger has
described the Eucharistic community as a “holy thing” granted to the
Church as the “real bond of unity.” See Ratzinger, Introduction, supra
note 77, at 334. Further, the Church is to be understood as the “center
of the Spirit’s activity in the world.” Id. at 335-36.
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pattern of love, the pattern of being-from, being-with, and
being-for.
V. Ordering Freedom in Accord with the Human
Spirit and Democratic Ideals
The well-reasoned alternative vision of human
freedom presented by Ratzinger clarifies the argument that
freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when core
Christian moral insights provide the point of reference for
law and justice. As noted at the outset, Ratzinger has
supplemented his argument with analysis of why prevalent
political theories of the modern era have failed. Part I of
this article presented part of Ratzinger’s assessment of the
shortcomings of modernity’s radical notion of human
freedom. This part of the article highlights another aspect
of the assessment, namely, that modernity’s typical
approach to freedom has missed its mark precisely because
of its failure to be guided by the fundamental pattern of
love imprinted within every human being. It then briefly
discusses certain aspects of how use of fundamental
Christian insights can be fully consistent with key ideals
held in a pluralistic democratic society.
A. Modern Ideas of Freedom Are in Opposition
to the Essence of the Human Person
In Truth and Freedom,146 published in 1996,
Ratzinger identifies fundamental elements of modern
approaches to freedom 147 and shows that these elements
146

Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 337-53.
Ratzinger traces the evolution from Luther’s struggle for freedom of
conscience in the religious sphere; to the middle phrase characterized
by Kant’s call to use “pure reason,” and where two distinct approaches
emerged: a natural rights orientation grounded in a metaphysical idea,
and a radical anarchic approach wherein no right order exists in nature

147
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tend to allow humans to act in opposition to the internal
striving of the human spirit. Ratzinger’s analysis supports
the vision that freedom is inherently linked to truth and,
specifically, the truth regarding the essence of human
existence.
He shows that modernity’s anarchical
conception of freedom cannot be correct because it allows
humans to regard the “fundamental figure of human
existence” as itself an attack on freedom.
Ratzinger’s analysis is based on the principle that
the fundamental pattern of human existence is a being
“from,” “with,” and “for” another. 148 Ratzinger points out
(arising from Rousseau’s ideas); to the later Marxist approaches. Id. at
340-43. He concludes that the widespread view of freedom today is
characterized by the individualistic ideology which was a component of
all Enlightenment thought by anarchic tendencies (human will is the
sole norm of human action) and by the Marxist tendency to rely on
structures and systems to bring about justice. Id. at 342-43. Despite
failures to bring about a sense of justice, Ratzinger notes that the
radical current of Enlightenment has not lost its appeal. Fascination for
the grand promise of emancipation made at the inception of modernity
remains. Id. at 344. To Ratzinger, then, the question “What is
freedom?” cannot be avoided and involves issues of “what man is and
how he can live rightly both individually and collectively.” Id. at 33840, 344.
148
Id. at 346. Notably, the philosophical or theological basis for
understanding human beings as “beings from, with, and for” is
suggested only in passing in Truth and Freedom. Ratzinger points to
the “hidden theological core” underlying the modern, anarchic
conception of freedom: the desire to be “like a god who depends on
nothing and no one, whose own freedom is not restricted by that of
another.” Id. at 347. But he also points to the theological error. In this
ideology the divinity is conceived as a pure egoism, which is the
extreme opposite of the real essence of God as revealed by God in
Jesus Christ. In Jesus, God has revealed himself as relational: “by his
very nature he is entirely being-for (Father), being-from (Son), and
being-with (Holy Spirit).” Id. at 347. For Ratzinger, this is the reason
why the essence of human existence follows the pattern. Resisting the
pattern leads to dehumanization, which will result in the destruction of
the human being through the destruction of the truth of the human
being. Id. at 347.
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that this fundamental anthropological pattern is most
starkly presented by the unborn child. The being of the
unborn child is only from and through the mother and can
survive only by physically being with the mother. The
“being-with” of the child prompts the being of the mother
to become a “being for.” Importantly, the pattern remains
after the child is born. The outward form of the “beingfrom and -with” may change as the child matures. The
child nonetheless remains dependent; and although the
mother may assign the care of the child to another, there
remains “a ‘from’ that demands a ‘for.’”149 Furthermore,
Ratzinger points out that this pattern remains even in
adults: “Even the adult can exist only with and from
another, and is thus continually thrown back on that beingfor which is the very thing he would like to shut out.”150

149

Id. at 346.
Id. at 346. Notably, this important point—the all-encompassing
nature of the “from” and “for” pattern—is illustrated more thoroughly
by Ratzinger in other writings. Ratzinger links the pattern to
humanity’s corporality, i.e., his being “spirit in body.” See Ratzinger,
Introduction, supra note 77.
Corporality necessitates physical
dependence on those immediately surrounding a human being
(including both parentage and mutual daily care); but this dependence
extends to needs of the spirit in man and, as well, extends to
dependence on the past and future of mankind. By way of example, he
points to the human need for language (to which the whole of history
has contributed); for culture (the “web of history that impinges on the
individual through speech and social communication”); and for a future
(“man is a being who lives for the future, who continually takes care to
plan ahead beyond the passing moment and could no longer exist if he
suddenly found himself without a future”). Id. at 245-48.
Another important insight on the human need for other was
made by Ratzinger in a 1981 Lenten homily: “Human beings have their
selves not only in themselves but also outside of themselves: they live
in those whom they love and in those who love them and to whom they
are ‘present.’” See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Sin and Salvation, in IN THE
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 72.
150
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Ratzinger then focuses on the fact that man in
contemporary society mightily resists this fundamental
pattern. “[M]an quite spontaneously takes for granted the
being-for of others in the form of today’s network of
service systems, yet if he had his way he would prefer not
to be forced to participate in such a “from” and “for,” but
would like to become wholly independent, and to be able to
do and not to do just what he pleases.”151 Ratzinger notes
that it is this modern attitude or demand for freedom that is
reflected in society’s acceptance of abortion. “[A]bortion
appears as a right of freedom.” The woman “must have the
power to make decisions about her own life, and no one
else can – so we are told – impose from the outside any
ultimately binding norm.”152 Ratzinger’s point of emphasis
is that, from the modern perspective of freedom, requiring a
woman to act in accord with the basic anthropologic pattern
is perceived as an attack on freedom.153 This example
supports Ratzinger’s key argument that a conception of
freedom that demands liberation from the very essence of
what it means to be human simply cannot be correct. As he
states, “exactly what sort of freedom has the right to annul
another’s freedom as soon as it begins?”154
Genuine human freedom, therefore, cannot rest on
the individualistic model of radical autonomy and selfsufficiency. The complex weave of human dependencies
does not allow this approach. Rather, Ratzinger explains,
“Man’s freedom is shared freedom, freedom in the conjoint
existence of liberties that limit and thus sustain one
151

Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 346-47.
Id. at 346.
153
Id. at 347.
154
That society would allow real but secondary interests to prevail over
the fundamental right to life also shows that modernity’s decision to
restrict reason results in reason being used to justify the irrational.
JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 63
(2006).
152
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another.”155 This conception of freedom thus necessarily
requires a right or just ordering of rights and relationships:
an “ordered communion of freedoms.”156 This sort of
“right ordering” requires laws in society that are grounded
in standards or values that foster human action consistent
with the truth regarding the essence of human existence.
This reference to “right ordering” in Truth and Freedom is
very similar to a statement expressed in the Instruction on
Christian Freedom and Liberation issued by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
Truth and justice are therefore
the measure of true freedom. .
. . Far from being achieved in
total self-sufficiency and an
absence
of
relationships,
freedom only truly exists
where
reciprocal
bonds,
governed by truth and justice,
link people to one another.
But for such bonds to be
possible, each person must
live in the truth.157
This is, then, but another way of saying that each person
must live in conformity with the intelligibility within man,
the pattern of “being-from,” “being-with,” and “being-for.”

155

Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 348.
Id. at 352.
157
ICFL, supra note 44, at #26. In Truth and Freedom, Ratzinger
shows that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of
responsibility and acceptance of ever greater fraternal bonds and that
responsibility, living in response to what the human being is in truth,
entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational
understanding. Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 34951.
156
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B. Ordering Freedom in Love Is Consistent with
Democratic Ideals
Ratzinger’s vision for protecting freedom in society
rests on three points. First, freedom is safeguarded only
when democratic government and the majority vote are
limited by inviolable moral standards.
Second,
safeguarding genuine freedom—freedom consistent with
the internal yearning for the transcendent—requires that the
inviolable standards be consistent with the intelligibility
within man—the “being-from,” “being-with,” and “beingfor” pattern impressed on the human spirit by virtue of
being a creature of God. Third, core Christian insights and
values properly used to inform the ordering of relationships
in society can achieve this requisite conformity to Eternal
Reason and Love. As noted, this “right ordering” requires
laws in society that are grounded in standards or values that
foster human action consistent with the truth. Further,
although Ratzinger agrees with the idea of a secular state,
he advocates that the State has a role in prudently fostering
respect for those values, including expecting reverence and
respect for God and holy things, and encouraging serious
study of questions such as the existence of and nature of
This vision remains consistent with key
God.158
158

See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 21820. A key reason for this type of state action is the need for sufficient
unity among the citizens regarding the values deemed inviolable. See
Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 188
(“Ultimately, the democratic system can only function if certain
fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone . . . an
ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained even if its rational basis
cannot be established absolutely and conclusively”). See also
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205 (“[Pluralist
democracy, in itself, does not] unite[] its citizens in a fundamental
assent to the state;” for its foundations, it depends on other powers and
forces outside of itself); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21, at 131
(noting that “a formal unity without clear content is fundamentally no

91

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 419
democratic ideals. It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss this point in detail, but it is important to recognize
that Ratzinger has addressed this concern.
From a practical perspective, Ratzinger recognizes
the need to adhere to two key principles in carrying out the
exchange between politics and faith. First, he readily
acknowledges the need to maintain the properly distinct
and delimited spheres of Church and State.159 Ratzinger
notes that the Christian faith brought about the secular
state, a society in which the political realm is limited and
provides space for freedom of conscience.160 The State is
responsible for peace and justice, and governs on the basis

unity at all; unity based on common skepticism and not knowledge is,
in essence, based on capitulation).
Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary
responsibility for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the
Church and Christians. Id. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom,
Law, and the Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006)
(emphasizing the public task of Christian churches in that they must be
free “to address the freedom of all human beings so the moral forces of
history may remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER,
Biblical Aspects of the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH,
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note
12, at 147, 151 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects] (The core
responsible political activity is to nurture public acceptance of the
validity of morality and God’s commandments.).
159
See, e.g., Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 161-62
(noting that “[w]here the Church itself becomes the state, freedom
becomes lost.” But freedom is also lost when the Church is precluded
from being a public and publically relevant authority).
160
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Conscience in Its Age, in CHURCH,
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note
12, at 165, 174 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Conscience] (noting that, by
altering the ancient practice of state authority over religion, Jesus set a
limit to earthly authority and proclaimed the freedom of the person that
transcends all political systems); Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects, supra
note 158, at 148-49; JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 114 (2006).
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of reason.161 But Church and State have a common moral
responsibility based on the essence of man and the essence
of justice.162 Thus, although politics is the realm of reason,
Ratzinger emphasizes that political reason must include
moral reason.163 Further, it cannot be limited to mere
technological and calculating reason, a reason that has cut
off its historical roots, namely, the basic memory of
Because of modernity’s self-imposed
mankind.164
narrowing of reason, the evidential character of a
fundamental intuition common to all the great cultures has
been eroded, namely, the conviction regarding:
[T]he doctrine of objective
values expressed in the Being
of the world; the belief that
attitudes exist that correspond
to the message of the universe
and are true and therefore
good, and that other attitudes
161

See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 22-24 (2006)..
162
See, e.g., id. at 114. Ratzinger frequently explains that the essence
of justice depends on a universal criterion, as opposed to merely
pragmatic criteria determined by the group or by majority vote. See,
e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 133-37 (noting that,
in Greek and Roman philosophy of the state, a state that constructs
justice only on the basis of majority opinions sinks down to the level of
the “robber band”).
163
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, NEED ARTICLE NAME, in VALUES
IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 24 (2006); Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation,
supra note 12, 216-17.
164
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF
CULTURES 36-43 (2006) (explaining the confused ideology of freedom
that has resulted from modern philosophy’s tendency to limit reason to
what is considered objectively verifiable fact, and to see issues only in
terms of feasibility, functionality, and effectiveness and characterizing
such an approach to reasoning as being radically opposed to all other
historical cultures of humanity).
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likewise exist that are
genuinely and always false
because they contradict Being.
. . . [and thus] the conviction
that man’s Being contains an
imperative; the conviction that
he does not himself invent
morality on the basis of
calculations of expediency but
rather finds it already present
in the essence of things.165
In governing, the State should make full use of reason’s
capacity to discern the moral message—the intelligible
meaning—within creation. And, in doing so, the State
should recognize that the discernment process is greatly
assisted by the insights of faith.166
For its part, the Church’s primary role is to
evangelize and bring about the inner conversion of
165

Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 34-36 (emphasis in
original).
166
Ratzinger explains that modernity’s self-limitation of reason has
meant that what is most specific to man—moral reasoning—has been
unjustifiably delimited to the subjective realm. He notes that, in reality,
reason can perceive more than quantitative facts. Creation reveals a
moral message that is discernible by use of reason, especially when
assisted by faith and when it draws upon the experience of human
existence over time. Full use of moral reasoning is reasoning in the
highest sense. The imposed limitation of reason to quantifiable facts
precludes the scientific method from attaining its aim of garnering
knowledge most in accord with reality; and, conversely, full use of
reason’s capabilities will more readily attain knowledge in accord with
reality. Thus, “the great ethical insights of mankind are just as rational
and just as true as—indeed, more true than—the experimental
knowledge of the realm of the natural sciences and technology. They
are more true, because they touch more deeply the essential character
of Being and have a more decisive significance for the humanity of
man.” Id. at 37-42.
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individuals. The political and economic running of society
is not a direct part of the Church’s mission, but Jesus
“entrusted to [the Church] the word of truth which is
capable of enlightening consciences.”167 The power of the
Gospel, as lived by convicted Christians, can “penetrate[]
the human community and its history,” thereby purifying
and sustaining a culture of life consistent with the
This includes nurturing the idea of
Beatitudes.168
conscience as recognition of man as creation, thereby
fostering respect for the Creator in man as opposed to the
more common notion of conscience being a wholly
independent internal forum for deciding what is good or
evil.169 But the Church in various institutional forms, and
especially in and through the activities of individuals, can
and also must make claims and demands on public law.170
167

ICFL, supra note 44, at #61.
Id. at #62. See also ICATL, supra not 44, at ch. XI, #8 (“[I]t is only
by making appeal to the ‘moral potential’ of the person and to the
constant need for interior conversion, that social change will be brought
about which will be truly in the service of man. For it will only be in
the measure that they collaborate freely in these necessary changes
through their own initiative and in solidarity, that people, awakened to
a sense of their responsibility, will grow in humanity. The inversion of
morality and structures is steeped in a materialist anthropology which is
incompatible with the dignity of mankind”).
169
See Ratzinger, Conscience, supra note 160, at 169-70 (quoting
Reinhold Schneider: “Conscience is knowledge of responsibility for the
whole of creation and before him who has made it.”). Ratzinger agrees
that a person must follow a clear verdict of conscience, but stresses that
this must be understood in conjunction with the reality that conscience
cannot be identified with a person’s subjective certainty about himself
and his moral conduct (this would in fact enslave persons by making
them dependent on prevailing opinions of the day), and also that
conscience can err. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace. . . , in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 75-100 (2006).
170
See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 163 (noting that
“the Church cannot simply retreat into the private sphere”). In
addition, the Church has societal function. As explained by Ratzinger
in Introduction to Christianity, the Church and being Christian relate to
168

95

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 423
In making demands on the public law, however,
Ratzinger emphasizes the need to focus on essential core
values bearing on freedom. This is the second key
principle to keep in mind in carrying out the exchange
between politics and faith. It is an important way of
preventing overreaching that would upset a proper ChurchState balance. At times Ratzinger points to certain core
essentials, namely, human dignity and human rights
grounded in man as the image of God; marriage, and
family, grounded in the truth of the human person; and
reverence for God and to that which is holy to other
persons.171 More often, Ratzinger points to the Decalogue
as a starting point, because it constitutes a “sublime
expression” of moral reason and, as such, coincides in
many ways with the great ethical traditions of other
religions.172 To Ratzinger, respect for the Creator in man
entails living “as an answer – as a response to what we are
in truth.”173 And the Decalogue, with its origin from the
Creator, is a “self-presentation and self-exhibition of God,”
and thus a “luminous manifestation of his truth.”174
Notably, he stresses the need to continually unfold the
meaning of the Decalogue, recognizing that coming to
appreciate the whole of the truth requires an active process
in which “reason’s entire quest for the criteria of our

the fact that each human must work out his freedom within the
“framework of the already existing whole of human life that stamps and
molds him;” their purpose is “to save history as history and to break
through or transform the collective grid that forms the site of human
existence.” Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, 247-48.
171
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Europe’s Identity, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 147-49 (2006).
172
See JOSEPH RATZINGER, To Change or Preserve, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 29 (2006).
173
See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 349-51.
174
Id.
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responsibility truly comes into its own.”175 To Ratzinger,
this is simply part and parcel of Christianity’s synthesis of
faith and reason: reason needs faith, but faith also, precisely
as faith, must work in conjunction with reason.176
Ratzinger also is convinced that judicious use of
core Christian insights and values to inform the ordering of
relationships in society helps maintain full consistency with
notions of tolerance. His reasoning on this issue has two
aspects to it. First, Ratzinger has explained that use of
Christian insights as the inviolable point of reference for
law and justice in society should not be considered an
unjust imposition of values. The insights reflect the
intelligibility in things or the meaning or truth in Creation.
And, as explained by Ratzinger, there is in man—at the
ontological level—an expectation of sorts, a primal
knowledge or remembrance of the good and true that needs
help from without to become aware of its own self.177 This
is the ontological level of the human conscience. He
explains:
This anamnesis of our origin,
resulting from the fact that our
being is constitutively in
keeping with God, is not a
175

Id. (noting that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of
responsibility—living in response to what the human being is in truth—
which entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational
understanding).
176
Ratzinger has explained the relationship between faith and reason as
follows: “[F]aith demands and reveals reason, understands itself as the
environment of reason, so that faith is not correct if the insights to
which it leads are not at least rudimentarily reasonable, while on the
other hand reason cuts the ground from beneath its feet if it does away
with faith.” Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158.
177
JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace: Conscience and Truth, in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 90-95 (2006) (explaining the classical
concept of synderesis as anamnesis of the Creator existing at the
ontological level of conscience).
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knowledge articulated in
concepts, a treasure store of
retrievable contents. It is an
inner sense, a capacity for
recognition, in such a way that
the one addressed recognizes
in himself an echo of what is
said to him. If he does not
hide from his own self, he
comes to the insight: this is
the goal toward which my
whole being tends, this is
where I want to go. This
anamnesis of the Creator,
which is identical with the
foundations of our existence,
is the reason that mission is
both possible and justified.178
This primal knowledge, of course, can become distorted or
greatly weakened by culture. Nonetheless, when the
Church or others present and explain Christian values, it
can spark recognition. This is not an imposition, but,
rather, there is a fusion that activates the capacity to receive
the truth.179
Second, because Christian insights and values are
grounded in Love, their use as the inviolable reference
should not lead to inappropriate intolerance for other
perspectives. Rather, as explained by Ratzinger, the surest
guarantee of tolerance is the identity of Truth and Love.
On the one hand this means that, in an appropriate praxis of
freedom, the evangelical mission of the Church and
Christians will be carried out with Love, which necessarily
implies respect for religious liberty freedom in civil
178
179

Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-94.
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society.180 On a deeper level, however, the identity of
Truth and Love suggests that typical notions of tolerance
reflect confusion about the meaning of genuine human
freedom. The typical idea of tolerance is that it is the
attitude of respect for the views of others that safeguards
freedom.181 From the Christian perspective of human
freedom, it is the use of core Christian values or insights as
a point of reference for law and justice that is itself the
safeguard for freedom. Tolerance is simply the appropriate
attitude to have since matters of conscience should not be
coerced. This is a subtle but real distinction. The
persuasiveness of Ratzinger’s view—as to both aspects of
notions of tolerance—is tied to careful and prudent use of
essential core values.
180

See JOSEPH RATZINGER, TRUTH AND TOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN
BELIEF AND WORLD RELIGIONS 231 (Henry Taylor trans., Ignatius
Press 1st Am. ed. 2004). See also Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme
Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women
Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love, (June 29, 2009)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html, at #2 (noting
that “[t]ruth needs to be sought, found and expressed with the
‘economy’ of charity, but charity in its turn needs to be understood,
confirmed and practiced in the light of the truth”). See also Declaration
on Religious Freedom (DIGNITATIS HUMANAE): On the Right of the
Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters
Religious), promulgated by Pope Paul VI, December 7, 1965 (available
at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/docume
nts/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html) (last accessed
4/28/2014).
181
For example, in a law review article calling for the abandonment of
the neutrality principle, Dean Steven Smith explains that the
“restoration of tolerance” as a “respectable attitude” is justified. He
explains that tolerance – respect for the views of those who disagree
with the substantive values selected by society – will protect their
liberty. See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif.
L. Rev. 305 (1990).
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Ratzinger has thus addressed the major concerns
that relate to use of core Christian insights as the inviolable
standard in a pluralistic democratic society. The Christian
vision, when fully and properly understood, remains
consistent with key democratic ideals.
V. Conclusion
A key purpose of this article has been to explain, in
a comprehensive way, a well-reasoned alternative
perspective of human freedom that brings to light the fact
that the doctrine of neutrality presents a real obstacle to
freedom in democratic society. A sound argument exists to
support the claim that liberty and justice in society depend
on state recognition of, and prudent use of, core Christian
values in lawmaking and policy-making.182 A strong case
has been made that judgments concerning the ends in life
worthy of pursuit are not solely subjective. Rather,
freedom is an integral aspect of the human person, and,
thus, how freedom is used matters. The heart of the
message is that Christian values have their origin from the
transcendent and, more specifically, from the Creator of
humanity and the world. As such, these values are
necessarily consistent with the meaning or intelligibility in
creation and will thereby promote genuine human freedom.
Personal choices about how to live do matter, and it should
be permissible for the State—through prudent adherence to
core values—to foster a culture in which persons can more
readily live in a genuinely human way.
182

It is appropriate to reiterate that this would not necessarily mean a
return to state practices struck down by the Court due to Establishment
Clause concerns. Past reliance on Christian values in fashioning laws
may not always have been “prudent” and may have involved values
beyond the realm appropriately considered “core values.”
Cf.
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 212 (noting that
Christians have at times in the past expected too much from the
“earthly city”).
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From this alternative perspective, the essence of
human freedom is being receptive to God the Creator, and
acting consistent with the pattern impressed on the human
spirit by virtue of being a creature of God.183 This view of
freedom is of course intimately bound-up with belief in
God. But the counter-perspective—the view associated
with the radial philosophy of freedom and, ultimately, the
principle of liberal neutrality—similarly has a theological
basis, namely, the rejection of belief in God the Creator.184
A rejection that is played out by the banishment of ideas
related to religion and morality to the subjective realm.185
Indeed, in Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger
emphasized that the ultimate divide in contemporary
society rests on the question of the existence of God:
The real antagonism typical of
today’s world is not that
between diverse religious
cultures; rather, it is the
antagonism
between
the
183

Indeed, Ratzinger has stated that “[i]f there is no longer any
obligation to which [man] can and must respond in freedom, then there
is no longer any realm of freedom at all.” Ratzinger, A Turning Point,
supra note 11, at 41.
184
Ratzinger has explained that behind the radical philosophy of
freedom “there stands a programme which must ultimately be labeled
theological: God is no longer recognized as a reality standing over
against man, but instead man may himself or herself become what he or
she imagines a divinity would be if it existed. . . .” Ratzinger, Freedom
and Liberation, supra note 24, at 260.
185
See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 33-41
(noting that the consequence of materialism and the narrowing of
reason is that “[m]orality, just like religion, now belongs to the realm of
the subjective. If it is subjective, then it is something posited by man.
It does not precede vis-à-vis us: we precede it and fashion it. This
movement of [separating the world of feelings and the world of facts] .
. . essentially knows no limits. . . . Calculation rules, and power rules.
Morality has surrendered.”).
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radical emancipation of man
from God, from the roots of
life, on the one hand, and the
great religious cultures, on the
other.
If we come to
experience a clash of cultures .
. . . [it] will be between this
radical emancipation of man
and the great historical
cultures. Accordingly, [the
strategy of using constitutions
to keep God out of the public
realm] is not the expression of
tolerance that wishes to
protect
the
non-theistic
religions and the dignity of
atheists and agnostics; rather,
it is the expression of a
consciousness that would like
to see God eradicated once
and for all from the public life
of humanity and shut up in the
subjective sphere of cultural
residues from the past. In this
way relativism, which is the
starting point of the whole
becomes
a
process,
dogmatism that believes itself
in possession of the definitive
knowledge of human reason,
with the right to consider
everything else merely as a
stage in human history that is
basically
obsolete
and
deserves to be relativized. In
reality, this means that we
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have need of roots if we are to
survive and that we must not
lose sight of God if we do not
want human dignity to
disappear.186
This is strong language from a respected political thinker,
and the relativism of which he speaks is simply another
way of discussing neutrality. In the Crisis of Cultures and
other writings, Ratzinger has addressed the reasonableness
of belief in creation187 and the reasonableness of faith.188
186

JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44
(2006) (The phrase “the strategy of using constitutions to keep God out
of the public realm” was substituted for the phrase “the refusal to refer
to God in the Constitution,” in which Ratzinger was referring to the
European constitution).
187
For example, Ratzinger has explained that belief in Creation is
reasonable, and, further, that “even from the perspective of the data of
the natural sciences it is the ‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and
better explanation than any of the other theories.” See Ratzinger, God
the Creator, supra note 82, at 17. In the second homily, Ratzinger
explains that the scientific-based theories hinge on the entire ensemble
of nature arising out of errors and dissonances and that some scientists
acknowledge the absurdness of the theories but, nonetheless, cannot
break out of the scientific mindset because “the scientific method
demands that a question not be permitted to which the answer would
have to be God.” Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 22-25.
188
In Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger explains that science cannot prove
that God does not exist, and, if a person searches for God, certainty can
be reached as to God’s existence. The assurance arises in part the way
faith in other aspects of a technology-based society arises: we place
trust in others who are qualified, credible and have knowledge when
the validity of that trust is verified in daily experiences. A relationship
with God always involves relationship with other humans. Over time,
the living encounter with others that is inherently part of faith (the
encounter with God and other humans) leads to certainty. Faith is
transformed to knowledge. “The experience builds and comes to
possess an evidentiary character that assures us.” JOSEPH RATZINGER,
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 79-82, 103-110 (2006).
Ratzinger notes that seeking knowledge of God is not irrational.
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In light of the failures of the modern political freedom
movements and the thorough and well-reasoned case
supporting the prudent use of core Christian values in
democratic society, it is reasonable to conclude that a more
moderate use of neutrality principles will better safeguard
liberty and justice.

Rather, what is being sought is actually the very foundation of
rationality. Id. at 89-90.
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STUDENT SHOWCASE ARTICLE
Incorporating the Lonely Star: How Puerto Rico
Became Incorporated and Earned a Place in the
Sisterhood of States
By: Willie Santana1
In the prosecution of the war
against . . . Spain by the
people of the United States in
the cause of liberty, justice,
and humanity, its military
forces have come to occupy
the island of Puerto Rico.
They come bearing the
banner of freedom. . . . They
bring you the fostering arm
of a free people, whose
greatest power is in its justice
and humanity to all those
living within its fold.2
Major General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of U.S.
Forces in Puerto Rico, in a proclamation issued in 1898
upon the American invasion of the island.

1

Mr. Santana is a third-year law student at the University of Tennessee
College of Law and a native of Puerto Rico. He thanks his wife Kara
for her support, and Professor Ben Barton for his encouragement and
guidance in researching and writing this paper.
2
FRENCH ENSOR CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND SPAIN: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, Vol. II, 297 (1911).
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I. Introduction
On November 7, 2012, Americans all around the
nation celebrated or bemoaned the result of the quadrennial
presidential election. Meanwhile, a historic vote in Puerto
Rico to reject the existing status of the island went largely
unnoticed in the rest of the United States.3 Popular
indifference towards Puerto Rico and the other American
territories was not always the rule. In fact, the election of
1900 was largely decided on the issue of what to do with
the new American possessions,4 and a series of Supreme
Court decisions, later collectively named the INSULAR
CASES, were front and center in the national dialogue
during the early twentieth century.5
While largely unknown today, the Insular Cases are
immensely significant because they created a dichotomy of
3

When asked whether voters supported the present territorial status of
the island, fifty-four percent of voters voted “No.” A large majority of
registered voters, seventy-seven percent, participated in the vote.
PUERTO RICO ELECTIONS COMMISSION, PRESENT FORM OF
TERRITORIAL STATUS –ISLAND WIDE RESULTS, available at
http://div1.ceepur.org/REYDI_NocheDelEvento/index.html#en/default/
CONDICION_POLITICA_TERRITORIAL_ACTUAL_ISLA.xml.
4
The territories in question at the time of the 1900 election were the
four islands ceded to the United States pursuant to the treaty ending the
Spanish-American War—Cuba, Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto
Rico. A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, 30 Stat.
1754. Modern American territories include Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana
Islands. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPENDENCIES AND AREAS OF
SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTY, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/10543.htm.
5
Although the exact list of Insular Cases is debated, for the purposes of
this paper, the Insular Cases include: Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298 (1922), De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), Goetze v. United
States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901), Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901), Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901), Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), and Huus v. N.Y. and Porto Rico
Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
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status—a novel concept at the time—for American
territories under the Constitution’s Territorial Clause.6
Under the Insular Cases, territories are classified as either
incorporated or unincorporated. Incorporated territories are
nascent states, while unincorporated territories are subject
to the plenary power of Congress in perpetuity unless
Congress changes the territory’s status.7 This principle,
enshrined in law by the same Fuller Court that framed the
infamous separate-but-equal doctrine, is known as the
territorial incorporation doctrine.
While the public debate over whether the United
States, a nation born of anti-colonial fever, could itself
become an imperial power has largely subsided, its
consequences live on today. Although the issues raised by
the territorial incorporation doctrine are of consequence to
all modern American territories, most discussion of these
issues is centered on Puerto Rico—by far the largest
American territory, both in size and population.8
The chief premise behind the doctrine of territorial
incorporation is that, because territories are “subject to the
sovereignty of and []owned by the United States,” they are
not foreign in the “international sense. . . . [but are] foreign

6

The Territorial Clause of the Constitution reads: “The Congress shall
have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
7
The Court held that because “incorporation is not to be assumed
without express declaration, or an implication so strong as to exclude
any other view,” Congress did not incorporate Puerto Rico by granting
Puerto Ricans citizenship. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306
(1922).
8
At nearly 4 million residents, the population of Puerto Rico far
surpasses that of the other territories. In comparison, the next highest
populated territory has a total population of 181,000. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, ESTIMATED RESIDENT POPULATION WITH PROJECTIONS
available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1313.pdf.
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to the United States in a domestic sense.”9 In reaching this
decision, the Court was influenced heavily by a series of
Harvard Law Review articles, many of which were open in
their paternalism, and sometimes contempt, for the
inhabitants of the new possessions.10
The true significance behind the doctrine of
territorial incorporation as a constitutional principle is that
the doctrine placed the new territories outside a traditional
territorial transition process that was older than the
Constitution itself. The territory-to-state process was first
conceived by the Congress of the Confederation of the
United States through the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.11
The ordinance itself influenced the drafting of the
Territorial Clause of the Constitution during the
Philadelphia Convention.
This ordinance was later
amended to be compatible with the new Constitution by the
First Congress of the United States and signed into law by
George Washington in 1789. Although the Northwest
Ordinance was explicitly drafted to govern only the modern
Midwest (then known as the Northwest Territory), with few
9

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901) (White, J., concurring).
For the five contemporary articles discussing the legal disposition of
the American possessions see Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional
Questions Incident to the Acquisition of Government by the United
States of Island Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1899); C.C.
Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365
(1899); Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions:
A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155 (1899); James B. Thayer, Our
New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1899); Carman F. Randolph,
Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1890).
Mr. Baldwin, for example, did not attempt to clothe his contempt for
the residents of the new American possessions, openly describing
citizens of Puerto Rico as “ignorant and lawless brigands that
infest[ed]” the island. Baldwin, supra note 10, at 451.
11
GRUPO DE INVESTIGADORES PUERTORRIQUEÑOS, BREAKTHROUGH
FROM COLONIALISM,
VOL. I., at Loc. 639 (Kindle ed. 2012) [hereinafter STATEHOOD
STUDY].
10
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exceptions each subsequent territory followed the same
process to transition to statehood after the formation of the
union.12
The Northwest Ordinance transition-to-statehood
process can be broken down into three steps.13 First,
Congress appoints a governor, secretary, and judiciary to
administer the territory. The territorial governor and
judiciary establish laws to govern the territory, and these
laws are subject to congressional oversight.14 In phase two,
the territory establishes a more representative form of
government where the territorial citizens elect a house of
representatives, while the governor and a new upper
chamber remain appointed by Congress.15 This upper
chamber, the Legislative Council, is appointed from names
submitted by the territorial legislature. During this stage,
the legislature also elects a non-voting delegate to
Congress. The third stage requires a fully republican form
of government and mandates admission to the union as a
matter of right.16 The people of Puerto Rico expected to
follow this process after the island came under the
sovereignty of the United States, but to date Puerto Rico
continues to exist not as a nation or a state, but as a territory
or possession—a quasi-colony of the United States.17
12

Thirty one-states joined the Union following the process set out by
the Northwest Ordinance, the most recent being the former Territory of
Hawaii. In fact, only the original thirteen colonies and the states of
Kentucky (ceded from Virginia), Vermont (independent), Maine (ceded
from Massachusetts), West Virginia (ceded from Virginia), Texas
(independent) and California (U.S. Military rule post-Mexican
American War) joined the Union through a process other than that
established by the Northwest Ordinance. STATEHOOD STUDY, supra
note 11, at loc. 929.
13
STATEHOOD STUDY, supra note 11, at loc. 639-655.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
EDGARDO MELÉNDEZ, PUERTO RICO’S STATEHOOD MOVEMENT, 2-12
(Bernard K. Johnpoll ed., 1988).
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America won Puerto Rico after a thirteen-day
military campaign. A force of 3,415 American soldiers
encountered little opposition and were instead greeted by
Puerto Ricans with cheers of: “¡Viva Puerto Rico
[A]mericano!”18 Even prior to the invasion, a strong
annexationist movement existed because the United States
was, as it is today, the main export market for Puerto
Rico’s goods, and also because of an attraction to
America’s classical liberal governing philosophy.19 Puerto
Rico’s pre-invasion annexationist movement actually aided
the invasion force in selecting its initial targets and
provided assistance to the U.S. military as it moved through
the island.20 Because of the annexationist movement’s
involvement in the invasion of Puerto Rico, expectations
were high that the invasion would in time lead to the island
joining the several states as a full member of the union.
The annexationist movement transitioned to a statehood
party, the Republican Party of Puerto Rico, shortly after the
invasion.21
Among the modern political parties on the island,
the pro-statehood New Progressive Party can trace its
philosophical roots back to the Republican Party of Puerto
Rico, founded on July 4th, 1899.22 Early actions taken by
the United States on the island—the passing of an Organic

18

Id. at 21.
Id. at 17-18.
20
Id. at 20-21.
21
The Republican Party of Puerto Rico was founded on July 4, 1899
and sought the “definitive and sincere annexation” of Puerto Rico to the
United States with the goal of the island’s eventual admission as a state.
Id. at 36.
22
Partido Nuevo Progresista in Spanish (PNP). The modern PNP
organization has its technical roots in the Partido Estadista Republicano
(PER) of the 1960’s, but the intellectual father of Puerto Rico’s
statehood movement is José Celso Barbosa who founded the
Republican Party of Puerto Rico in 1899.
19
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Act in 1900,23 the establishment of Federal Courts in the
island, a series of economic reforms, and later the
wholesale grant of American citizenship to those living
(and born thereafter) in Puerto Rico—fanned the hopes of
annexation on the island. The Supreme Court has
periodically dashed those hopes ever since.24
The legal issues presented by Puerto Rico and the
other territories acquired by the United States at the turn of
the twentieth century were novel and thus ripe for Supreme
Court review.25 For the first time, the United States
assumed sovereignty over land not only non-contiguous to
its existing states and territories, but also over culturally
distinct peoples with little connection to Anglo-American
tradition.26 In some ways, these issues remain unresolved
today, as the territories still exist in an ambiguous,
perpetual, quasi-colonial status.
At first, however, the issue of Puerto Rico’s status
appeared more certain. When Congress passed an organic
act for Puerto Rico in 1900, it seemed to have placed
Puerto Rico on the track to statehood. The Act created a
territorial government to succeed the military commission
that governed the island since its invasion and created the
office of Resident Commissioner, a non-voting delegate to
the House of Representatives.27 This organic act largely
23

31 Stat. 77 (1900).
Meléndez, supra note 17 at 33-34.
25
The imperialism debate refers generally to a national conversation
that took place at the turn of the century, but specifically to the election
of 1900. DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE
PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE CONSTITUTION 4
(Christina Duffy Burnett & Blake Marshall eds. 2001) [Hereinafter
Burnett].
26
Although the former Mexican colonies of California, New Mexico,
and the Republic of Texas were largely populated by distinct cultural
and ethnic peoples, a large population of American immigrants already
resided in these locales.
27
31 Stat. 77 (1900).
24
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mirrored the organic acts of the other territories that
followed the Northwest Ordinance path to statehood, and
mostly parallels the first phase of that process.28
Meanwhile, one of the main issues of the
presidential election of 1900 was whether the Constitution
extended in full force to the newly acquired territories.
McKinley, an imperialist who argued that the Constitution
did not necessarily extend to the new territories, won the
election. Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court adopted this
position in the Insular Cases.29
The Supreme Court announced the territorial
incorporation doctrine in Downes v. Bidwell.30 The case
centered on a shipment of oranges from Puerto Rico to
New York. Under the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, goods
from Puerto Rico were subject to the same fees and duties
as good from foreign countries, but the fees were
discounted by eighty-five percent.31 Mr. Downes paid the
import duties under protest and sued for a refund. The
lawsuit argued that since Puerto Rico was not a foreign
country, the Uniformity Clause prohibited these fees. 32 Mr.
Downes relied on a then-recent court decision that held
Puerto Rico and the other territories ceded to the United
States pursuant to the Treaty of Paris had ceased to be
foreign countries.33 The Court framed the issue in the case
as whether the “revenue clauses of the Constitution extend
of their own force to our newly acquired territories.”34
Declaring without
discussion
that “[t]he
Constitution itself does not answer the question,” the Court
then crafted an extraconstitutional answer to the question
28

31 Stat. 77 (1900); Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 929.
Burnett, supra note 25 at 4.
30
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
31
Id. at 247-48.
32
Id.
33
The case Mr. Downes relied upon is another one of the Insular Cases:
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
34
Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
29
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presented to it.35 The Court discussed the history of the
Northwest Ordinance and the Territorial Clause of the
Constitution, but focused most of its analysis distinguishing
the Treaty of Paris from the Louisiana Purchase Treaty and
the Joint Resolution Annexing the Republic of Hawaii.
Interestingly, after analyzing the Louisiana Purchase and
noting that the treaty explicitly provided that the people of
this territory were to be guaranteed the “enjoyment of all
the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the
United States” as soon as possible, the Court declared that
Congress “would [n]ever assent to the annexation of
territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however
foreign they may be to our [culture], shall become at once
citizens of the United States.”36 Ultimately, because the
Court was “of [the] opinion that the power to acquire
territory by treaty implies . . . [the power] to prescribe upon
what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants,
and what their status shall be in . . . the ‘American
empire,’” and because the Treaty of Paris provided “‘that
the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
[of the ceded territory] . . . shall be determined by
Congress,’” the Court held that the uniformity clause did
not apply to Puerto Rico and its sister insular territories.37
The Court’s brief discussion of the territorial
inhabitants’ status in the “American Empire” implied
initially that citizenship would alter the state of affairs.
Indeed, the Court pointed out that if citizenship were
granted to the inhabitants of the new territories and their
“children thereafter born, whether savages or civilized” it
would result in “extremely serious” consequences.38 The
decision was silent on what these serious consequences

35

Id.
Id. at 252, 280.
37
Id. at 279-80.
38
Id. at 279.
36
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could be, but the use of the word “savages” certainly
provides a vivid hint.
Although Downes seemed to settle the issue of
whether Puerto Rico was incorporated, and the
consequences of this unincorporated status, the issue
recurred. In 1915, Congress amended the Judicial Code to
extend federal appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme
Courts of Puerto Rico and the Territory of Hawaii.39 In
1917, Congress passed the Jones–Shafroth Act, which
granted American Citizenship to all former Spanish
subjects and their children living in Puerto Rico.40 The Act
also established the Puerto Rican Senate and split up Puerto
Rico’s government into legislative, executive, and judicial
branches, thus mirroring state governments.41 Finally, the
Act created the Federal District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico and placed that new court under the appellate
jurisdiction of the First Circuit Court of Appeals. The Act
also made Puerto Rico subject to all federal statutes.
Many annexationists in Puerto Rico took these
actions to mean that Congress was moving Puerto Rico
from the traditional “phase one” of the Northwest
Ordinance scheme to phase two of that process. Implicit in
this theory was the assumption that by making Puerto
Ricans citizens and establishing a territorial government,
Congress had in fact incorporated Puerto Rico into the
union.
The
Supreme
Court
would
disappoint
annexationists once again. Despite the breadth of the Jones
Act, the Court again held that Puerto Rico was an
unincorporated territory of the United States in Balzac v.
Porto Rico.42 Balzac came to the Court upon a writ of error
39

38 Stat. 803 §246 (1915).
The Jones Act (39 Stat. 951) provided a mechanism for Puerto
Ricans to reject the grant of citizenship, only 288 did so.
41
39 Stat. 951 (1917).
42
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
40
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from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.43 Mr. Balzac was
a newspaper editor facing a charge of misdemeanor
criminal libel. He demanded a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment. The district court declined.44 Asserting
constitutional error, Mr. Balzac appealed to the Puerto
Rican Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court’s
decision. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.45
The Court held that extending American citizenship
to the residents of Puerto Rico did not incorporate Puerto
Rico into the United States, so the Court affirmed Mr.
Balzac’s conviction.46 The Court declared that the Jones
Act did not confer upon Puerto Ricans any additional right,
other than the right to move to the mainland with the same
rights and responsibilities as any other citizen.47 More
specifically, the Court ruled without dissent that it is not the
status of a person that determines the applicability of
constitutional provisions, but locality.48
The Court has not discussed the territorial
incorporation doctrine in detail since. Instead, it has relied
on the doctrine to extend or deny constitutional rights to the
residents of Puerto Rico and to analyze the constitutionality
of various provisions of a myriad of federal statutes.
On two occasions, however, the Court cast doubt on
the continued validity of the doctrine. First, the Court
noted in Reid v. Covert, a case involving military
servicemen overseas, that the scope of the Insular Cases
was to facilitate the temporary government of the
territories, and thus the doctrine did not have wider
43

Id. at 300.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Only fundamental rights are extended to the unincorporated
territories, and since at the time, a right to a jury trial was not deemed a
fundamental right, this issue was dispositive. Id. at 306.
47
Id. at 308.
48
Id. at 309.
44
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applicability.49 Therefore, unless a century-old exercise of
sovereignty and rule can be regarded as temporary, the
doctrine no longer applies.
Likewise, in Torres v. Puerto Rico, the Court
decided that the protections of the Fourth Amendment
extended to Puerto Rico.50 Justice Brennan’s concurrence,
joined by three other Justices, argued that the Insular Cases
were clearly not “authority” on the question of “the
application of the Fourth Amendment – or any other
provision of the Bill of Rights – to the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.”51
The Court has also noted that it “may well be that
over time the ties between the United States and any of its
unincorporated territories strengthen in ways that are of
constitutional significance.”52 The ties between Puerto
Rico and the United States have indeed strengthened
significantly since the Court decided the Insular Cases.
Today, more Puerto Ricans reside in the mainland United
States than in Puerto Rico;53 there is a Supreme Court
Justice of Puerto Rican descent;54 and hundreds of
49

354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979).
51
Id. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008) (discussing the
Insular Cases to determine what constitutional rights extended to
enemy combatants held prisoner in Guantanamo Bay).
53
4,623,716 Puerto Ricans resided in the United States as of the 2010
Census, while the population of Puerto Rico was 3,725,789. Census
Bureau, The Hispanic Population: 2010, at 3 available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2013); Census Bureau, 2010 Census Interactive
Population Search, available at
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=72 (last
visited Feb. 15, 2013).
54
Sheryl Stolberg, Woman in the News: Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a
Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27websotomayor.html
?_r=0.
50
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thousands of Puerto Ricans have served with distinction in
the United States Armed Forces since the SpanishAmerican war.55 With Puerto Ricans in prominent and
visible roles at all levels of American society, Puerto
Ricans are no more foreign to the United States than are
New Yorkers, Texans, or Hawaiians.
II. Statehood Historically
The Constitution mentions new states only twice.
The text of the New States Clause, Article 3 section 4,
protects the geographic and political integrity of existing
states.56 The clause requires consent from a state’s
legislature for any cession of territory by a state for the
formation of a new one, or the combination of several
states for the same purpose.57 By negative implication, the
clause is the only constitutional prescription for forming a
new state. The clause thus vests Congress with any other
power to admit new states. The New States Clause was
born out of a perceived deficiency of the Articles of
Confederation—the controversy surrounding the authority
of the Congress of the Confederation to pass the Northwest
Ordinances governing territories.58

55

Statement by Anabelle Rodriguez, Secretary of Justice for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, on the Bombing on Vieques,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june01/vieques_427.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
56
The New States Clause reads: “New States may be admitted by the
Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 1.
57
U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 1.
58
Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 787. See also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 38 (James Madison).

118

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 446
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, dealing with the
disposition of the western territories, is regarded as among
the most important acts of the Congress of the
Confederation, second only to the convening of the
Philadelphia Convention.59 The creation of architecture for
the administration and disposition of these territories was
no small feat. This achievement was critical to the
formation of the union, as the unclear status of the western
territories almost derailed the ratification of the Articles of
Confederation.60 The smaller landless states feared being
overpowered in the union by the larger states with western
lands and refused to ratify the Articles unless the larger
states relinquished their claim over their unsettled western
territories.61 It was not until the State of Virginia, under the
leadership of Thomas Jefferson, agreed to cede its western
territory to the Confederacy, and the other landed states
followed suit, that the Articles of Confederation were
finally ratified.62
Having solved the problem of ratification, the
Congress of the Confederation was immediately faced with
the urgent matter of what to do with the ceded territory.
The Articles of Confederation were silent on the creation
and admission of new states, so the Congress tried to craft a
process.63 Several proposals emerged. The earliest
proposal treated the territories as colonies of the states that
ceded each territory.64
However, fear of perpetual
59

The Library of Congress, Primary Documents in American History
Northwest Ordinance,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/northwest.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2013).
60
Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 497 (noting that deadlock over
the disposition of the western lands that many states laid claims to
delayed ratification of the Articles of Confederation).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 510.
64
Id. at loc. 514.
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ownership of these territories by the Confederacy became a
strong concern, and the idea emerged for a compact
between the states and the Confederacy that ensured selfgovernance for the territorial colonies and guaranteed their
eventual admission into the Union.65 This compact came to
being as The Resolution of 1780, and it provided that the
territory was to be “formed into distinct republican states,
which shall become members of the federal union, and
have the same rights of sovereign[ty] . . . as the other
states.”66 The purpose of this compact was to preserve the
rights of the states and prevent imperialism.67 Thus,
through this compact, the Congress of the Confederacy
would assume control over the territories for the explicit
purpose of constituting new states.
Shortly after the Congress passed the Resolution of
1780, Thomas Paine proposed the creation of a new state,
the state of Vandalia, in a region that today covers modern
West Virginia, Kentucky, and parts of Pennsylvania.68
Although the state was never formed, the Paine plan
proposed transitional steps to statehood that were
eventually paralleled by the Northwest Ordinance.
A few years after Paine’s proposal, several
Continental Army veterans led by General Rufus Putnam
proposed forming a new state in modern-day Ohio by
granting ownership of the land to veterans of the American
Revolution and providing the veterans with farming

65

Id.
Congress of the Confederacy of the United States, 1780 Resolution
on Public Lands,
http://www.minnesotalegalhistoryproject.org/assets/1780%20Resolutio
n%20on%20Public%20Lands.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
67
Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 514.
68
George H. Alden, The Evolution of the American System of forming
and Admitting New States into the Union, 18 ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 79, 83
(1901) (detailing the Paine Plan).
66

120

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 448
equipment.69 In return, this military state would provide
for the defense of the union. Richard Bland, a delegate
from Virginia, proposed a similar plan that would reserve
ten percent of the lands in the new states to benefit the
Confederacy in its efforts to provide for the defense of the
union and other public works.70 Both plans failed in
Congress.
Although the Paine, Putnam, and Bland plans were
unsuccessful in the creation of new states, elements of each
plan can be found in the foundation of America’s statemaking architecture, the Northwest Ordinance. In 1784,
Virginia presented the Confederacy with the Deed of
Cession for its western territories and spurred action on the
territories’ disposition in Congress.71 The same year, a
committee led by Thomas Jefferson referred a plan to the
Congress for the creation of sixteen curiously named new
states.72 Congress passed this plan into law with only minor
amendments. The plan provided for an initial territorial
government at the behest of settlers or through an order of
Congress. Once the population of a territory reached
twenty thousand, its citizens could call a constitutional
convention and form a state government. This first version
of the Northwest Ordinance prescribed certain parameters
for the would-be state government structures, most notably
a guaranteed republican form of government.
This
guarantee was later incorporated into the Constitution of
the United States.73
The 1784 ordinance was never implemented, and a
new ordinance was passed in 1785. The second Northwest
69

Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
71
Statehood Study, supra note 11, at loc.580.
72
Jefferson would have named the new states: Sylvania, Michigania,
Cherronesus, Assenisippia, Metropotaima, Illinoia, Saratoga,
Washington, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia.
73
Statehood Study, supra note 11, at loc. 596.
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Ordinance is only notable because it established the basic
survey system of townships that ensured a more orderly
settlement of the western lands. A shift in leadership, from
Jefferson to Monroe, and the emergence of powerful
prospecting companies74 seeking to exploit the western
territories moved Congress to expressly repeal the
ordinance of 1784 and enact the Northwest Ordinance of
1787. Thus, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 became the
nation’s state formation system into the twentieth century.
As stated above, the ordinance established a threestage process culminating on admission to the union as a
matter of right. Like the ordinance of 1874, it provided that
the new states should enter the union subject to specific
covenants. It is also striking that the articles of compact
between the Confederacy and the future states contained
provisions strikingly similar to those that would become
enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment.75
The Articles of the Confederacy failed to address
many of the challenges that faced the nascent American
nation. Recognizing these weaknesses, Congress called for
a constitutional convention. The Framers convened in
Philadelphia in May of 1787; the result was the
Constitution of the United States. After agreeing on more
pressing issues such as the necessity for a stronger national
government, how this government would be subdivided,
and how the states were to be represented in this new
national body politic, the convention turned its attention to
the mechanisms for the management of the existing western
territories and the admission of new states.
This discussion about admission of new states
focused on two main points: the silence of the Articles of
Confederation on the subject and the existing Northwest
74
75

Specifically, the Ohio and Scioto prospecting companies.
Id. at loc. 670.

122

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 450
Ordinances.76 In many ways, the two foci of discussion
were interrelated; while the wisdom of the territorial
scheme created by the ordinances was fairly accepted,
authority for the system’s creation was doubtful. The
convention delegates were faced with the choice of
legitimizing the territorial scheme by crafting authority for
Congress to enact it, or to strip the national government of
its control over the lands ceded to the federal government
by the states.77 The delegation from Virginia proposed
granting the power to admit states to the Congress and
submitted a draft resolution to that effect for consideration
by convention delegates. The delegates adopted the
Virginia resolution as a working draft for this provision.78
Beginning with the Virginia proposal, the Framers
debated whether the new states would be admitted on equal
footing as the original states and how to protect the existing
states from being dismembered in order to reduce their
influence. Eventually, the drafters decided that unequal
membership in the union was antithetical to the postcolonial ideals the new nation was born out of, but agreed
that the integrity of the existing states should be
protected.79 Thus, the Virginia proposal was amended so
that consent of a state would be necessary before it could
be divided to form a new one. The Framers borrowed
language from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the
Resolution of 1780 to draft what became the New States
Clause of the Constitution. Having established authority
76

THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison) (noting that the territorial
system was conceived “without the least color of constitutional
authority”). Curiously, the most influential of the land ordinances, the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, was passed while the constitutional
convention was in session.
77
C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the
Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43, 57-58
(1949).
78
Statehood Study, supra note 11, at loc. 812.
79
Id. at loc. 845.
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for Congress to admit new states, the convention turned its
attention to the disposition and governance of the territories
and the ability of the central government to hold property.
Through several amendments, language giving Congress
authority to “dispose of and make all needful rules” for all
territory and property of the United States was approved
without amendment in the final draft of the Constitution.80
The Constitution was ratified by June of 1788.
a. Routes to Statehood
Congress now had clear power over the disposition
of the western territories; since ratification, thirty-one states
have followed the process from territories organized by
Congress under an organic act into full statehood.81
Congress first exercised its new territorial authority when it
organized the Southwest Territory, the modern state of
Tennessee, following the three-phase model of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.82
Shortly after the
organization of the Southwest Territory, Congress
reenacted the Ordinance of 1787 as the First Organic Act
for the Northwest Territory in 1789.83 The rest of the states
followed somewhat similar paths.
b. Unique States
a. California

80

The territorial clause of the constitution does not appear to have been
hotly debated. It reads: The Congress shall have power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the
United States, or of any particular state. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2.
81
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
82
Statehood Study, supra note 11 at loc. 1754.
83
Id. at loc. 906.
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California, although it followed the Tennessee
Plan84 to achieve statehood, is unique in that California
transitioned from a sparsely populated former colony of
Mexico under American military rule to a state of the union
without ever being organized as a territory.85 California
was not organized as territory because Congress could not
decide what role slavery would play, if any, in the new
This controversy continued as Congress
territory.86
debated
California’s
petition
for
statehood.
Representatives from southern states objected to
California’s request for admission as a free state since there
was no counterbalancing slave state to admit in order to
maintain the balance of power between the free and slave
states of the union. Congress even discussed splitting
California in two at the Mason-Dixon Line.87 Additionally,
some members of Congress felt that allowing California to
skip the territorial transition process would undermine the
state-making system.88 Abolitionist and slave-holding
factions eventually negotiated the Compromise of 1850,
and California was admitted to the union as a free state.
b. New Mexico

84

The term Tennessee Plan refers to the largely self-driven process that
Tennessee followed into statehood. The then-Southwest territory
organized its own legislature, called for a constitutional convention,
and boldly declared its territorial status ended before Congress ever
saw its petition for statehood. The territory also elected its
congressional delegation and sent them to Washington without
congressional consent. The Tennessee plan was implemented
successfully by the states of Michigan, Iowa, California, Oregon,
Kansas, and Alaska. Id. at loc. 1775, 1997.
85
Id. at loc. 6450.
86
Id. at loc. 6710.
87
Id. at loc. 6758.
88
Id. at loc. 6726.
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Congress passed an organic act establishing
territorial government for the territory of New Mexico as
part of the compromise leading to California’s admission to
the union in the year 1850.89 By the time of its
organization, the Territory was already populous enough to
petition for statehood, and the same year as its organization
an unofficial convention drafted a state constitution. This
constitution was written both in English and Spanish and
declared that New Mexico was a non-slaveholding state.90
Because of tensions leading up to the Civil War and
irregularities in the original state elections, this first effort
for statehood failed. The process of establishing a state
government would suffer fits and starts for decades.
Efforts in Congress also suffered similar fates, with several
bills narrowly failing, stifled by technicalities or dying at
the conference stage.91 New Mexico would remain a
territory for sixty-two years before achieving statehood.
New Mexico finally joined the union in 1912 through the
enabling-act route to statehood (as opposed to the
Tennessee Plan route). Although many internal and
external factors led to this delay, the substantial Hispanic
population of the territory and the territorial government’s
adherence to Spanish as an official language in the territory
were large factors. In fact, the enabling-act admitting New
Mexico to the union explicitly prescribed the use of English
in public schools.92
c. Hawaii
The most recent addition to the community of
states, the insular state of Hawaii, is unique in a myriad of
ways. Together with Alaska, it is one of only two non89

Id. at loc. 10921, 10954.
Id. at loc. 10970.
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contiguous states. It is the only island-state and the only
bilingual state.93
Hawaii’s relationship with the United States has
been a tenuous one. The road to statehood for Hawaii
began with sugar. In 1875 the Kingdom of Hawaii and the
United States signed what today would be recognized as a
free trade agreement. The treaty allowed Hawaiian sugar
and other goods to reach to American markets duty free and
ceded territory to the U.S. Navy for what later became the
Pearl Harbor Naval Base.94 The treaty was very lucrative
to Hawaii, but its sugar production came to be dominated
by American companies and industrialists.
In 1890, a series of tariffs in the United States
threatened the island’s sugar market and American sugar
industrialists realized that the annexation of the island
would eliminate the tariff. These industrialists enlisted the
United States Minister to Hawaii’s assistance, and he
persuaded the U.S. Marine Corps to assist the industrialists
in overthrowing the Hawaiian monarchy.95 The American
businessmen then set up a provisional government in
Hawaii to request annexation by the United States. Despite
President Cleveland’s calls for the monarchy’s
reinstatement, and his characterization of the actions by
U.S. personnel as dishonorable, the monarchy was never
reinstated.96 Instead, the provisional government called a
constitutional convention and formed the independent
Republic of Hawaii.
The Cleveland administration
reluctantly engaged in diplomatic relations with the new
government. The Hawaiian Republic negotiated a treaty of
annexation, but it was never ratified in the U.S. Senate.
93

Hawaiian is designated as a co-official language in the island along
with English. HAW. ST. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
94
The treaty became known as the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875. 19 Stat.
625 (1875).
95
H.R. Res 2001, 53rd Cong. (1894).
96
S. J. Res. 19, 103d Cong. (1993).
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The onset of the Spanish-American war raised Hawaii’s
profile as a base in the Pacific Campaign against Spain in
the Philippines. Following the process used to annex
Texas, the United States soon annexed Hawaii as a territory
pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress.97
Unlike Texas, Hawaii was organized as a territory
pursuant to an organic act in 1900, and Hawaii’s path to
statehood took several decades.98 Congress debated the
subject of Hawaiian statehood in 1935 and again in 1937,
but on both occasions the bills failed amid strong
opposition.99 In 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, the territorial government ceded all independent
authority when it declared martial law on the islands.
Martial law ended in 1944.100 World War II signaled a
break in the Hawaiian statehood movement, but after the
war it began again in earnest. In 1950, a Hawaiian state
constitution was approved by more than seventy-five
percent of voters. This vote was followed in 1954 by a
100,000-signature petition, reportedly weighing two
hundred and fifty pounds.101 As with prior states, partisan
negotiations stalled Hawaii’s admission.
Democrats
ironically thought that Hawaii was a reliably Republican
state and insisted that reliably Democrat Alaska be
admitted first.102 In 1959, President Eisenhower signed the
97

This resolution became known as the Newlands Resolution, after Mr.
Francis Newland who first proposed it. 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
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The Hawaiian Organic Act. 31 Stat. 141 (1900).
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The Honolulu Advertiser, Timeline: Hawaii's March to Statehood,
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Hawaii Enablement Act and Hawaii became the last state to
join the union.
III. Political Path of Other Insular Territories of
the United States
The United States currently exercises sovereignty
over five inhabited island chains as unincorporated
territories: American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Each has
its own history of American acquisition and governance.
They will be discussed, in order, as comparison points to
the Puerto Rican experience.
a. American Samoa
The islands now known as American Samoa came
under American sovereignty through a compromise
between Germany, England, and the United States in
1899.103 At different points in the 19th Century, all three
nations laid claim to the entire archipelago. Since
ratification of the Tripartite Convention, the islands have
been governed as an unorganized territory of the United
States.104 The islands were first administered by the U.S.
Navy and later by Department of the Interior.105
b. Northern Mariana Islands
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This compromise is embodied in a treaty known as the Tripartite
Convention. 31 Stat. 1878 (1900).
104
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: American
Samoa, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/aq.html.
105
Exec. Order No. 10264, 16 F.R. 6417 (1951) (transferring control of
the islands known as American Samoa from the Department of the
Navy to the Department of the Interior effective July 1951).
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The Northern Mariana Islands are part of the same
archipelago as the Island of Guam. At the end of the
Spanish-American War, Spain ceded Guam to the United
States and sold the rest of the archipelago to Germany.106
Japan invaded the islands during World War I and retained
control until the United Nations put the islands under
American protection after World War II.107 The Northern
Mariana Islands made several attempts to reunify with
Guam but were ultimately unsuccessful.108 The Northern
Mariana Islands’ government then decided to pursue a
closer relationship to the United States and formed a
territorial government in 1978.109 It has remained in that
role since.
c. U.S. Virgin Islands
The United States purchased the then-Danish West
Indies from Denmark in 1916 for the purpose of
constructing a naval base in the archipelago. When both
nations ratified the treaty, the islands became the U.S.
Virgin Islands.110 Interestingly, the naval bases were built
106

For the treaty selling the Northern Mariana Islands to Germany, see
German-Spanish Treaty of 1899, Ger.-Spain, Feb. 12 1899, Gaceta de
Madrid [Madrid Gazette], 1 de Julio de 1899 (Spain) available at
http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1899/182/A00001-00001.pdf
(providing for the sale of the Carolinas and Mariana Islands –with the
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million German Marks) (author’s translation).
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University of Hawaii, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
http://libweb.hawaii.edu/digicoll/ttp/ttpi.html.
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The reasons for the failure of reunification attempts are outside the
scope of this paper, but the opposition stems, at least in part, from NMI
native cooperation with the Japanese during World War II. See also,
Haidee V. Eugenio, NMI, Guam reunification will be up to the people,
SAIPAN TRIBUNE, Apr. 26, 2011 available at
http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=10892.
109
90 Stat. 263 (1976).
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in Puerto Rico instead. The U.S. Virgin Islands are
governed as an unincorporated territory of the United States
and administered by the Department of the Interior.
d. Guam
Guam came under U.S. jurisdiction by the Treaty of
Paris of 1898. President McKinley immediately placed the
island under the control of the U.S. Navy because of its
strategic position in the Pacific Ocean.111 The Navy
controlled Guam until the Japanese Empire invaded the
island during World War II.112 The Japanese Empire
controlled the island from 1941 until 1944, when allied
forces invaded the island and restored the Naval
Government.113 Congress finally granted Guamanians
American citizenship and a civilian government in 1950
through an organic act.114 The issue of status in modern
Guam has only been tested once in 1982, and Guamanian
support for non-territorial options was weak.115 Although
the issue of status is important to Guamanians, focus on
this political issue has diminished in recent years.116
e. Cuba and the Philippines
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Guam History and Culture, http://www.guamonline.com/history/history.htm; Central Intelligence Agency, The
World Factbook: Guam, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/gq.html.
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Guam History, supra note 111.
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Id.
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Organic Act of Guam, Ch. 512, 64 Stat. 384 (1950).
115
Robert A. Underwood, Guam’s Political Status, GUAMPEDIA (Aug.
13, 2012), http://guampedia.com/guams-political-status/ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2013) (noting that a territorial option received fifty-one
percent of the vote in the 1982 plebiscite, statehood received twenty
one percent, and independence five percent).
116
Id.
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There are also two former U.S. Territories that
moved on to nationhood: Cuba and the Philippines. The
United States exercised control over Cuba and the
Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century. Like
Puerto Rico and Guam, Spain ceded these islands to the
United States under the Treaty of Paris. Cuba, however,
was never intended to remain an American possession and
declared its independence a mere three years after the
Treaty of Paris in 1901.117
The Philippines, however, followed a rockier path
to nationhood starting in 1896 with the Philippine
revolution.118 The revolution ebbed and flowed for two
years until the revolutionaries allied with the United States
during the Spanish-American War.119 This PhilippineSpanish conflict officially ended in 1898 when the
Kingdom of Spain ceded the island chain to the United
States. The revolutionaries did not recognize American
sovereignty over the islands and revolted in 1899.120 The
United States quickly subdued the revolution.
The
Philippines remained an unincorporated territory until the
end of World War II. The United States granted the
Philippines independence through the Philippine
Independence Act.121 The Act provided for a ten-year
transition period and culminated with Philippine
sovereignty in 1946.
IV. Puerto Rico’s Path
Puerto Rico is the first unincorporated territory of
the United States and the only one of Spain’s former
117

Chadwick, supra note 2 at 434-35.
August 1896:Revolt in the Philippines, PUB. BROAD.SYS.,
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colonies in the western hemisphere to remain a possession
of another nation. The relevant political history of the
island begins with the arrival of Christopher Columbus in
1493 and the first Spanish settlement in 1508. Despite
attempts by France in 1528, England in 1595, and the
Dutch in 1625 to wrestle control of the island from the
Spanish, the Kingdom of Spain maintained almost
continuous control over the island for more than four
centuries. Early in the nineteenth century, Spain granted
citizenship to its subjects in Puerto Rico and the island was
represented in the Spanish Parliament through its provincial
government pursuant to the Cadiz Constitution.122 Spain
stripped this representation and provincial autonomy from
the island when the Cadiz Constitution was revoked several
years later. High taxes imposed by the Spanish Crown and
a strict policy of exile for dissenters sparked a popular
uprising for independence known as El Grito de Lares.123
The Spanish authorities subdued this rebellion, but it led
Spain to grant Puerto Rico more control over its affairs.124
In 1898, a semi-autonomous government convened in the
island after popular elections.125
This semi-autonomous government would not last
long. The United States included Puerto Rico as a target
for its Caribbean intervention during the Spanish-American
War at the behest of Puerto Rican exiles in New York.126
American forces invaded the island in the summer of
122

CADIZ CONST. Art. I. available at
http://www.congreso.es/docu/constituciones/1812/ce1812_cd.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2013) (declaring that the Spanish Nation is comprised
of Spaniards in both hemispheres) (author’s translation).
123
Translated to “The Lares Cry,” named after the small town in
southern Puerto Rico where it took place.
124
Meléndez, supra note 17, at 16.
125
This authority was granted to Puerto Rico and the other Spanish
provinces in the Carta Autonomica in 1897. Puerto Rico History,
http://www.topuertorico.org/history4.shtml.
126
Meléndez, supra note 17, at 16.
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1898.127 By December, the war was over and the United
States and the Kingdom of Spain signed a treaty of peace in
Paris. The terms of the treaty gave control over the islands
of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the
United States.128 The treaty was quickly ratified in the
United States Senate the following year.
Between the ratification of the treaty and the
passage of the first organic act for the island, Puerto Rico
was under a military government. The military government
was short lived, but it efficiently implemented a number of
reforms aimed at integrating the island into the American
way of life.129
Congress established a territorial
government in 1900 through the Foraker Act.130 This law
established the island’s court system, introduced a series of
property reforms to foster the island’s sugar economy, and
created the office of the Resident Commissioner, Puerto
Rico’s non-voting delegate to Congress.
The island of Puerto Rico gained more autonomy in
the second decade of the twentieth century with the passing
of the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917. The most significant
effect of the act was the extension of citizenship to all
Puerto Ricans living in the island and their children.131 The
act also divided the territorial government into the
traditionally American legislative-executive-judicial silos
and mandated the popular election of the territorial
legislature. Under the Jones Act, the governor remained an
appointed official. Notably, no Puerto Rican would serve
in the office until 1946. The Jones Act was amended in
1948 and Puerto Ricans for the first time had a fully
representative local government.132 Elections were held
127
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later that year and the first popularly elected Puerto Rican
governor took office in 1949.
A strong separatist movement advocated for Puerto
Rico’s independence from the United States during the first
third of the twentieth century but ultimately failed to gain
popular support on the island. By the middle of the
century, the movement had significantly weakened. Many
factors led to the decline, including Puerto Rico’s inclusion
in New Deal legislation, the island’s strong participation in
both World Wars and the conflict in Korea, a fracturing of
the movement, and a mass migration of Puerto Ricans to
the continental United States.
One of the major reasons for the separatist
movement’s decline was that one of its most charismatic
leaders, Luis Muñoz Marín, broke with the movement
when he refused to support an independence bill that was
being considered by Congress in 1936. Shortly thereafter
Mr. Muñoz133 helped found the Partido Popular
Democratico (PPD), the island’s modern current procommonwealth party. Mr. Muñoz became the island’s first
popularly elected governor and served in the role for four
continuous four-year terms.
Governor Muñoz presided over a period of rapid
change for Puerto Rico. On July 4, 1950, President
Truman signed Public Law 600 and the governor’s
administration set out to draft a constitution for Congress’
approval.134 The governor called for a constitutional
convention and christened the convention’s new
constitution the Estado Libre Asociado (ELA), directly
translated as Free Associated State. To avoid confusion
that Puerto Rico was a state, the ELA would be referred to
as the Commonwealth in the United States. This Puerto
Rican Constitution was approved with two minor
133
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134
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amendments in Congress the following year and took effect
upon the results of a popular referendum approving the
ELA on July 25, 1952.135 The ELA has remained largely
unchanged, but despite attempts by Governor Muñoz to
reduce what can be best termed as cultural erosion on the
island, Puerto Rican society has changed significantly
under the ELA.
V. The Future for Puerto Rico
The adoption of the ELA had the effect of
cementing the political debate in the island around the issue
of status. Governor Muñoz’s PPD continues to advocate a
version of the ELA, the annexationists became statehooders
under the banner of the PNP, and what was left of the
separatist movement became the Partido Independentista
Puertorriqueño (PIP). To some extent, however, each party
seeks the same end: The resolution of the island’s political
status once and for all.
a. Continued Territorial Status – Estado Libre
Asociado
One option for Puerto Rico’s future is inaction. As
previously established, the Insular Cases make it possible
for Puerto Rico to remain a territory of the United States in
perpetuity. Fortunately, inaction is disfavored both in
Puerto Rico and the United States.136 Maintaining the ELA
135

Congress approved the Puerto Rican Constitution through the
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is also contrary to the principles of self-governance and
self-determination that the United States is founded upon.
Thus, final resolution of this issue is long overdue and
necessary.
b. Independence
Clearly, one way to resolve the island status is for
Puerto Rico to become a free and independent nation.
Precedent exists for this option in the experience of former
Treaty of Paris territories Cuba and the Philippines, both
independent today.137
Independence would preserve Puerto Rico’s culture
to a greater extent than either of the other possible
governing structures and would mean protecting the central
role of the Spanish language in the island. Legitimate
concerns exist, however, about the island’s municipal debt
and its ability to economically support itself if it were to
gain independence. Additionally, Puerto Ricans have come
to take pride in and value their American citizenship, which
would be at risk if Puerto Rico became independent.138
future status”); Report by President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s
Status at 10-11 (2007) available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/2007-report-by-the-presidenttask-force-on-puerto-rico-status.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2013)
(recommending a mandate of periodic votes until Puerto Ricans choose
a non-territorial option and defining the non-territorial options as
independence or statehood).
137
It is important to note Cuba was treated differently in the Treaty of
Paris and was never meant to remain under American sovereignty, the
Philippines were granted independence in through an act of Congress.
Philippine Independence Act, 48 Stat. 456 (1934).
138
There is no guarantee that Puerto Ricans in the mainland would
retain their American citizenship if Puerto Rico became independent.
There is precedent to the contrary. The Philippine Independence Act
stripped all Filipinos of their American citizenship upon the island
chain’s independence whether they were living in the United States or
abroad. 48 Stat. 456 §14 (“Upon the final and complete withdrawal of
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Furthermore, a large Puerto Rican Diaspora has
strengthened the ties between Puerto Rico and the United
States to such an extent that disconnecting the communities
could have negative social and political repercussions both
on the mainland and the island. 139 Finally, and perhaps as
a result of the aforementioned factors, Puerto Rican support
for independence is very low. The island has voted on the
question of status four times since the enactment of the
ELA and the most support that independence has been able
to garner was 5.5% of the votes in 2012.140

c. Enhanced Commonwealth
The pro-commonwealth party of the island proposes
that an enhanced or sovereign commonwealth would best
achieve Puerto Rican sovereignty.141 Under the enhanced
commonwealth, Puerto Ricans would remain American
citizens and Puerto Rico would assume sovereignty over its
own internal and external affairs. The PPD’s proposal for
an enhanced commonwealth would be based on a treaty of
free association that would continue federal funding for
programs on the island while reducing the federal
administrative footprint in Puerto Rico.142 On the surface,
[the United States from] the Philippine Islands the immigration laws of
the United States. . . shall apply to persons who were born in the
Philippine Islands to the same extent as in the case of other foreign
countries).
139
See Census Bureau, supra note 53.
140
Puerto Rico Elections Commission, Non-Territorial Options –
Island Wide Results, available at
http://div1.ceepur.org/REYDI_NocheDelEvento/index.html#en/default/
OPCIONES_NO_TERRITORIALES_ISLA.xml (last visited Feb. 1,
2013).
141
Burnett, supra note 25, at 20.
142
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this solution appears to be a silver bullet to solve the issue
of Puerto Rico’s status. The enhanced commonwealth
would preserve the American citizenship of all Puerto
Ricans, protect Puerto Rican culture from further cultural
erosion, and Puerto Rico would be self-sovereign for the
first time since before colonialism.
The enhanced commonwealth, however, may be
incompatible with the Constitution of the United States
because its dual promises of sovereignty and continued
birthright American citizenship are irreconcilable. Further,
it is an open question whether Congress would approve
such a change, and why they would. From Congress’ point
of view, Puerto Rico would remain a relatively expensive
proposition with less federal oversight and without an
obvious reason why it should support a basically
independent state.
The PPD’s enhanced commonwealth proposal is
very similar to a proposed commonwealth for the island of
Guam that was debated by Congress in 1994.143 The Guam
proposal would have required the mutual consent of the
citizens Guam and of Congress before any act of Congress
became applicable in the island. Because the act was
incompatible with the long-recognized supreme power of
Congress to dispose of the territories, the Act never made it
out of committee. Congress’ power over the territories is
supreme, or plenary, because the Constitution recognizes
only States and Territories and granted authority over the
The territories are akin to
latter to Congress.144
municipalities in the states and are thus “mere
subdivisions” of the United States. Congress’ power over
the territories remains “so long as they remain in a
territorial condition.”145 Thus, even if Congress agreed to
143

Guam Commonwealth Bill, H.R. 1521, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
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145
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an enhanced commonwealth solution, it could change its
mind at any time. Only if Puerto Rico were to become
independent, then negotiate on even ground with the United
States for a treaty that continued federal funding in the
island, would Congress be bound. Again, the political
feasibility of such a negotiation is an open question.
The problem for the PPD’s enhanced
commonwealth is that remaining “in a territorial condition”
is important to the enhanced commonwealth’s second pillar
–the preservation of American citizenship for persons born
in the island. The Constitution did not contain a provision
for citizenship until the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification. The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly extends
birthright citizenship only to those born in and “subject to
the jurisdiction” of the United States.146 Thus, for the
enhanced commonwealth’s promise of continued birthright
citizenship to Puerto Ricans to stand constitutional scrutiny,
Puerto Rico must remain “subject to the jurisdiction” of the
United States. It is clear that the ELA as it stands today is
disfavored both by the United States and the people of
Puerto Rico, and the enhanced commonwealth proposal is
at best uncertain and at worst unworkable under the United
States Constitution.
d. Statehood
The only other political avenue for the final
resolution of Puerto Rico’s status is for the island to join
the community of states in the union. The prospect of
becoming a state has steadily gained support in Puerto Rico
since the first status referendum in 1967. Statehood
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received 39% of the vote then, but it garnered 46.3% in
1993, 46.5% in 1998, and 61.3% in 2012.147
In the 115 years since Puerto Rico came under
American sovereignty, Puerto Ricans have steadily
integrated into American culture and the institutions of
American government have grown substantially in the
island. The local political organization is virtually identical
to those in the fifty states and Puerto Rico’s economy has
fully integrated with that of the mainland United States.
This high degree of social and political integration over the
past century makes transition to statehood the most easily
implemented of all the possible non-territorial options.
Despite the fact that Puerto Ricans have been part
of American society for over a century, there is strong
opposition on the island and the mainland to a Puerto Rican
state.
On the island, both the independence and
commonwealth parties oppose statehood, articulating
concern for the protection of Puerto Rican culture and
identity. These parties point out that by becoming a state,
Puerto Rico would lose its Olympic team, the ability for
Puerto Ricans to compete in pageants like the Miss
Universe competition, and that Puerto Ricans would be
forced to adopt English as their first language.
Whether Puerto Rico would remain Spanish
speaking is a key issue for statehood opponents on the
island and the mainland, with island opponents fearing
English and mainland opponents demanding it. The
mainland opposition also articulates economic and political
concerns. On the economic front, if admitted, the island
would be the poorest state of the union. Its per capita
income is not even half of Mississippi’s, currently the
nation’s poorest state, and the island’s unemployment rate
is almost double the national measure. Becoming a state
147
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would eliminate caps on direct aid to households in the
island, which will dramatically increase the number of
welfare recipients in Puerto Rico.
The other front of opposition in the mainland is
political. If Puerto Rico were to be admitted to the union, it
would be awarded five or six representatives and two
senators in Congress. Republicans fear that Puerto Rico
would be a reliably Democratic state.
Large state
delegations from states like California also fear their
influence would be diluted by giving up a number of
representatives in the house. Another avenue of political
opposition is that admission of Puerto Rico as a state may
prompt the other insular territories to petition for statehood.
Although the opposing arguments to Puerto Rico’s
statehood are formidable, they are by no means ironclad.
The island opposition on the grounds of protecting the
cultural integrity of Puerto Ricans, while laudable, fails to
take into account that each state of the union is culturally
distinct from the others. This cultural diversity existed at
the time of the American Revolution and it remains a fact
today. It is true that the distinct culture of some states is
more accentuated than others, but it would be inaccurate to
say that Hawaiians, New Yorkers, Texans and Louisianans
are not culturally distinct from one other.
The issue of language, likewise, is soluble. If
admitted, Puerto Rico would not be the first bilingual state,
a distinction held by New Mexico, nor would it be the only
currently bilingual state—Hawaii’s state languages are
English and Hawaiian.148
As for the economic questions, the effects of Puerto
Rico’s admission to the union are difficult to predict. It is
very possible, if not likely, that economic activity in the
island would increase upon its admission.149 Indeed,
148
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American companies often stay away from investing in
Puerto Rico because of its uncertain relationship with the
United States. Tourism would likely also increase as more
Americans come to the realization that they can travel to
Puerto Rico without a passport.150
The political opposition to the Puerto Rico’s
admission to the island is also founded on shaky premises.
Puerto Ricans on the island do not currently view politics
from a Democrat or Republican point of view. Island
politics have revolved around the issue of status for more
than sixty years. Any attempt to predict how Puerto Ricans
will fall along party lines would be futile. In fact, until
2012, the two highest offices in the island—the Governor
and Resident Commissioner—were held by a Republican
and a Democrat. Both men were members of Puerto Rico’s
statehood party.
Opposition to Puerto Rico’s statehood on the
grounds that the other insular territories will also seek
statehood upon Puerto Rico’s admission is unwarranted.
First, unlike Puerto Rico, the population of the other insular
territories is relatively small.151 Admitting states with such
small populations is not likely to be desirable or feasible.
Secondly, Puerto Rico is further along the political process
to statehood than any of the other insular territories. For
example, the Department of the Interior administers all
other insular territories while Puerto Rico is largely self-

Greenhouse, Evolution in Europe; East-West Berlin, a Boomtown in
the Making, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1990, at A1 (noting that an economic
boom in Germany in the early 1990s was the direct result of German
reunification).
150
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is not a widely known fact. Carlos Romero–Barcelo, Puerto Rico,
U.S.A.: The Case for Statehood, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 80-81 (1981).
151
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the union. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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governed as a de facto state.152 Finally, of the other insular
territories, only Guam has ever taken steps indicating a
desire for eventual admission.153 Thus, at least for the
moment, the people of the insular territories appear
satisfied with their current status.
VI. Puerto Rico’s Incorporation
The Supreme Court once opined that “[i]t may well
be that over time the ties between the United States and any
of its unincorporated territories strengthen in ways that are
of constitutional significance.”154 Puerto Rico has reached
that tipping point. In the century since the United States
invaded the island, Puerto Ricans have risen to some of the
highest positions in the Federal Government. Puerto
Ricans have served as Federal Judges, American
Ambassadors, Generals, and Admirals. Since 2009, with
the confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, a Puerto
Rican sits on the highest court of the land.
Many Puerto Ricans, including Justice Sotomayor’s
mother, have served in the United States military since
1898. In fact, if Puerto Rico were a state, it would be
among the highest in per capita volunteering for the armed
forces.155
More evidence of the strengthening of ties to the
United States is the 1966 Public Law 89-571, which made
the Federal District Courts in Puerto Rico into Article III
courts, an act that Congress has not taken with other
unincorporated territories.156 All federal agencies treat
Puerto Rico in the same manner they would a state. Unless
152
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otherwise specified, all civil and criminal federal laws
apply to Puerto Rico as they do to the states.157 Perhaps the
most reliable indicator of the integration of Puerto Rico
into American society is the fact that as of the census of
2010, more Puerto Ricans resided in the United States than
in Puerto Rico.158
VII. Conclusion
It has been more than a century since American
forces quietly landed on a beach in southern Puerto Rico
and were received with cheers of “Viva Puerto Rico
Americano.” Ninety-six years have passed since Puerto
Ricans joined the brotherhood of citizenship with their
continental counterparts. Four hundred thousand Puerto
Ricans have served in the United States military and have
risen to the highest levels of American society. Despite all
of this, Puerto Ricans on the island remain sentenced to
second-class citizenship. This situation is patently unfair to
Puerto Ricans on the island, who have no vote in a
Congress with plenary power over their affairs. The
situation is also unfair to Americans on the mainland who
largely subsidize Puerto Rico’s government.
This past November, Puerto Ricans rejected the
current territorial status of the island. That much is clear.
Opponents of statehood have raised questions about the
interpretation of the statehood portion of the vote, but even
they cannot deny that a majority of Puerto Ricans voted to
do away with the territorial nature of their relationship with
the United States. Ultimately, everyone involved is best
served by a final resolution to this question, and that can
only come through statehood or independence. Of those,
statehood best respects the sacrifices made by Puerto
157
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Ricans in the past century and reflects the gradual but
significant integration of the island into American society.
The Supreme Court of the United States once
declared that Puerto Rico was “not foreign in the
“international sense . . . [but] foreign to the United States in
a domestic sense.”159 This proclamation was arguably
erroneous even in its time, and it definitely is today. Puerto
Rico and its people are no longer foreign to the United
States in a domestic or international sense; accordingly, it
makes no sense to consider them as such.

159

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901) (White, J.,
concurring).
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POLICY NOTE
SOME MORE FOR SAMOA:
THE CASE FOR CITIZENSHIP UNIFORMITY1
By: Benjamin S. Morrell2
I.

Introduction

In the late 1960s, Leneuoti Tuaua graduated from
college in California and applied to several government
jobs around the state, hoping to start a career in law
enforcement.3 He scored well on the entrance exams for
the California Highway Patrol and the San Mateo County
Sheriff’s Office.4 Tuaua had lived in the United States his
entire life and had a U.S. passport, yet his applications were
denied because he was not a citizen. At the top of Tuaua’s
passport, stamped in large type, read the words: “THE
BEARER IS A UNITED STATES NATIONAL AND
NOT A UNITED STATES CITIZEN.”5 Tuaua was born in
American Samoa, a longtime U.S. territory in the South
Pacific that consists of five volcanic islands and two coral
atolls, and has a population of over fifty-five thousand.6
Unlike Americans born in Puerto Rico, Guam, and every
other U.S. territory, those born in American Samoa are
1

SOME MORE OF SAMOA (Columbia Pictures 1941).
J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Tennessee College of Law.
3
Fili Sagapolutele, Am. Samoans Sue for U.S. Citizenship Based On
Constitution, PACIFIC ISLANDS REPORT, July 12, 2012, available at
http://pidp.org/pireport/2012/July/07-13-10.htm.
4
Id.
5
DC Circuit Appeal, WE THE PEOPLE PROJECT,
http://www.equalrightsnow.org/tuaua_appealed_to_d_c_circuit (last
visited Jan. 29, 2014).
6
Insular Area Summary for American Samoa, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR (Apr. 2010), http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/americansamoa.cfm.
2
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“generally considered nationals but not as citizens of the
United States.”7
This status carries with it several
difficulties, limitations, and perplexities, as well as an
intangible stigma of lacking citizenship rights afforded to
other Americans.8
Tuaua, along with four other American Samoans
and the Samoan Federation of America, a nonprofit
organization that advocates for Samoans’ rights, 9 sued the
U.S. government in 2012, arguing that the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees full
citizenship to those born in American Samoa.10 On June
26, 2013, a federal district court judge in Washington, D.C.
granted the government’s motion to dismiss, disposing of
the suit in its earliest stages.11 Citing the doctrine of
territorial incorporation from a hundred-year-old body of
Supreme Court precedent known as the Insular Cases, 12 the
court noted that, for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, American Samoans are not entitled to U.S.
citizenship by birth.13 The plaintiffs have appealed the case
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.14 Tuaua,
the lead plaintiff, asks, “[i]f we are American Samoans,
then why not citizens? I believe American Samoans
deserve the same rights and benefits as all other
Americans.”15
7

12 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., USCIS POLICY MANUAL pt. A, ch. 2 (Mar. 11, 2014).
8
Tuaua FAQ, WE THE PEOPLE PROJECT,
http://www.equalrightsnow.org/tuaua_faq (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
9
Id.
10
Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88. (D.D.C. 2013).
11
Id. at 90.
12
Id. at 94; see Id. n. 9 (for a full list of the Insular Cases).
13
Id. at 94.
14
DC Circuit Appeal, supra note 5.
15
American Samoa Lawsuit Seeks US Citizenship, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK NEWS (July 13, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-07-13/american-samoalawsuit-seeks-us-citizenship.
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This note will explore the territorial incorporation
doctrine, a judicially created doctrine under which the
Constitution applies fully only in incorporated United
States territories, and the reasons why it is has no legitimate
place in Twenty-First Century American jurisprudence.
From the outdated and xenophobic cases that support the
doctrine, to the discriminatory practices it promotes, the
territorial incorporation doctrine simply fails to advance
any compelling state or federal interest.
II.

Development of the Law
A.

Historical Background

American Samoa became a territory of the United
States in 1899 after Germany and the U.S. signed the
Tripartite Convention, agreeing to divide ownership of the
Samoan Islands.16 Located in the Polynesian region of the
southern Pacific Ocean, American Samoa’s annexation
occurred soon after the Spanish–American War; this period
marked the apex of America’s foray into the entrenched
European institutions of imperialism and colonialism.17
During World War II, U.S. troops in the Pacific Theatre
used American Samoa as a major communications hub and
naval base.18 Many Samoans voluntarily enlisted in the
U.S. Marines and served on active duty until the end of the
war.19 Samoans have served in the U.S. military ever since.
Per capita, soldiers from American Samoa have died in
Afghanistan and Iraq at a higher rate than any other U.S.
16

GEORGE HERBERT RYDEN, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES IN RELATION TO SAMOA 574 (1933).
17
Joe Waldo Ellison, The Partition of Samoa: A Study in Imperialism
and Diplomacy, 8 PAC. HIST. REV. 259, 288 (1939).
18
JACK C. HUDSON & KATE G. HUDSON, AMERICAN SAMOA IN WORLD
WAR II 18 (1994), available at
http://ashpo.com/downloads/library/7500319.pdf.
19
Id. at 25–27.
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state or territory.20 Three of the plaintiffs in Tuaua v.
United States are veterans.21
New Zealand wrested control of Western Samoa
from Germany during the First World War. Following
World War II, it became a “trust territory” of the United
Nations before declaring independence in 1962.22 Today,
the Independent State of Samoa comprises the majority of
the island chain, with a population of nearly two hundred
thousand.23 By contrast, American Samoa has seen very
little political change over the last century and today
“continues its status as an unorganized, unincorporated
United States territory.”24
B.

“National” vs. “Citizen”

The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.”25 The concept of citizenship
by birth has its roots in the ancient Greco–Roman concept
of jus soli: “the law of the soil,” which granted citizenship

20

Kirsten Scharnberg, Where the U.S. Military is the Family Business,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 11, 2007, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-0311/news/0703110486_1_military-recruiters-american-samoans-bootcamp.
21
Tuaua FAQ, supra note 8.
22
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., United States Government Policy and
Social Stratification in American Samoa, 53 OCEANIA 29, 29–30
(1982).
23
Central Intelligence Agency, Samoa, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan.
30, 2014), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ws.html.
24
Laughlin, supra note 22, at 30.
25
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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by birth within the territory of a state or city.26 English
common law adopted the doctrine following the decline of
medieval feudalism, and the U.S. kept it at common law
until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment codified jus
soli in the Constitution.27
Congress has defined a “national of the United
States” as “a citizen of the United States, or . . . a person
who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes
permanent allegiance to the United States.”28 All citizens,
then, are nationals, but not all nationals are citizens. A
“person born in an outlying possession of the United States
on or after the date of formal acquisition of such
possession” is a national, but not a citizen.29 Presently,
“[t]he term ‘outlying possessions of the United States’
means American Samoa and Swains Island.”30 The only
Americans who become noncitizen nationals by birth are
those born in American Samoa.
American Samoans are not citizens of any country,
though they still have obligations and some rights under
American law. Compared to other Americans, and even
those living in other territories, Samoans often have fewer
rights and more hardships with no apparent rhyme or
reason. Although nationals can generally work and reside
anywhere in the U.S,31 like U.S. citizens in other territories,
they cannot vote in federal elections and do not pay many
26

Citizenship, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACADEMIC
EDITION,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/118828/citizenship?ancho
r=ref22254 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
27
Id.
28
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2012).
29
8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (1988).
30
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29) (2012). In 1925, Congress declared U.S.
sovereignty over Swain’s Island and made it a part of American Samoa.
See 48 U.S.C. § 1662.
31
U.S. National, IMMIHELP (2014),
http://www.immihelp.com/immigration/us-national.html.
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federal taxes.32 Nationals may apply for U.S. citizenship,
but under the same rules as other permanent residents,33
which requires living in a U.S. state for three months,34
paying nearly seven hundred dollars in fees, and passing a
civics exam and an English literacy test.35 Despite the high
rate of military enlistment, American Samoans cannot
become military officers unless they successfully apply for
citizenship.36 Different states treat nationals inconsistently.
Among other restrictions, many states prohibit nationals
from owning guns, serving on juries, and holding public
office.37
C.

The Insular
Incorporation

Cases

and

Territorial

After the American annexation of several overseas
territories at the turn of the century, individuals who found
themselves suddenly under the authority of the United
States attempted to invoke the rights and freedoms of the
Constitution through the American courts. The U.S.
Supreme Court handled these challenges in a series of
decisions known as the Insular Cases.38 Whereas previous
administrations had sought to create new states out of
freshly acquired land, President McKinley established a
new trend of colonialism with the intention of keeping
these new “colonies” at arm’s length, using them primarily

32

Insular Area Summary for American Samoa, supra note 6.
Id.
34
American Samoa Lawsuit Seeks US Citizenship, supra note 15.
35
DC Circuit Appeal, supra note 5.
36
Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense, 41 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 71, 85–86 (2013).
37
Id.
38
Adriel Cepeda Derieux, A Most Insular Minority, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 797 (2010).
33
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for military purposes and posturing before the international
community.39
Following the lead of the Executive Branch, the
Supreme Court relegated the new territories to a legal
periphery analogous to their geographic relation to the
American mainland by conjuring up the doctrine of
territorial incorporation and applying it throughout the
Insular Cases:
This
doctrine
divided
domestic territory -- that is,
territory
within
the
internationally
recognized
boundaries of the United
States and subject to its
sovereignty -- into two
categories:
those
places
“incorporated”
into
the
United States and forming an
integral
part
thereof
(including the states, the
District of Columbia, and the
“incorporated
territories”);
and
those
places
not
incorporated into the United
States,
but
merely
“belonging” to it (which
came to be known as the
“unincorporated
territories”).40
Beginning in 1901, the Insular Cases held that the full
weight of the Constitution did not “follow[] the [American]
39

Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 799
(2005).
40
Id. at 800.
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flag”41 to these new, unincorporated territories, and that
only the most basic Constitutional rights apply there.42
Justifying the invention of this wholly new doctrine, the
Court noted that one “false step at this time might be fatal
to the development of . . . the American Empire.”43 The
Court provided little guidance on how to evaluate whether
a constitutional right is “fundamental.”44
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue
of citizenship regarding inhabitants of the territories in
Downes v. Bidwell. The Supreme Court interpreted the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
“limitation to persons born or naturalized in the United
States which is not extended to persons born in any place
‘subject to their jurisdiction.’”45 Citizenship, the most
fundamental and seminal of rights, was not fundamental
enough for the Court to apply to the territories. Residents
of the territories lived in a state of uncertainty as to which
rights they had and which remained out of their grasp,
nestled away in the incorporated and purportedly more
civilized regions of the “American Empire.”
Eventually, as the country shifted away from its
imperialistic gaze, Congress began to concretely define the
legal and political relationships between the U.S. and its
territories through legislation on an individual basis. Over
the years, Congress granted full citizenship rights to
residents of Guam,46 Puerto Rico,47 the U.S. Virgin
Islands,48 and the Northern Mariana Islands,49 while
41

Id. at 805.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
43
Id. at 286.
44
Morrison, supra note 36, at 105.
45
Downes, 182 U.S. at 251.
46
Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. § 1421 (1950).
47
Jones–Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64–36, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
48
8 U.S.C. § 1406 (1952).
49
48 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976) (The Northern Mariana Islands gained full
U.S. citizenship for its citizens contemporaneously with its political
42
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relinquishing control of the Philippines50 and the Panama
Canal Zone.51 Among the inhabited territories of the U.S.,
only American Samoa remained unincorporated. Congress
eventually passed the Immigration and Naturalization
Act,52 which codified the old distinction between
incorporated territories and unincorporated territories. As
the last unincorporated territory, American Samoa was the
only place to experience a unique handicap of its residents’
rights as Americans through the now legislated and
codified territorial incorporation doctrine.53
III.

Analysis

The Insular Cases were decided by many of the
same justices who endorsed racial segregation in Plessy v.
Ferguson only a few years before.54 They have invited
comparison to Plessy ever since establishing a “doctrine of
separate and unequal.”55 The high percentage of native,
nonwhite populations in the American territories, especially
at the turn of the century, invite these ugly associations.56
As the Court in Downes put it, the territories were
“inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion,
customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of

union with the U.S. in 1976.). See Covenant to Establish a
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union
with the United States of America § 1801 (1975), available at
http://www.cnmilaw.org/section1801.html.
50
Treaty of General Relations and Protocol with the Republic of the
Philippines, U.S.-Phil., July 4, 1946, 61 Stat. 1174.
51
Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, U.S.-Pan., July 22, 1977, TIAS
10030.
52
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
53
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2012).
54
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55
Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 283, 291
(2007).
56
Id. at 289.
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thought.”57 Tellingly, the opinion in Downes heavily
quotes Dred Scott v. Sandford.58 Through this unflattering
historical lens, it becomes clearer how the Supreme Court
could have found that citizenship is not a fundamental right
under the Constitution. Fundamentality, they may have
privately reasoned, depending on factors more transparent
than the content of one’s character. McKinley’s original
goal of colonial exploitation rang true. The U.S. was not
interested in the people, only the land.
Rather than being actively based on institutional
racism today, the anomaly of American Samoa’s status as
the last unincorporated territory without citizenship by
birthright appears to have no specific justification. A rule
this obscure, perplexing, and technical should require a
compelling reason for its existence. Neither the court in
Tuaua nor Congress managed to pinpoint any distinct
characteristics of American Samoa that would vindicate or
even attempt to explain the arbitrary nature of its unique,
unincorporated status today. With no governmental interest
replacing the original imperialistic one, the incorporation
doctrine has no purpose yet still exists. It is at best a
vestigial reminder of America’s imperialistic past and at
worst the last surviving mechanism of a systematic “regime
of political apartheid.”59
The landscape of the Constitution has changed
drastically over the last century, due more to its
interpretation by the Supreme Court than its subsequent
amendments.
In the early Twentieth Century, the
Fourteenth Amendment condoned racial segregation,60 but
would not tolerate maximum hours regulations for bakers

57

Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
Id. at 250, 271, 274–76 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857)).
59
Downes, 182 U.S. at 283.
60
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537.
58
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and factory workers.61 Many state court verdicts could be
retried, trumped, and reversed by federal common law at a
defendant’s whim.62 The Bill of Rights largely did not
apply to the states, even regarding crucial liberties like
protection against double jeopardy63 and confessions
obtained through torture.64 The Supreme Court has no
qualms with overturning old precedent where a
fundamental right is being infringed,65 where years of
experience have simply shown continuous and systematic
unfairness,66 or even where the Court finds a new right to
read into the Constitution67 or decides to delete a
previously valid one.68 Considering these modern trends in
constitutional law, and the rotting, cobwebbed foundation
of the territorial incorporation doctrine, the ruling in Tuaua
makes sense only by remembering that it was decided at the
trial level.69 Trial judges typically leave the trendsetting to
the appellate courts and often feel it beyond their authority
to make new policy. Whether the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit will take on this challenge remains to
be seen, but given the shaky ground on which the territorial
incorporation doctrine stands, it would not be surprising to
see it fall.

61

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
63
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
64
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
65
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
67
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68
See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
69
Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
62
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IV.

Conclusion

The Insular Cases’ doctrine of territorial
incorporation provides a spectacularly poor justification for
preserving the modern distinction between U.S. citizens
and nationals by birth. Considering the Court’s woefully
antiquated approach to constitutional interpretation,
especially regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
fact that the underlying original goal of facilitating
American colonial ambition is long gone, these cases offer
little persuasive support once put in context.
The
difference now only applies to the residents of one tiny
island chain in the Southern Hemisphere, following a
protracted period of arbitrary congressional cherry picking
of rights for other territories, evidences the perennial dearth
of common sense surrounding this issue. Under the current
dichotomy one might need to amend the Declaration of
Independence to read “all men are created equal unless they
are created in American Samoa.”70 Without a legitimate
state interest this construction moves from the troubling to
the absurd. Uniformity of American citizenship by itself
would make practical sense on its face, eliminating the
second-class stigma associated with hailing from one
particular U.S. territory while simplifying a needlessly
complex issue. Accomplishing this goal through the
mechanism of the Fourteenth Amendment, by way of the
courts, would offer more consistency, not only with the
application of the law, but also with its interpretation.
The simple answer is, in this case, the correct one.
Being in the United States should mean just that, with no
need for an asterisk. `As a vestige from a cavalier and
discriminatory part of the nation’s past, the doctrine of
territorial incorporation squarely belongs in the dustbin of

70

Morrison, supra note 36, at 146.
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history, not in the pages of Twenty-First Century court
opinions.71

71

Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
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POLICY NOTE
SELLING ITS SOUL: AN ANALYSIS OF A FORPROFIT CORPORATION’S
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY IN
AMERICA
By: Steffen Pelletier1
I. Introduction
Is it possible to consider the principles and morals
upon which a business entity is built as separate from the
individual shareholders that form the business entity—do
they make up a “soul”?
While the question above, on its face, rings more of
philosophy than law and policy, there is currently a
substantial question of law that is strikingly similar, if not
the same, yielded by the contraception mandate of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).
In brief, the PPACA, among other things, requires all
health insurance policies, including those policies made
available to subscribers through a privately held
corporation, to provide contraceptive and preventative care
for women.2 Rooted in the fundamental religious beliefs
they hold, many Americans find this so-called
“contraceptive mandate” abhorrent.3 Certainly, no one
would question that it is those Americans’ right to speak
and act in accordance with that belief. However, the more
1

J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Tennessee College of Law.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 sec. 1001(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2013).
3
Jack Kerwick, Backlash Against Obamacare Contraceptive Mandate,
THE NEW AM. (Jul. 3, 2013, 15:12),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/15891backlash-against-obamacare-contraceptive-mandate.
2
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complex question arises when dealing with the privately
held for-profit corporation. Specifically, assuming a
private corporation’s fundamental principles on which it
was built are in direct conflict with the entire notion of
contraceptive care, what is the extent of Congress’s ability
to require the corporation to make insurance available
covering contraceptive care?
In this policy note, I will address the many
considerations surrounding a corporation’s legal and moral
autonomy. The general threshold question is this: to what
extent is a for-profit corporation afforded religion and
speech protections separately and distinctly from its
shareholders?4 I intend this note to serve as a guide
through the myriad complicated considerations implicated
by this issue; in addition, I conclude that there is both
objective value in and legal authority supporting the
protection of a corporation’s right to act in accordance with
its religious affiliation. I will show that a corporation has a
“soul” of its own—an individual and distinct set of
principles that should be valued and protected.
II. The Development of the Law: The PPACA and
“Preventative Health Services”
The PPACA mandates that “preventative health
services” be included in healthcare plans without any cost
sharing.5 Congress did not initially define “preventative
health services” and instead authorized the Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to promulgate rules
to this effect.6 DHHS issued a preliminary rule that defined
the religious employer exception narrowly and included
4

John K. DiMugno, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate, 25 No. 1 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2013).
5
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
2713, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
6
3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 13:51 (2013).
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contraception in the definition of “preventative health
service.”7 In order to qualify for the “religious employer
exception,” an organization is required to (1) have the
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily
employ persons who share its religious views; (3) primarily
serve persons who share its religious views; and (4) be a
nonprofit organization.8 Accordingly, this exemption did
not exempt many religious employers, such as Catholic
healthcare providers, from being required to offer
contraception as part of the routine coverage policies they
Because the Catholic Church forbids
offered.9
contraception, those non-exempt Catholic organizations
would be forced to either violate their Catholic principles
or violate the newly enacted law.10 Although the DHHS
attempted to resolve the issue by delaying the date on
which religious-affiliated nonprofits were required to
comply with the law by one year and ordered the insurance
companies of those religious employers to pay for the
contraception, rather than the employers directly, the
primary dispute remained: specifically, the Catholic Church
wanted absolutely no affiliation with the provision of
contraceptives.11
7

Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv)
(2013).
8
Id.
9
3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6.
10
See id.; Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, Vatican (July 25, 1968),
available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p
-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html.
11
See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130; 3 Religious Organizations and the Law §
13:51 (citing White House Misrepresents Its Own Contraceptive
Mandate, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-020.cfm. Additionally, the
exemption clause was again amended and expanded to define “religious
employers” only as those that are considered nonprofit religious houses
of worship and religious orders as defined by the IRS. The amended
contraception mandate, while expanded to include more groups and
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Additionally, many other nonprofits and for-profits
corporations have remained unwilling to breach their
fundamental principles by providing insurance coverage for
contraceptives. The crux of this conflict is primarily rooted
in the interplay between the federal act giving individuals
statutory claims where the government “substantially
burdens” her freedom to exercise her religion and case law
which identifies corporations as individuals.
III. Substantive Law at Issue
A. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)
of 1993 was a response to the holding of the Supreme
Court in Employment Div. v. Smith. 12 In Smith, the Court
held that the dispositive issue in evaluating the
constitutionality of a law under the First Amendment is not
whether a law suppressed an individual’s religious
practices.13 Rather, the Court held that, so long as the law
was otherwise “neutral” and “generally applicable” to all
individuals, the secondary effect of whether the law
suppressed the religious practices of some is irrelevant.14
In effect, the Court removed the sometimes ambiguous
organization, still did not provide an exemption to other non-profits,
and more extensively, for-profit corporations that asserted religious
reasons for exemption. The amended contraception mandate was
finalized on June 28, 2013. However, the mandate’s final version did
little to mitigate the increased litigation from those still outside of the
exemption. See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.
12
Codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993); Emp’t
Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990); see
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994).
13
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
14
Id at 878-81, 876.
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weighing between two equally valid considerations: a
compelling government interest and the right an American
enjoys to practice his or her religion freely.15
Congress acted swiftly through its enactment of the
RFRA, which was not only intended to replace the Smith
standard with the compelling interest test, shifting the
burden of proof to the government, but also to provide
statutory claims and defenses for an individual where a law
“substantially burdens” his or her freedom to exercise his
or her religion.16
The RFRA provides that the
government’s burden is met if it demonstrates that the law
or policy is “(1) in a furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”17
Notably, sub-section (c) provides that “[a] person
whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
against a government.”18 To date, the federal circuit courts
have held that subsection (c)’s use of “person” is
ambiguous and therefore, the potential application of
subsection (c) to different organizations and corporations is
a matter of statutory interpretation.19 There is a circuit split
15

Id at 879.
The RFRA provides that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability[ ]” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)); see
Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470, 474 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No.95C5371, 1996 WL 22964, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1996)).
17
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added).
18
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).
19
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
16
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as to which entities may bring a claim, and, of those, which
entities may be successful in adjudicating their claims on
the merits.20
B. First Amendment and Citizens United
For-profit corporations raising claims based on the
RFRA find support in the landmark Supreme Court holding
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,21 which
held that corporations enjoy First Amendment
protections.22 The petitioner, Citizens United, sought
injunctive relief from anticipated civil and criminal
penalties that would be imposed on it following the release
of a political documentary within thirty days of the 2008
Democratic primary elections.23 The Court specifically
held that the First Amendment applies to corporations and
it “does not permit Congress to make categorical
distinctions based on corporate identity” concerning
freedom of speech.24 Further, it held that “[n]o sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on political speech of
non-profit or for-profit corporations.”25 Citizens United’s
20

Id.
See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
22
Id. at 886, 917.
23
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte v. Sebelius, 735
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Citizens United, 558
U.S. 310).
24
The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make categorical
distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the
content of the political speech. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (citing
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778, n. 14 (1978)).
25
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315. The sweeping implications of the
holding that a corporation has its own identity that is separate from an
individual citizen cannot be understated. When analyzing whether a
section of the Bipartisan Reform Act restricting corporate speech was
21
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sweeping implication is simply this: “[t]he First
Amendment protects speech and the speaker, and the ideas
that flow from each,” regardless of whether the speaker is a
person in the literal sense or a for-profit corporation.26
IV. Action to the Courts
A. Non-Profit Dismissals
Two types of lawsuits have been filed in response to
the contraception: those brought by nonprofit religious
employers like the Catholic dioceses, and those brought by
for-profit companies owned by religious individuals who
disagree with the use of contraception.27 Many of the
claims brought by nonprofit organizations have been
dismissed on procedural grounds dealing primarily with
ripeness.28

unconstitutional, the Court noted that if the Act were imposed on an
individual citizen the government’s “time, place, and manner”
argument would not be accepted, but instead be seen as a government
action to silence suspect voices. Id. at 339.
26
Id. at 341.
27
HHS Mandate Central, THE BECKET FUND fOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/, (last visited Jan. 28,
2014). Specifically, there have been a total of 91 cases filed by over
300 plaintiffs, including 46 cases brought by for-profit companies and
45 cases brought by non-profit organizations. Additionally, there have
been 2 class action cases brought. Of those cases adjudicated on the
merits, 33 injunctions have been granted and 6 denied in cases filed by
for-profit companies, and 19 injunctions have been granted and 1
denied in cases filed by non-profit organizations. See HHS Mandate
Central, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Jan. 28,
2014).
28
DiMugno, supra note 4. (Noting the reason behind many of these
dismissals was that the DHHS was still finalizing its rules.) See
Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012).
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B. For-Profit Litigation and Circuit Court Splits
Cases brought by for-profit corporations generally
do not share the same procedural impediments as their
nonprofit counterparts29 and have reached the United States
Courts of Appeal on the merits.30 Currently, there is a split
between five Circuit Courts on whether for-profit
corporations and their owners are able to bring First
Amendment RFRA claims.31 The Seventh and Tenth
Circuits have held that for-profit corporations and their
owners have legitimate RFRA claims.32 The D.C. Circuit
Court rejected the corporate claim, but recognized the
individual claim.33 Finally, the Third and Sixth Circuits
rejected both corporate and individual claims.34
1. Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius, Hobby
Lobby, a for-profit corporation, and its individual owners
filed for injunctive relief claiming that the contraception
mandate for employers violated their religious freedoms by
compelling them to fund insurance coverage for “drugs or
devices they consider to induce abortions.”35 In defense of
29

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326.
31
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665;
Gilardi, 733 F.3d 1208; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th
Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 678 (U.S. 2013).
32
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665.
33
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1216.
34
Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d 618; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.,
724 F.3d 377.
35
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1141. What is problematic
about this quote is that it is from the synopsis and this exact quote is
not found within the case. The RE or stack checker should have found
30
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the PPACA, the Attorney General argued that for-profit
corporations are not considered “persons” under the RFRA
because, among other things, Congress did not specifically
include for-profit corporations as an entity offered rights
and protections under the RFRA.36 Because Congress did
not specifically define the term “person,” the United States
contended that the Tenth Circuit should adopted the
definition of ‘persons’ as defined under other laws that
excluded corporations.37
The Tenth Circuit agreed that because Congress
provided no definition for “person” within the RFRA, it left
such definition to the discretion of the court.38 However,
the Tenth Circuit turned to the Dictionary Act, in which a
corporation is included in the definition of a “person.”39
Rejecting the government’s argument, the Tenth Circuit
held that although other statutes do not include a
corporation within the definition of a “person,” the court is
not afforded the power to figuratively cut-and-paste
definitions from statute to statute.40 Accordingly, where
where this was discussed in the case and made the appropriate citation,
and then changed the language to paraphrase the same point.
36
Id. at 1128.
37
Id. at 1130 (citing The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
(1964); The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., (2009); the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.A. §
203 (2006)). (The United States argues that for-profit corporations are
not recognized as persons? under these Acts and thus should not be
given that status under the RFRA).
38
Id. at 1129.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1130. (Rather than implying that similar narrowing
constructions should be imported into statutes that do not contain such
language, they imply Congress is quite capable of narrowing the scope
of a statutory entitlement or affording a type of statutory exemption
when it wants to. The corollary to this rule, of course, is that when the
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Congress did not define “person,” the court must default to
the Dictionary Act.41
In Korte v. Sebelius, the Seventh Circuit addressed
the same issue.42 Like the Tenth Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit held that corporations and individual owners might
be successful on the merits of their cases.43 However, the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis differed slightly from that of the
Tenth Circuit. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that
“nothing in the Court’s general jurisprudence of corporate
constitutional rights suggests a non-profit limitation on
organizational free-exercise rights.”44
2. D.C. Circuit Court
In Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services, the D.C. Circuit recognized that individual
corporate owners might have RFRC standing. However,
the D.C. Circuit split from the Tenth and Seventh Circuits
in its holding that a corporation itself does not have
standing to bring a claim under a RFRA.45 The court
looked to the “nature and history” surrounding the passage
of the RFRA.46 The court held that the cases that
exemptions are not present, it is not that they are “carried forward” but
rather that they do not apply).
41
Id. at 1129 (In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed the RFRA
rights of corporate claimants, notwithstanding the claimants' decision to
use the corporate form. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc),
aff'd, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006)
(affirming a RFRA claim brought by “a New Mexico corporation on its
own behalf”).
42
Korte, 735 F.3d at 664.
43
Id. at 665.
44
Id. at 681.
45
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215.
46
Id. at 1214.
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influenced the RFRA’s formation concerned individual
rights, not corporate rights, and therefore they concluded
that the RFRA does not apply to for-profit corporations.47
Furthermore, the court held that “there is no basis for
concluding that a secular organization can exercise
religion.”48 Therefore, in effect, the D.C. Circuit held that
it is simply not possible to infringe upon a secular
corporation’s freedom to exercise religion, as the
corporation is not considered a “person” under the RFRA.
The court notes that they are satisfied that the shareholders
have been “‘injured in a way that is separate and distinct
from an injury to a corporation.’”49
3. Sixth and Third Circuit Courts
In Autocam Corporation v. Sebelius, Autocam
Corporation and Autocam Medical, high-volume
manufacturing corporations owned by a single Catholic
family, brought RFRA claims seeking injunctive relief
from the contraception mandate. The Sixth Circuit held
that Autocam was barred from bringing an RFRA claim
because it was not considered a “person” under the RFRA
and that the shareholders were barred because of the
shareholder-standing rule.50 The court held that the
plaintiff’s reliance on Citizens United was “unavailing”
because the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech
Clause have historically been interpreted in different
ways.51 The Court held that while Citizen United identified
a number of cases where it recognized that corporations
enjoyed rights under the First Amendment, because these
cases only concerned freedom of speech, the Court could
47

Id.
Id. at 1215.
49
Id.
50
Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 623, 626.
51
Id. at 628.
48
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not concede that the Religious Exercise clause entailed the
same constitutional treatment.52
Likewise, in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
the Third Circuit held that for-profit secular corporations
could not assert claims under the RFRA because they were
incapable of engaging in religious exercise.53 It held that
there is no authority applying the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to secular for-profit organizations in
the same way as the Free Speech Clause.54 The court held
that the proximity of the two clauses does not imply that all
First Amendment rights are afforded to for-profit secular
corporations.55
V. The Future for For-Profit Corporations
While the RFRA protects religious organizations
and individuals’ religious freedoms from substantially
burdensome government laws, the courts are addressing for
the first time whether for-profit corporations are considered
“persons” who have the ability and right to exercise
religious freedoms.56 Citizen United provides a compelling
argument, implying that because corporations have a
distinct voice and enjoy Freedom of Speech rights under
the First Amendment, those business entities are also
entitled to Religious Exercise rights as well.57

52

Id.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381.
54
Id. at 385-86. The stack checker noted that this passage concerned
the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause and not really the direct
application of the FEC to for-profit corporations. I wasn’t sure exactly
how to fix this.
55
Id. at 387.
56
Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for
Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 61 (2013).
57
Id. at 98.
53
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The primary conflict between the circuit courts
presents a more complex issue than the right to invoke the
religious protection of the First Amendment. Rather, this
issue arguably requires the reevaluation of a corporation’s
identity and ability to invoke any First Amendment
protections.58
In March of 2014, the Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to address this seemingly philosophical issue
concerning the identity of the for-profit corporation.59
However, the answer lies behind statutory analysis of the
RFRA and previous Supreme Court decisions concerning
corporate rights.60 While analyzing the Circuit courts’
holdings may provide insight into how the Supreme Court
will rule concerning for-profit corporations’ identities and
First Amendment protections, the future of for-profit,
privately owned corporations is unclear.
The idea of “corporate personhood” is not a modern
idea, but a historical practice that has evolved with our
country’s democracy.61 In today’s modern economy, a
business entity can, undoubtedly, have an identity that
includes specific goals, motives, and morals.62
Additionally, courts have recognized a business entity’s
ability to act in accordance with certain established

58

See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.
Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Birth-Control Mandate
(UPDATED), (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/court-to-rule-on-birth-controlmandate/.
60
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129; Korte, 735 F.3d at 681.
61
John B. Stanton, Keeping the Faith: How Courts Should Determine
"Sincerely-Held Religious Belief" in Free Exercise of Religion Claims
by for-Profit Companies, 59 LOY. L. REV. 723, 748 (2013).
62
Id. at 756 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
(1983); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006)).
59

174

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 502
principles. 63 What, then, creates the distinction between
nonprofit and for-profit entities so as to deny for-profit
corporations the ability to adhere to the same goals,
motives, and morals?
As the Tenth Circuit held, there is both objective
value in protecting a corporation’s right to act in
accordance with the religious affiliations upon which it was
built, as well as legal authority to support such protection.64
The Tenth Circuit held in Hobby Lobby that Hobby Lobby
considered itself a “faith-based” corporation.65 The court
noted that nonprofits have historically been afforded the
right to act in accordance with a “faith-based” identity in
the market place.66 In comparison, for-profit corporations
have a voice that is protected by the First Amendment;
furthermore, they are required to adhere to specific moral
and social standards that are in place to benefit and protect
the general public.67 Thus, disallowing a corporation’s
clear faith-based identity would contradict those moral
expectations that we as a society impose on corporations,
and the US Supreme Court has allowed to flourish.
Accordingly, and in the case of the PPACA, a for-profit
corporation should be afforded the right to act in
accordance with a faith-based identity, just as it has been
offered in those other instances discussed above.68
VI. Conclusion

63

THE BECKET FUND, Statutes of Non Profit Cases, (2013),
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#tab1.
64
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129.
65
Id. at 1131.
66
Id.
67
Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 44
(2013).
68
Id.
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The United States prides itself on its diversity of
views, cultures, and religions. However, respecting and
protecting the right to speak and act in accordance with
those beliefs has been of the utmost importance throughout
the nation’s history.69 The federal government is now
attempting to alter the definition of for-profit corporations
in our country by disallowing them to act upon any other
motivation than monetary ends. Allowing a for-profit
corporation to be forthcoming with its foundational
principles not only reveals its greater purpose, but also puts
the general public on notice of that purpose while allowing
the correct implementation of the contraception mandate.
Rather than restricting the ability of a for-profit corporation
to act as moral entity, the Supreme Court should consider
the sincerity of the corporation’s foundational principles.
By analyzing the sincerity of a for-profit corporation’s
motivation to adhere to specific principles, the government
is both recognizing the identity and protecting the rights of
the for-profit corporation.
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William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2002).
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